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ABSTRACT 
In the light of the rapid demographic changes of becoming the ageing society and the 
gradual increase in government expenditure on the social security system, this thesis 
conducts an in-depth evaluation in a wide range of aspects of the social insurance 
programme that covers five self-contained studies, each of which is mainly relevant 
to the old-age pension system, known as the notional (non-financial) defined 
contribution (NDC) scheme. The scheme is currently approaching the adult phase, 
and it is time to investigate lessons learned and to explore important issues that need 
to be addressed to enhance the existing scheme. 
Given the financial information provided on balance sheets and income statements, 
the first study assesses the financial stability after the introduction of the Swedish 
NDC system and the negative effects of financial and economic crises in the recent 
years on pension benefits and notional accounts. Sweden also becomes the leader in 
providing extensive information to the NDC plan’s members and the pensioners 
through the so-called orange envelope. As a result, the second study aims to examine 
the experience of public communication and information on the Swedish pension 
system. 
The other part of the thesis focuses on the annuity divisors used to convert an 
accumulated notional capital into a life annuity. The use of unisex annuity divisors 
introduces an intra-generational redistribution of income from the short-lived toward 
long-lived individuals. It implies that persons with low mortality risk get back more 
money over their lifetime than they have contributed in the pension scheme. The 
third study intends to quantify the distributional effects of a generic NDC system 
using the demographic divisor and the economic divisor by the means of the money’s 
worth ratio. Moreover, a complex actuarial model is developed in the computation of 
the annuity divisor for the case of the life annuity covering both old-age and 
survivors’ benefits. 
In addition, the thesis works on the multiple state model for disabled workers in 
order to explore the evolution of disability risk among the states of active, disabled, 
and dead. A generic method for the estimation of the one-year probabilities of 
transition; dying and surviving in a particular state, is proposed by using the cross-
sectional data and making assumptions corresponding to the relative ratio between 
the probabilities of death for disabled and active persons. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Social security programme – providing individuals with a degree of income security 
when faced with the contingencies of old age, survivorship, incapacity, disability, 
unemployment or sickness – continues to play a significant role in many countries. 
Over the last century, age distribution of population has dramatically shifted towards 
an ageing society as a consequence of unprecedented demographic changes with the 
increase in life expectancies and the decrease in fertility rates. One implication of the 
rapid population ageing and longevity growth is that more resources must be devoted 
to support the elderly and governments must frequently raise social security 
expenditure in particular on old-age pension benefits. Additionally, the ongoing 
process of population ageing and the increasing social security burden have recently 
required several adjustments of the social protection benefits and put enormous 
pressure on the sustainability of the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security 
system (Attanasio et al., 2007; Bloom and McKinnon, 2010; Ediev, 2014; Bouchet et 
al., 2017; Vogel et al., 2017). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries have confronted a high level of public social expenditure accounting for 21% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) on average where the pension is a major section of 
social security expenses (OECD, 2017a). Public expenditure on pensions is forecast to 
grow from around 9% of GDP in 2010-15 to 11.3% in 2060 (OECD, 2015). Besides, 
the financial and economic crises pose fundamental and far-reaching challenges to 
pension systems. The pension systems commonly respond to such challenges that have 
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resulted in long-term fiscal problems by means of parametric pension reforms aimed 
at maintaining the basic structure of the existing system. These parametric reforms 
include, for instance, changes in contribution rate, increases in pension eligibility age, 
changes in the number of years used in benefits calculation or decreases in indexation 
of pensions in payment so that the resources accumulated during working life are 
sufficient to ensure the payments promised to pensioners (Whiteford and Whitehouse, 
2006; Martin and Whitehouse, 2008; Whitehouse, 2009; OECD, 2015). 
Traditional defined benefit (DB) schemes with a PAYG financing – workers’ current 
contributions pay for pensioners’ current benefits – have also been criticised for 
creating strong incentives for early retirement and, thus, significant distortions in the 
labour market (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998; Gruber and Wise, 1998; Kapteyn 
and de Vos, 1998). As a consequence, the structural pension reform – partially or 
entirely – shifting from a DB PAYG to a funded pension scheme or a new innovative 
public pension programme known as ‘notional (non-financial) defined contribution’ 
(NDC) has been triggered in order to tackle the fall in labour force participation rates 
and the fiscal crisis. 
Specifically, the basic idea of the NDC scheme is to reproduce the logic of a defined 
contribution pension plan within a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) framework. The notional 
account is a virtual one that records individual contributions, together with the 
fictitious return that they generate throughout each contributor’s working life. As 
opposed to the financial account scheme, the contributions, however, are not invested 
in financial assets. The returns on contributions are set by law reflecting the financial 
health of the pension system that typically coincides with some long-term average 
growth rates of the GDP, of the wage bill or of the income from total social security 
contributions. The account balance is notional because it does exist only for record 
keeping (i.e. the system does not invest funds as the scheme is based on PAYG 
financing). Once a worker reaches retirement age, the virtual accumulated notional 
capital divided by the so-called ‘annuity divisor’ is transformed into a lifelong annuity. 
The divisor is determined by the remaining life expectancy at retirement for a given 
cohort, potential future pension indexations and the technical interest rate used to 
discount the cash flows. 
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In the 1990s, the first group of countries, Italy (1995), Latvia (1996), Poland (1999) 
and Sweden (1999) has legislated the NDC scheme as the first pillar of their pension 
system. Other countries, such as the Kyrgyz Republic (1996)1, the Russia Republic 
(2002)2, Greece (2012)3 and the Arab Republic of Egypt (2013)4 have adopted some 
elements of the NDC, but informative and analytical outcomes have been scarcely 
found due to incomplete implementation of the system. Several countries have 
expressed interest in the NDC approach including Argentina, Uruguay, Portugal, 
Spain, Iran, and China (Holzmann, 2017). 
The designs of the NDC schemes among countries exhibit both similarities and 
differences that can affect future levels of benefits as well as the overall performance 
of the scheme. The key components of the NDC pension schemes implemented in the 
four countries – Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden – are summarised in Table 1.1. It 
compares the main drivers of pension reform, the contribution rate, the notional rate 
of return applied to capitalise the contribution, the inheritance gains from the account 
holders who passed away during the accumulation phase, the indexation rate to adjust 
the amount of pension during the pay-out phase, the annuity divisor used to compute 
the initial pension as well as the retirement age5.
                                                          
1
 The Kyrgyz Republic’s scheme, Palmer (2006a), is for new entrants and is incompletely designed, 
especially regarding the rate of return used. With the long transition period, the first group of persons 
will retire in 2039, given entry at age 21 in 1997 and retirement at age 63. Until around 2060, the entire 
population will be covered by NDC. 
2
 Unlike in a typical NDC scheme, the pension benefits under the Russian system are inadequate design 
because of the low notional rate of return (below the average growth rate of wages) and are not adjusted 
in line with the changing (usually increasing) life expectancy at the time of retirement that means that 
newly granted annuities do not follow the development of life expectancy (Hauner, 2008). 
3
 In March 2012, a reform of the secondary (auxiliary) pension as one type of the first pillar DB PAYG 
scheme was enacted in which many of the larger auxiliary pension funds of employees are merged into 
one and turned into a Balanced Notional Defined Contribution system, precluding any kind of fund 
transfer from the national budget (Symeonidis, 2016). 
4
 The reformed system, combining non-financial (notional) defined contribution (NDC) and financial 
defined contribution (FDC) schemes, is mandatory for new entrants to the labour market and voluntary 
for current workers, starting from July 2013 (Maait and Demarco, 2012). However, implementation 
keeps being interrupted by the Arab Spring (Holzmann, 2017). 
5
 Additional information on the NDC features in the different countries can be found in Daniele and 
Nicola (2006) and Gronchi and Nistico (2006) for Italy, Vanovska (2004) and Palmer et al. (2006) for 
Latvia, Chłoń-Domińczak and Góra (2006) and Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012) for Poland and Palmer 
(2000), Könberg et al. (2006) and Swedish Pensions Agency (2017) for Sweden. 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Main characteristics of four NDC countries 
 Italy Latvia Poland Sweden 
Drivers to reform • Population ageing 
• Labour productivity  
• Population ageing 
• Adaptation of Soviet pension 
schemes to the market 
economy 
• Degree of formality  
• Population ageing 
• Adaptation of Soviet pension 
schemes to the market 
economy 
• Degree of formality  
• Population ageing 
• Labour productivity  
Contribution rate 33% (employees) 
20% (self-employed) 
24% (atypical contracts) 
14% 19.52% 16% 
Notional rate of 
return 
Five-year average of nominal 
GDP growth  
Covered wage bill growth Covered wage bill growth Per capita wage growth + 
Automatic balancing mechanism 
(if triggered) 
Inheritance gains Increase in general reserve Increase in general reserve Increase in general reserve Distributed on a birth cohort 
basis to the accounts of 
survivors in the cohort based on 
their relative share in the sum of 
all accounts in the cohort 
Indexation of 
pensions 
Price indexation Price indexation plus 25% of 
wage sum growth 
Price indexation Price indexation ± difference 
between real per capita wage 
growth and 1.6% rate of return + 
balancing when solvency ratio 
falls below unity 
Annuity divisor Life expectancy adjusted with an 
imputed rate of return, at 1.5% 
Life expectancy (unisex) at 
retirement age 
Life expectancy (unisex) at 
retirement age 
Life expectancy adjusted with an 
imputed rate of return, at 1.6% 
Retirement age 
(men/women) 
66.8/65.8 increaded in line with 
life expectancy at 65 
62.75/62.75 65/60 65/65 (minimum age of 61 for 
retirement) 
Source: Own illustration based on Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012) and OECD (2017b)
4
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The emergence of an NDC scheme primarily aims to encourage incentives to work, to 
delay retirement and, more especially, to stay in the formal labour market since 
benefits would depend on work record. A generic NDC system, in principle, is also 
intended to achieve financial stability in part through the dependence of pension 
annuities on life expectancy improvements together with the adjustable return on 
contributions reflecting the economic (or productivity) growth of the system. The 
scheme is designed to maintain long-run equivalence between assets and liabilities 
with a fixed contribution rate for all generations. In this sense, it makes the results of 
political intervention more transparent than the conventional DB PAYG does 
(Holzmann and Palmer, 2006a; Boeri and Galasso, 2013). 
Notional (Non-financial) Defined Contribution (NDC) schemes are currently 
approaching the adult phase, and it is time to examine lessons learned and to take stock 
of important issues that need to be addressed to ensure a successful adulthood. The 
thesis, thus, covers self-contained studies mainly conducting an in-depth evaluation in 
a wide range of aspects of the NDC pension scheme, especially focusing on Sweden 
as a pioneer handful country where the ideas of the NDC public pension model have 
been introduced. 
As part of the Swedish NDC reform, an actuarial balance sheet has been compiled 
since 2001 to measure the solvency of the system while it has been absent in the other 
NDC countries. The balance sheet is an instrument that provides a true and fair view 
of the pension system’s assets and liabilities, addresses an extraordinary level of 
transparency in the management of the public finances, immunes the system against 
political risk and gains credibility among contributors and pensioners in the sense of 
harmonising their expectation with the economic realities of the pension plan (Boado-
Penas et al., 2008; Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá, 2013). In addition to this, Sweden 
has legislated an automatic balance mechanism (ABM) for financial imbalances in its 
pension system. This mechanism is based on the solvency indicator that emerges from 
the actuarial balance sheet, known as the solvency ratio (or balance ratio) – the ratio 
of assets to liabilities. When assets are shown to be less than liabilities, this deficit is 
eliminated by reducing the indexation of benefits and the notional pension accounts 
(Settergren, 2001; Vidal-Meliá et al., 2009). 
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Given the financial information provided on the balance sheets and income statements, 
the first study presented in Chapter 2 aims to assess the financial stability over last 
decade between 2007–2015 as well as to investigate the negative effects of the 
financial and economic crises of 2008–2009 on the pension benefits and notional 
accounts. The policy responses to such crises are also discussed. 
Furthermore, one useful way of reaching the better designed and managed public 
pensions is to provide a well-planned public communication and an improved 
information about the pension plans. Participants also need information on pensions, 
e.g. the contributions made, the probable amount of their future pensions, the 
replacement rate, the retirement options, and the accrued and consolidated rights in 
order to make decisions at which age to retire and how much to save. Sweden becomes 
a leader in providing extensive information to individuals via an annual financial 
statement, or the so-called ‘orange envelope’, that contains information regarding 
contributions paid, an account statement, a fund report for the funded part and a 
forecast of the future pension. As a result, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to examine the 
issues of information that emerge when attempting to communicate with contributors 
and beneficiaries to explain pension schemes and pension reforms. The experience in 
Sweden after the introduction of an NDC plan and funded individual accounts is, thus, 
highlighted in the chapter. 
The other part of the thesis, composed by Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, studies the annuity 
divisor used to convert an accumulated notional capital into a life annuity. In relation 
to annuitisation rules, all NDC countries require the use of unisex life tables that 
assume a common (average) survival probability for men and women. Due to the 
existence of mortality differential across gender and another socioeconomic status, the 
use of unisex annuity divisor introduces an intra-generational redistribution of income 
from short-lived towards long-lived individuals. This treatment implies that persons 
with low mortality get back more money over their lifetime than they have paid for.  
Chapter 4 intends to quantify the distributional effects of a generic NDC system using 
two types of divisors – the demographic divisor related to the remaining life 
expectancy and the economic divisor found in the Swedish NDC system for a valuation 
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of pension liability associated with the size of pension payments and the pay-out period 
– to compute the amount of pension. The construction of the subgroup-specific cohort 
life tables across socioeconomic status that is assessed through educational attainment 
and used for the calculation of the annuity divisors and the money’s worth of the 
system is also demonstrated. 
Although all NDC countries share the same thing of using the unisex annuity divisor, 
Italy is the only country taking into account the survivors’ pensions apart from the old-
age pensions in the computation of the annuity divisor. The Italian NDC system 
provides an additional stream of payments to the surviving spouse and children after 
the death of the pensioner, but the formula of the annuity divisor created by law relies 
on the probabilities of surviving of the pensioner and his/her spouse. To fill this gap, 
the objectives of Chapter 5 are to develop a complex actuarial model for valuing the 
pension plan that covers the old-age and all possible survivors’ benefits – surviving 
spouse, surviving children, and all surviving family members – and to explore the 
differences of the annuity divisors obtained by the Italian rules and the proposed 
model. 
In addition to old-age pensions, the thesis also focuses on the incapacity benefits for 
disabled workers in Chapter 6. A thorough understanding of the transition of an 
individual into and out of a disabled state and the accurate estimation of the probability 
of becoming and remaining disabled are the essential information for the government 
to design a provision of disability benefits, to determine the demand for such benefits, 
and to project public expenditure on incapacity benefits. 
A multiple state model is typically used to describe the transition of the disability risk 
among the states of active, disabled, and dead. Ideally, the estimations of transition 
probabilities and transition intensities rely on longitudinal data; however, the data 
required are often missing. This chapter intends to propose a generic method of 
estimating the one-year transition probabilities when the recovery from disability is 
allowed by using the cross-sectional data in order to overcome the limitation of the 
data. Under some plausible assumptions concerning the probabilities of death among 
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disabled and non-disabled persons, the estimated prevalence rates of disability are used 
to decompose the survival probabilities in each state. 
Finally, the main findings of the thesis are concluded in Chapter 7. 
9 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Last Lessons Learned from the Swedish 
Public Pension System1 
Among the countries with NDCs, Sweden is the only one where an automatic 
balancing mechanism goes hand in hand with the prior calculation of a financial 
solvency indicator that emerges from an actuarial balance sheet. This chapter describes 
the Swedish pension experience over the 2007–2015 period through its accounting 
method, together with the problems faced by the system and the policy responses. 
During the financial crisis 2008, the imbalance of the Swedish NDC system has been 
chiefly caused by the change in indexation of the pension liability. Also, the system 
has done some policy responses with the aim to eliminate or at least reduce the 
volatility caused by the indexation itself. In particular, the use of smoothing balance 
ratio has been introduced from 2015, called as a damped balance ratio. In balancing 
the indexation should yearly be reduced by only one-third of the adjustment to achieve 
100 percent solvency. 
Keywords: accounting, balancing mechanism, public pensions, retirement, solvency, 
Sweden. 
 
                                                          
1 A version of the paper (joint work with María del Carmen Boado-Penas and Ole Settergren) will be 
published as a chapter of the book ‘Public Pension systems: The greatest economic challenge of the 21st 
century’ edited by Springer. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Social security systems across the world are undergoing significant reforms to adapt 
their schemes to economic and demographic uncertainties.  
In Europe, the common trend in the responses to the pension crisis is a wave of 
parametric adjustments that usually include changes in the contribution ceilings, 
increases in the retirement age or changes in the indexation of pensions2. Among the 
major changes carried out in pension reforms are the so-called notional defined 
contribution pension schemes (NDCs). 
The notional model has some positive features, such as facing the ageing population 
more or less automatically or improving the relationship between contributions and 
pensions paid. However, these schemes do not guarantee sustainability due to the 
PAYG nature3. Valdés-Prieto (2000) shows that NDCs cannot generally provide 
financial equilibrium over the short term unless they are in the realistic steady state 
and have a notional rate equal to the covered salary bill. Hence, NDCs also require 
other financial modification mechanisms, such as government guarantees and repeated 
recourse to legislation – to be imposed in the same way as traditional defined benefit 
(DB) systems – or special measures, such as automatic balancing mechanisms 
(ABMs). 
Sweden has gone beyond the NDC system that it implemented in 2001, in the sense 
that an income statement and a balance sheet4 are annually published with the aim of 
analysing the system’s solvency. Even so, an automatic balancing system that reduces 
the growth of the liabilities is triggered if the plan is not fully solvent. Sweden is 
claimed to be the only NDC country whose pension is financially sustainable over the 
long term in the sense that it is not necessary to make changes to the contribution rate5. 
                                                          
2 See Whitehouse (2009); Whitehouse et al. (2009) and OECD (2012). 
3 See Valdés-Prieto (2000) and Palmer (2013). 
4 Also called an actuarial balance sheet. 
5 According to Diamond (2004), a well-structured NDC system, with a decent-sized buffer stock of 
assets, will have little probability of needing legislative intervention as long as the economic growth is 
large enough. 
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This chapter first presents and discusses the Swedish accounting method (income 
statements and balance sheets over the 2007–2015 period), with special attention to 
changes in total assets and liabilities. Second, it describes and explains Sweden’s 
policy responses to the negative effects of the financial and economic crises on pension 
benefits and notional accounts, in combination with the effect of the new rules of 
automatic balancing. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the Swedish public pension 
system. Section 2.3 summarises the published balance sheets and income statements 
and analyses how they have evolved over the 2007–2015 period. Section 2.4 concludes 
with a discussion on the new responses to the economic crisis, which have been 
undertaken by the Swedish pension system since 2007. 
2.2 Swedish public pension system6 
The Swedish public pension system consists of two different earnings-related benefit 
schemes: an NDC pension (called the inkomstpension), on which this chapter focuses, 
and a fully funded financial defined contribution pension (the premium pension). A 
tax-financed guaranteed pension, annually adjusted according to the consumer price 
index, provides supplementary support for retirees with low NDC pensions. 
Under the NDC scheme, both accounts and benefits are indexed by the change in the 
average income. When the initial pension is calculated – that is, when the notional 
account value is converted into an annuity – the pension is increased or front-loaded 
on the basis of an assumed annual real growth rate of 1.6 percent for the income index. 
This rate of advanced interest is then deducted every year from the increase in the 
income index. Thus, the NDC pension is indexed annually by the change in the income 
index reduced by 1.6 percent. In certain situations, exceptions to the regular income 
indexation of accounts and benefits apply. These exceptions are governed by the ratio 
                                                          
6 For a more detailed description of the Swedish pension system, see the Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency (2007–2015) and Barr (2013). The latter paper also evaluates the pension system in Sweden 
against the goals established at the time of the reforms in the late 1990s. 
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of assets to liabilities (balance ratio7) as provided in the legislation on the balancing 
mechanism. The balance ratio is an indicator that emerges from the actuarial balance 
sheet of the NDC scheme (presented in Section 2.3), expressed as: 
 ( . .     )
 
 
Assets e g fund assets contribution asset
Balance ratio
Pension liabilities
 
The balance ratio used in Sweden has a dual purpose – to measure whether the system 
can fulfil its obligations to its contributors and to decide whether an ABM should be 
applied. 
Balancing mechanism 
Following Settergren’s (2001) work, if for some reason, the balance ratio is less than 
1, the ABM is triggered as shown in Figure 2.1. This process basically consists of 
reducing the growth in pension liability (i.e. the pensions in payment and the pension 
account balances of the economically active population). Thus, the balance index 
(Figure 2.1), rather than the change in the average income (expressed by an income or 
a salary index), is used to revalue the pensions in payment and the notional account of 
each contributor. 
This ABM can be considered asymmetric as it is only triggered when the solvency 
ratio is lower than 1. However, the Swedish ABM allows for recovery. After a period 
of low returns as a consequence of the mechanism, a period of higher-than-normal 
returns follows (Figure 2.1)8. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 To indicate that the solvency ratio of a PAYG scheme is different from that of the premium pension, 
the inkomstpension system calls this ratio the balance ratio. 
8 For more detailed explanations, see Barr and Diamond (2011). 
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the balancing mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Swedish Pensions Agency (2017) 
2.3 Development of solvency: Balance sheets for 2007–2015 
Sweden developed the new accounting rules with an almost identical discipline of the 
double-entry bookkeeping. The country also produces an actuarial balance sheet and 
an income statement every year. Its annual report has presented an overall picture of 
the financial health of the Swedish NDC pension system since 2001. 
The balance sheet for the Swedish NDC pension system is a financial statement listing 
the pension system’s obligation to contributors and pensioners on a particular date 
(also referred to as liabilities), together with the amounts of the various assets 
(financial assets and contribution amounts) that back up these commitments. The 
actuarial balance sheet mainly aims to provide a true and fair view of the pension 
system’s assets and liabilities in the beginning and at the end of each fiscal year; by 
comparing these figures, it intends to determine the change in the net worth. The 
balance sheet also contributes to the management and disclosure of financial 
information because it is useful not only for the authority governing the system but 
also for contributors and pensioners in general and for the body that guarantees 
income index 
balance index 
balance ratio < 1 
balancing activated 
 
Index 
value 
balance index = income index 
balancing terminated 
 
balance ratio > 1 
higher rate of indexation 
balance ratio < 1 
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payment (i.e. the state and the contributors it represents) (Boado-Penas et al., 2008; 
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá, 2013). 
The system’s assets comprise the value of future pension contributions, referred to as 
the contribution asset and the buffer fund. The first entry on the asset side is called the 
contribution asset, which is the turnover duration (TD) multiplied by the value of the 
contributions made in a specific period. The TD is the expected average length of time 
between the payment of a monetary unit of contribution into the system and the 
disbursement of the corresponding credit in the form of a pension. It thus reflects the 
difference between the weighted average age of pensioners and the weighted average 
age of contributors, assuming that economic, demographic and legal conditions are 
constant. The TD9 is also the sum of the pay-in duration and the pay-out duration. 
Additionally, the contribution asset is equivalent to the present value of the perpetual 
future flow of contributions discounted with the inverse of the TD, called the implicit 
discount rate. If the TD increases (decreases), the implicit discount rate decreases 
(increases), and the value of the contribution flow increases (decreases). The implicit 
discount rate varied between 3.13 and 3.29 (see Table 2.1). The implicit rate can also 
be regarded as the system’s discount rate for contributions because it is defined by the 
contribution flows’ capacity to amortise the pension debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 After 2015, the disclosure about the TD has been calculated in terms of the difference between the 
weighted average ages of pensioners and contributors. See the Annual Report of the Swedish Pension 
System (2015), Appendix B, Formula B.3.1. 
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Table 2.1: Balance sheet of the Swedish NDC pension system on December 31, 2007–2015 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Assets (% of GDP)        
Fund assets 27.2 20.9 25.1 25.4 23.9 26.0 28.1 30.1 29.4 
Contribution asset 185.5 191.2 193.5 186.8 186.7 187.7 188.9 187.5 178.4 
Total assets 212.7 212.1 218.6 212.2 210.6 213.7 217.0 217.6 207.8 
Liabilities and results brought forward (% of GDP) 
   
Opening results brought forward 3.0 0.5 -7.4 -9.2 2.8 4.3 -2.1 3.2 10.1 
Net income or loss for the year -2.5 -7.7 -2.4 12.1 1.5 -6.4 5.5 7.5 -6.0 
Closing results brought forward 0.5 -7.2 -9.8 2.9 4.3 -2.2 3.4 10.7 4.1 
Pension liability 212.2 219.3 228.4 209.3 206.3 215.8 213.6 206.8 203.7 
Total liabilities and results brought 
forward 
212.7 212.1 218.6 212.2 210.6 213.7 217.0 217.6 207.8 
Financial Indicators        
Balancing year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Balance ratio, original definitiona 1.0026 0.9672 0.9570 1.0138 1.0208 0.9901 1.0158 1.0521 1.0201 
Balance ratio, modified legislationb n.a. 0.9826 0.9549 1.0024 1.0198 0.9837 1.0040 1.0375 1.0067c 
Pay-in duration (years) 21.07 20.88 20.83 20.62 20.55 20.56 20.41 n.a n.a 
Pay-out duration (years) 10.69 10.79 10.83 10.88 10.89 10.92 10.99 n.a n.a 
Turnover duration (years) 31.76 31.67 31.66 31.51 31.44 31.48 31.40 30.37 n.a 
Smoothed turnover duration (years) 31.93 31.76 31.76 31.67 31.66 31.51 31.48 31.44 30.38 
Implicit discount rate (1/TD) (%) 3.13 3.15 3.15 3.16 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.18 3.29 
Income (or Balance) index (%) 4.5 6.2 -1.4 -2.7 5.2 5.8 -1.1 2.5 5.9 
GDP (SKr billions) 3,297 3,388 3,289 3,520 3,657 3,685 3,770 3,937 4,181 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; n.a. = not applicable 
a The balance ratio calculated according to the previous definition (2007). It is calculated solely on the 
basis of the buffer fund’s market value as of December 31 of the corresponding year, formerly called 
the financial position. 
b The balance ratio calculated according to the new definition (December 31, 2008 onwards). It is 
calculated on the basis of a three-year average of the buffer fund’s market value. 
c The damped balance ratio has been used instead of the balance ratio from December 31, 2015 onwards. 
It is equal to 1 plus one-third of the difference between the balance ratio fixed for that year and the 
number 1. 
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The buffer fund10, also called the fund asset, aims to stabilise pension disbursements 
and/or pension contributions in relation to economic and demographic changes. The 
buffer fund of the Swedish NDC system consists of five separate national pension 
funds (also known as Allmänna pensionsfonder [AP] Funds): the First, Second, Third, 
Fourth and Sixth AP Funds. Pension contributions are deposited equally to the First to 
the Fourth AP Funds, which also equally finance the pension disbursements. In 
contrast, the Sixth11 AP Fund is an evergreen one, which means that there are no 
contributions paid to and pension disbursements from the fund. The buffer fund’s size 
is large, amounting to 20.9–30.1 percent of the GDP (see Table 2.1) and 9.5–14.5 
percent as a share of the pension liability in 2007–2015. 
In the balance sheet, the pension liability includes a liability to contributors and a 
liability to pensioners. The liability to contributors is the notional accumulated capital 
in the contributors’ accounts. The liability to pensioners is the present value of the 
expected total of all pensions paid to current pensioners during their lifetimes, taking 
into account the current life expectancy and the real technical interest rate applied (1.6 
percent) when the amount of the initial pension was calculated. The pension liability 
varies from 203.7 to 228.4 percent of the GDP (see Table 2.1). 
Since the system was implemented in 2001, the contribution asset has always been less 
than the pension liability over time. For example, in 2015, the contribution asset 
accounted for SEK 7,457 billion, in contrast to SEK 8,517 billion in pension liability 
(see Table A.1 in Appendix A.1). The system would have been partially insolvent. 
However, by including the buffer fund that absorbs the differences between the inflow 
                                                          
10 Sweden is the only one among NDC countries where has created the buffer fund. Several countries 
with the PAYG state pension system (e.g. Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain, etc.) have 
established the public reserve funds (Yermo, 2008). 
11 The Sixth National Pension Fund, known as the Sixth AP Fund, operates as a long-term investor in 
unlisted companies. Profits can be reinvested, and any losses must be covered by the fund capital. The 
owner (i.e. the Swedish Parliament) may, by changing the law, decide to allow funds to be paid into or 
withdrawn from the Sixth AP Fund. The Sixth AP Fund invests in the private equity market, while the 
First to the Fourth AP Funds had identical investment rules and were allocated the same amount of 
capital in connection with the reorganisation of the AP Funds in 2001. 
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of contributions and the outflow of pensions, the total assets will likely exceed the 
pension liability. 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of total assets, pension liability and balance ratio of the Swedish NDC 
pension system 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the total assets, the pension liability and the balance 
ratio for the 2007–2015 period. Before 2008, the system’s balance ratio was greater 
than 1, and the total assets and the pension liability had risen continuously, with a 
rather higher growth in liabilities than in total assets. In 2008, the financial position of 
the pension system substantially deteriorated. The balance ratio dropped below 1 for 
the first time, amounting to 0.9672 due to a huge net loss of SEK 261 billion, 
equivalent to 7.7 percent of the GDP (see Table 2.1). According to the original 
legislation, balancing was activated with a 3.28 percent reduction of the indexation of 
notional accounts and pensions in 2009/2010. However, in 2009, the parliament 
modified the new rule on the basis of the three-year average of the buffer fund for 
calculating the balance ratio. As a result, the modified balance ratio increased to 
0.9826, and the balancing effect was reduced to 1.74 percent. 
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In 2009, the system still faced financial deficit, but the loss (2.4 percent of the GDP) 
was not as large as that of the previous year. The total assets were less than 4.3 percent 
of the pension liability, for the balance ratio of 0.9549. The pension liability was 228.4 
percent of the GDP, the highest value during the period. The negative indexation of 
notional accounts and benefits in 2009 and 2010 forced a significant drop in the value 
of the pension liability, and then, assets exceeded liabilities at the end of 2010. This 
surplus was equal to 0.0024 percent, for the balance ratio of 1.0024. 
The pension system had been restored for a couple of years, and at the end of 2012, 
the pension liability exceeded the total assets again, for the balance ratio of 0.9837. 
Balancing was activated, and the indexation of pension balances and pension 
disbursements was decreased in 2013/2014. The pension liability has been revalued at 
a slower rate, and the pension system has been strengthened financially since 2013. 
The pension liability reached a value of 213.6 percent of the GDP in 2013 and 206.8 
percent of the GDP in 2014, while the balance ratio increased to 1.004 in 2013 and 
1.0375 in 2014. With the aim of reducing the volatility caused by the indexation, the 
new form of smoothing the balance ratio (referred to as the damped balance ratio) was 
introduced and amounted to 1.0067, as of December 31, 2015. The damped balance 
ratio restricts balancing to one-third, resulting in less volatility in pension benefits 
when balancing is activated. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the balance ratio and the income/balance 
index. When the balance ratio was less than 1, balancing was activated, and the income 
index was reduced in the next fiscal year. For example, in 2008 and 2009, the balance 
ratio was less than 1, and then, the income index was dropped in 2009 and 2010. After 
balancing was deactivated, the balance ratio was greater than 1, and the income index 
was increased. For instance, the balance ratio was higher than one in 2010 and 2011, 
and the income index rose in 2011 and 2012. 
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Figure 2.3: Balance ratio and income (or balance) index of the Swedish NDC pension system 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
Income statements of the NDC scheme 
A full explanation of the reasons for the changes in the NDC system’s solvency is 
specified and quantified in the income statement. It is divided into three sections: 
change in fund assets, change in contribution asset and change in pension liability, 
each presented as a percentage of the GDP over the 2007–2015 period (Table 2.2). 
• Change in fund assets (buffer fund) 
The total annual pension contributions and disbursements have amounted to 
approximately 6 percent of the GDP since 2007. In the first eight years after the scheme 
was implemented, the net cash flow of the AP Funds (the difference between 
contributions and disbursements, commonly referred to as the buffer fund entry) was 
positive. However, since 2009, the pension disbursements have become greater than 
the pension contributions. One reason for the growth in pension benefits is the huge 
number of cohorts born in the 1940s, who have recently retired (Swedish Pensions 
Agency, 2010). The relatively substantial increase in the income index is another 
reason for the higher value of pension disbursements. For instance, in the beginning of 
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2009, the income index rose by 6.2 percent compared to 4.5 percent in the beginning 
of 2008, and then, the pension benefits grew by 9 percent in 2009, from SEK 199 
billion in 2008 to SEK 217 billion in 2009. 
However, the deficit of the net cash flow between pension contributions and benefits 
was offset by the returns on assets and capital in the buffer fund. From 2009 onwards, 
the positive return on capital has resulted in a relatively good overall change in fund 
assets; for example, the return on funded capital accounted for 3.76 and 1.60 percent 
of the GDP in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The variations in the returns on the buffer 
fund reflect the volatility in the assets’ prices allocated in each AP Fund. The 
investment strategies for the funds are broadly proportioned to 60 percent of equities 
and 40 percent of bonds. 
The administrative costs are deducted annually from the pension funds, only until a 
retiree begins to draw a pension. At the current cost level, the deduction for costs 
reduces the value of the funds by approximately 0.05 percent of the GDP. The 
administrative costs reported in the income statement contain the costs of insurance 
administration and the National Pension Funds’ operating expenses. Asset 
management fees, performance-based fees and transaction costs, such as brokerage 
commissions, are not reported as direct costs by the funds but have a negative effect 
on the section of the return on funded capital. 
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Table 2.2: Income statement of the Swedish NDC pension system, 2007–2015 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Change in fund assets (% of GDP)        
Pension contributions 5.76 5.99 6.17 5.82 5.91 6.02 6.02 5.99 5.88 
Pension disbursements -5.64 -5.87 -6.60 -6.25 -6.02 -6.40 -6.74 -6.48 -6.34 
Return on funded capital 1.15 -5.73 4.14 2.41 -0.46 2.74 3.40 3.76 1.60 
Administrative costs -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Total 1.24 -5.64 3.65 1.93 -0.60 2.31 2.65 3.23 1.10 
Change in contribution assets (% of GDP)    
Value of change in contribution 
revenue 
5.85 11.66 -3.50 6.59 6.97 3.26 5.70 6.76 7.96 
Value of change in turnover duration -0.67 -0.97 -0.03 -0.54 -0.05 -0.90 -0.16 -0.20 -6.12 
Total 5.19 10.66 -3.50 6.05 6.92 2.36 5.52 6.53 1.84 
Change in pension liabilitya (% of GDP)        
New pension credits and ATP points -5.88 -6.44 -6.51 -6.11 -5.66 -6.19 -6.42 -5.84 -5.88 
Pension disbursements 5.64 5.87 6.60 6.25 6.02 6.40 6.74 6.48 6.34 
Indexation or change in value -8.13 -11.36 -1.95 4.69 -4.79 -10.94 -2.55 -2.34 -9.04 
Value of change in life expectancy -0.52 -0.80 -0.70 -0.71 -0.38 -0.35 -0.42 -0.51 -0.36 
Inheritance gains arising 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.29 
Inheritance gains distributed -0.33 -0.35 -0.40 -0.37 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37 -0.36 -0.33 
Deduction for administrative costs 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 
Total -8.89 -12.72 -2.55 4.12 -4.84 -11.10 -2.68 -2.24 -8.97 
Net income or loss for the year  
(% of GDP) 
-2.49 -7.70 -2.40 12.07 1.48 -6.43 5.49 7.52 -6.03 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; ATP = Allmän tilläggspension 
a A negative item (-) increases the pension liability, and a positive item decreases it (by the shown 
amount). 
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• Change in contribution asset 
In the income statement, the change in the contribution asset is divided into the value 
of the change in the contribution revenue and the value of the change in the TD. 
The value of the change in the contribution revenue, representing how much more (or 
less) the liability can be financed by a higher (or lower) level of contributions relative 
to the previous year, is the monetary value as expressed by the growth in the value of 
the contributions per capita multiplied by the growth of the labour force (Settergren, 
2013). Due to a gradual increase in pension contributions since the pension scheme 
was implemented, the value of the change in the contribution revenue has been positive 
and in 2008, reached the maximum value of 11.66 percent of the GDP. In 2009, the 
contribution asset fell to SEK 6,362 billion from SEK 6,477 billion in 2008, resulting 
in a negative value of the change in the contribution revenue (-3.50 percent of the 
GDP). A reduction in contributions was one reason for the loss incurred in the pension 
system and worsened the balance ratio. During the 2010–2015 period, the contribution 
revenue had slightly grown again at 3.26–7.96 percent of the GDP. 
The value of the change in the TD, which is the two-year average of the smoothed 
contribution revenue12 multiplied by the change in the TD, had dropped since 2005 
and amounted to -6.12 percent of the GDP in 2015. The smoothed TD was 31.44 years 
in 2014 and 30.38 in 2015 (see Table 2.1). Therefore, the change in the TD dropped 
by 1.06 years, resulting in a sizable negative value of the change in the TD in 2015. 
Taking into account the inverse relationship between the TD and the implicit discount 
rate, the marginally lower TD represents a slight increase in the implicit discount rate 
for the contribution flow, from 3.13 percent in 2007 to 3.29 percent in 2015 (see Table 
2.1). The decreased TD and the increased implicit discount rate have reduced the 
contribution flow’s capacity to finance the pension liability. 
The pay-in duration, reflecting the difference in the number of years between the 
expected average age of earning a pension credit and the expected average age of 
                                                          
12 As of the financial year 2015, a smoothed contribution revenue is no longer used. 
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retirement, had decreased from 21.07 years to 20.41 years over the 2007–2013 period 
(see Table 2.1). This change represents an increase in the expected average age of 
contributors. However, the reasons for the negative trend have not been fully 
investigated13 (Settergren, 2013).  
On the other hand, the pay-out duration, which is the difference in the number of years 
between the expected average age of retirement and the expected average age of 
pension recipients, had risen from 10.69 years in 2007 to 10.99 years in 2013 (see 
Table 2.1). This means an increase in the expected money-weighted average age of 
retirees because of longevity. The net effect of the change in the expected ages leads 
to a moderate drop in the TD. Figure 2.4 also illustrates the evolution of the TD, which 
is the sum of the pay-in and the pay-out duration. 
The improvement in life expectancy has a direct effect on the increased pension 
liability and also changes the pension liability’s structure – the time profile of 
payments – in a way that does not need to be fully financed in a PAYG pension system. 
The increased TD implies that the same flow of contributions can finance a larger 
pension liability (Settergren, 2013). Besides, the net effect of the increase in life 
expectancy in a PAYG pension system, which is the difference of the increased value 
between the pension liability and the contribution flow, is associated with the higher 
TD. Settergren and Mikula (2005) and Vidal-Meliá and Boado-Penas (2013) describe 
how cash flows, the stock of assets and liabilities of the PAYG pension system are 
affected by a shift in the mortality pattern. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Settergren (2013) points out that the ages of entry to the labour force market have increased slightly, 
and the relative wages of younger employees seem to have decreased. This situation could be explained, 
at least partially, by the increase in immigration to Sweden. The adult immigrants might have pushed 
up the average age of entry to the labour market; thus, there has been a decrease in the TD. 
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of pay-in and pay-out duration of the NDC Swedish pension system 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
• Change in pension liability 
The changes in the size of the pension liability are caused by seven main items: new 
pension credits and Allmän tilläggspension (ATP) points, pension disbursements, 
indexation or change in value, value of change in life expectancy, inheritance gains 
arising, inheritance gains distributed and deduction of administrative costs as 
presented in the income statement (Table 2.2). 
The new pension credits and the ATP points had been in a range of 5.66–6.51 percent 
of the GDP over the 2007–2015 period. The pension credits are accumulated in the 
notional account, whereas the ATP points corresponding to the estimated value of the 
new pension credits earned in the DB system are being phased out14. When the ATP 
points disappear completely, the value of this item will be identical with the pension 
contributions in the section of the change in fund assets. The equality between the 
                                                          
14 Currently, the value of new ATP points (that corresponding to the old pension system) is very small 
and will no longer be earned after 2017. 
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contributions paid and the new pension credits earned is one common characteristic of 
an NDC or a defined contribution scheme (Settergren, 2013). 
As pension benefits are paid out by the AP Funds and also constitute an amortisation 
of the pension liability, the amount of pension disbursements then reduces both the 
values of the fund assets and the pension liability. The value of the pension 
disbursements included in the change in the fund assets (Table A.2 in Appendix A.1) 
has the same value as the change in the pension liability. 
The pension liability changes primarily with the annual indexation of pensions and 
pension account balances. The higher value of the indexation increases the pension 
liability. Indexation is determined by the change in the income index, in combination 
with the balance ratio in the years when balancing is activated, referred to as the 
balance index. In 2008, the indexation produced an increase in the pension liability, 
amounting to 11.36 percent of the GDP. Since balancing was activated in 2009 and 
2010, the indexation was reduced. As a result, the pension liability decreased to 
approximately 4.69 percent of the GDP in 2010. In 2012, the pension liability 
increased to 10.94 percent of the GDP because of the high indexation, 5.2 percent of 
the income index, and the financial position of the system deteriorated with a negative 
balance ratio. The balancing mechanism was then activated, and the indexation was 
dropped to restore the system, which increased the pension liability by 2.55 and 2.34 
percent of the GDP in 2013 and 2014, respectively. 
Additionally, the pension liability is positively related to the change in the life 
expectancy. Life expectancy, as used in the income statement, refers to the assumed 
length of time for which an average pension amount is disbursed (the so-called 
economic life expectancy). For the NDC system, a higher life expectancy will increase 
only the pension liability to retirees. According to the projected negative impact on 
pensions of younger cohorts as presented in the 2010 Orange Report (Swedish 
Pensions Agency, 2010), the monthly pension will be lower for younger cohorts if they 
retire at a fixed age when life expectancy is improving. Therefore, the pension liability 
to active workers is unaffected by mortality changes. The value of the change in life 
expectancy (Table A.2 in Appendix A.1) is the difference between the pension liability 
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calculated with the economic life expectancy used in the financial year and that used 
in the previous year. Over the 2007–2015 period, the value of the change in life 
expectancy had varied between -0.35 and -0.80 percent of the GDP. 
The remaining accounting item in Table 2.2, inheritance gains, represents the notional 
account balances of participants who do not survive to retirement age, distributed to 
the survivors belonging to the same birth cohort. The items vary between 0.3 and 0.4 
percent of the GDP. The inheritance gains distributed are not those actually arising but 
those expected to arise. Hence, both items are not offset perfectly. 
The administrative costs are deducted from the notional accounts to finance the 
administrative and the fund management costs. On average, the deduction amount 
ranged between 0.02 and 0.06 percent of the GDP in 2007–2015 and did not exactly 
match the cash withdrawals from the fund assets in the administrative cost item. 
Eventually, the net income/loss for the year is the sum of the totals of three sections: 
change in fund assets, change in contribution asset and change in pension liability. 
However, regarding the double-entry accounting system, the net income/loss is 
equivalent to the difference between the change in assets (fund assets and contribution 
asset) and the change in liabilities. Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of the change in 
assets, the change in pension liability and the net income/loss of the Swedish NDC 
pension system. The value had been volatile, range from the loss of 7.70 percent of the 
GDP in 2008 and the gain of 12.07 percent of the GDP in 2010. The imbalance of the 
system’s financial position is chiefly caused by the change in the indexation of the 
pension liability. 
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of change in assets, change in pension liability and net income/loss of 
the Swedish NDC pension system 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
2.4 Conclusions and new responses to economic crisis 
This chapter has described the Swedish experience in its NDC pension system over 
the 2007–2015 period, with special attention to the balance ratio under economic and 
financial uncertainties. It has shown how in the post-2008 recession, the solvency of 
the Swedish NDC scheme dropped, and the balance ratio fell significantly below the 
unity in 2008, 2009 and 2012. The automatic balancing mechanism was triggered with 
the reduction in indexation of pensions and notional accounts in 2010, 2011 and 2014.  
Three different policy responses had been carried out in this respect, as follows: 
The first was to smooth the value of the buffer fund used in the balance ratio. Thus, 
instead of using the value of the buffer fund as of 31 December in a specific year, the 
average of the value of the buffer fund as of 31 December in the last three years was 
used.  This change was legislated despite (the predecessor to) the Swedish Pensions 
Agency’s objection about the measure’s inefficiency. The agency proposed that rather 
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than smoothing the value of the buffer fund, the solvency deficit’s effect on the 
pensions should be smoothed. According to the agency, this solution would result in a 
more efficient smoothing, partly due to considering all sources of solvency volatility, 
not only the volatility resulting from the value of the buffer fund. 
The second policy response to the reduced pensions under the notional model was to 
cut taxes on pensions so as to counteract the net effect of the negative indexation. The 
retirees were more or less completely compensated for their losses in inkomstpension 
by the reduced taxes. This policy response implies that one of the main objectives of 
the NDC design – to insulate government finances from the development of the public 
pension plan – was not achieved.  
Third, the volatility of the solvency measure – the balance ratio – triggered the Swedish 
Pension Agency’s analysis of the reasons for the unanticipated level of volatility. This 
work revealed that the three-year smoothing of the income index caused a delay 
relative to the development of the contributions to the plan. This situation caused a 
significant real volatility in the ratio of the contribution asset to the pension liabilities. 
For example, a shift downwards in the nominal earnings growth would immediately 
result in a lower growth in the contributions and the contribution asset. The income 
index would fully react to this outcome with a four-year delay, causing a ceteris 
paribus permanent negative gap between assets and liabilities. The result would also 
be observed in traditional actuarial projections of the NDC plan. 
This pre-crisis (unidentified but obvious from the experience) source of solvency 
volatility triggered the legislative attempt to eliminate or at least reduce the volatility 
caused by the indexation itself. The Swedish Pension Agency proposed measures that 
would eliminate the volatility caused by the indexation. Its main component was to 
eliminate the smoothing in the indexation and to make it slightly forward looking. 
Rather than using the change in income in the current year relative to the previous one, 
the (projected) change in income in the coming year relative to the current one should 
be used. The difference between the projected and the actual income growth should 
affect the indexation the following year. The agency claimed that combined with some 
compensating adjustments, this solution would completely eliminate the avoidable 
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solvency volatility caused by the delay in indexation relative to the contribution 
development. To further reduce volatility, the agency proposed that balancing should 
only come into effect if the balance ratio was below the unity for three years in a row, 
and that in balancing, the indexation should yearly be reduced by only one-third of the 
adjustment necessary to achieve 100 percent solvency. 
The Pensionsgroup (set up by the government to negotiate any changes to the political 
agreement on the pension reform in 1994) decided to propose to the parliament a 
simplified version of the technical adjustments recommended by the Swedish Pensions 
Agency. The smoothing of the income index was abolished, but the forward-looking 
design proposed by the agency was not enacted. The government/Pensionsgroup 
judged the forward-looking proposal (the increased use of projections in the 
indexation) as a risk and also disliked the technical changes forced by its design. 
Neither did the government/Pensionsgroup adopt the agency’s proposed rule of only 
using the balance mechanism if the solvency was less than 100 percent for three 
consecutive years. However, the new form of smoothing (reducing the indexation by 
only one-third of the necessary reduction to achieve 100 percent solvency) was 
implemented. The new indexation and the new balance ratio (called as a damped 
balance ratio) were introduced in 2015.15 
The volatility of the indexation of pensions caused by the balance mechanism has been 
criticised by various groups in Sweden. Perhaps the most vocal critique has come from 
groups representing retirees, but other groups have also expressed disapproval. The 
political parties supporting the pension agreement have not criticised the balance 
mechanism’s goal to secure an automatic, financially stable pension scheme. As 
evident from their legislative actions, they have disliked the volatility and tried to 
reduce it while adhering to the principle of automatic financial stability. 
                                                          
15 Another change in legislation addressed the inefficiency in the indexation/balance mechanism that 
implied that pension credits earned during a balancing period, and thus not subjected to a downward 
adjustment of the indexation, would still benefit from balancing the mechanisms upward. This 
inefficiency was already acknowledged by legislators when the balance mechanism was legislated in 
2000, but at that time, no satisfactory solution to the problem was identified – partly due to time 
constraints. Barr and Diamond (2011) criticise this inefficiency. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, there has been almost no professional or popular debate on the 
relevance of the solvency measure used. Considering the positive projections of the 
pension plan (the actual and the projected sizes of the buffer fund) – indicating that the 
present solvency deficit will be overcome without reducing pensions – the lack of 
debate is even more astonishing. This situation can possibly be attributed to the human 
tendency to accept a number as a fact, more or less regardless of the underlying 
ambiguities of the calculation. Another or complementary interpretation of this 
absence of a more profound and philosophical critique is that the use of only factual 
transactions and events in estimating solvency, without any projections, has worked. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sweden’s Fifteen Years of Communication 
Challenges: What are the Challenges 
Looking Forward?1 
It is clear that pension reforms require the solid backing of the population. This is only 
possible if the participants of the system are well informed and understand pension 
rules from an economic and financial point of view. In this sense, the Swedish social 
security administration publishes an annual actuarial balance of the solvency of the 
whole public system and at the same time sends out to each participant the orange 
envelope with information on the individual accumulated notional balance and funded 
accounts, movements during the year and also estimates of the individual pension 
amount under different scenarios. This chapter describes the Swedish pension 
experience on communication to its participants over the last fifteen years and 
discusses its effectiveness in terms of credibility. 
Keywords: accounting, individual information, public pensions, retirement, solvency, 
Sweden 
 
                                                          
1 A version of the paper (joint work with Ole Settergren, María del Carmen Boado-Penas and Erland 
Ekheden) was presented at the NDC III Conference, Rome, Italy, October 5-6, 2017 and will be 
published as a chapter in a book on NDCs edited by the World Bank. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Pensions are sufficiently complex to be very hard to understand. In particular, Barr and 
Diamond (2008), public pension systems are likely to need to be adjusted due to 
changes in demographic and economic conditions and may also change with political 
circumstances, what adds more complexity. New (1999) states that the problem may 
not be lack of information but an information processing problem. With an information 
processing problem, the problem is too complex for many agents to make rational 
choices even when they have the necessary information. Specifically, for pension 
products, Larsson et al. (2009), the long-time horizon between the payment of 
contributions and benefits produces inherent difficulties in understanding the product. 
According to Fornero (2014), political parties however do not rely on ideological 
message to communicate the reform and if the participants of the system do not 
understand its basic principles, it risks having little effects or even being repealed. 
Information is thus important not only for individual wellbeing but also for society. 
For an individual planning, knowledge of the system is essential to avoid mistakes as 
for the difference between the expected and actual pension benefits. Information on 
the financial sustainability of the pension system is also fundamental in the sense that 
if participants misinterpret the system and the need for reform they will try to reverse 
it. Also, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a; 2007b) and Biggs (2010) state that access to 
financial information and appropriate planning may have a positive impact on 
decision-making concerning retirement. Moreover, information about the pension 
benefits influences the age at which individuals retire (Sundén, 2013). Similarly, Boeri 
and Tabellini (2012) points out that reforms can obtain the popular support if they are 
well described, explained and understood. However, empirical evidence (e.g. Mitchell, 
1988; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011) amongst others 
indicates that most individuals have very limited information about the core elements 
of social insurance systems and on the key variables that define the amount of their 
pensions.  
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In the last years, governments in several countries try to facilitate decision making to 
the contributors by regularly sending statements about their individual pension 
position and estimates of the expected pension benefits. For example, the social 
security statement in the USA, the orange envelope in Sweden or the yellow envelope 
in Germany.2 
Information on the financial sustainability of the system can be described, Boado-
Penas and Vidal-Melía (2013), by means of the actuarial balance sheet3 – mainly 
explained as an aggregate accounting projection model. Allowing for particular 
differences between countries, actuarial balances are compiled, on a regular basis, in 
countries such as US, Japan or Canada, amongst others to reveal the financial position 
of the pension system.4 
It is clear that there is social demand of transparency regarding the management of the 
finances of pension systems and also a need of credibility in the sense that promises of 
payment are rationally respected. With all of this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to 
describe the Swedish pension experience on both individual information and 
information on the financial sustainability in terms of its effectiveness. 
The chapter is structured as follows; Section 3.2 describes the Swedish public pension 
system. The main channels of communications: the actuarial balance together with its 
main financial indicators over the 2007–2015 period (global information) and the 
orange report (individual information) are explained in the next section. The 
effectiveness of the Swedish information by means of survey results is illustrated in 
Section 3.4. and Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
                                                          
2 For more details, see Kritzer and Smith (2016). 
3 In Sweden, an actuarial balance sheet, in the accounting sense of the term, is used in the Swedish 
notional pension system. 
4 The actuarial balance of the US social security programs, OASDI (2015), is aimed at measuring the 
system’s financial solvency over a 75-year time horizon. In Japan, the Actuarial Affairs Division of the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Actuarial Affairs Division, 2014) compiles an actuarial 
balance at least every five years with a 95-year time that includes an automatic balancing mechanism 
to make the system sustainable in such horizon of time. In Canada, actuarial valuation reports on the 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) are prepared by the Office of the Chief Actuary (Office of the Chief 
Actuary, 2015) every three years. These reports determine a minimum contribution rate and show 
projections of the Plan’s contributions, expenditures and assets for the next 75 years. 
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3.2 Swedish public pension system5 
The Swedish public pension system consists of two different earnings-related benefit 
schemes: a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) scheme on pay-as-you-go financing 
(called the inkomstpension) and a fully funded financial defined contribution pension 
(called the premium pension). The contribution rates for two schemes are 18.5 percent 
of the pension base, with a split of 16 percent for the NDC pension and 2.5 percent for 
the FDC scheme. A tax-financed guaranteed pension, annually adjusted according to 
the consumer price index, also provides supplementary support for retirees with low 
NDC pensions. 
• Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme 
Under the Swedish NDC scheme, both accounts and benefits are indexed by the change 
in the average income. When the initial pension at retirement age6 is calculated – that 
is, when the notional account value is converted into an annuity – the pension is 
increased or front-loaded on the basis of an assumed annual real growth rate of 1.6 
percent for the income index. This rate of advanced interest is then deducted every 
year from the increase in the income index. Thus, the NDC pension is indexed annually 
by the change in the income index reduced by 1.6 percent.  
The Automatic Balancing Mechanism (ABM) applied to the NDC scheme 
In certain situations, exceptions to the regular income indexation of accounts and 
benefits apply. These exceptions are governed by the ratio of assets to liabilities 
(known as balance ratio7) as provided in the legislation on the balancing mechanism. 
The balance ratio is an indicator that emerges from the actuarial balance sheet of the 
NDC scheme (see more info in Section 2.2) and is used in Sweden in order to measure 
                                                          
5 For a more detailed description of the Swedish pension system, see the Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency (2007–2015) and Barr (2013). The latter paper also evaluates the pension system in Sweden 
against the goals established at the time of the reforms in the late 1990s. 
6 In Sweden, retirement is flexible and pension benefits can be withdrawn from age 61. When converting 
benefits into the whole life annuities, the life expectancy of the cohort is taken into account. 
7 To indicate that the solvency ratio of a PAYG scheme is different from that of the premium pension, 
the inkomstpension system calls this ratio the balance ratio. 
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whether the system can fulfil its obligations to its contributors and to decide whether 
an ABM should be applied. If the balance ratio is less than 1, the ABM is activated 
(see how the ‘Balancing mechanism’ works in Section 2.2). 
• Funded financial defined contribution (FDC) scheme 
In the FDC scheme, participants have the individual financial account and their 
pension contributions are invested in a large number of funds chosen by the members 
themselves. The rate of return on the individual accounts is determined by the return 
on the funds that the individual has chosen. The FDC pension can be drawn in either 
of traditional insurance with profit annuity or fund insurance. In contrast to the NDC 
scheme, the annuity divisor used to convert the value of the pension account into an 
annuity is based on forecasts of future life expectancy rather than the current remaining 
life expectancy of the person’s birth cohort. The initial pension of both forms of 
insurance is credited with an interest rate of 1.75 percent and a deduction for costs of 
0.1 percent (Swedish Pensions Agency, 2017). 
If the FDC pension is drawn in the form of traditional insurance with profit annuity, 
the pension is calculated as a guaranteed lifelong annuity. The shares in the 
individual’s accumulations are traded and the Swedish Pensions Agency assumes 
responsibility for the investment as well as the, very limited, financial and longevity 
risk. Thus, the person’s annuity is based on the performance of the fund as a whole. 
While, the fund insurance (or known as unit-linked insurance) means that a person’s 
accumulation remains in the pension funds chosen by the participant and a sufficient 
fund shares are sold to finance the payment of the premium pension. The pension 
increases with stock market gains, or vice versa. If the value of the fund shares 
increases, fewer shares are sold and if it decreases, more shares are sold. Changes in 
prices of fund shares have an effect on the value of the premium pension in the 
following year. 
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3.3 Channels of communication 
In order to make decisions about at which age to retire and how much to save, 
participants in the Swedish pension system need information about how the level of 
benefits are affected by the number of years of contributions and the retirement age. 
Also, a challenge for the communication strategy is to convey that the automatic 
balancing mechanism is a regular component of the indexation of earned pension 
rights. The annual report (that includes the actuarial balance sheet) and the orange 
envelope provide communication with participants regarding their individual pension 
and the sustainability of the whole pension system. 
3.3.1 Accounting information: The actuarial balance sheet 
Since 2001, the Swedish pension system has produced an actuarial balance sheet and 
income statement every year based on the principle of double-entry bookkeeping. 
Under the NDC scheme, the balance sheet can be defined as a financial statement 
listing the pension system’s obligation to contributors and pensioners (liabilities to 
contributors and pensioners) on a particular date together with the amounts of the 
various assets (financial assets and contribution amounts) that back up these 
commitments. The details about the accounting information of the NDC scheme is 
based on Section 2.3 of the development of solvency: balance sheets for 2007–2015 
(see Section 2.3 p.14-19). 
Under the fully-funded pension scheme, the insurance assets, which consist of fund 
insurance, conventional insurance, and temporary management, are reported at their 
true value, or accrued acquisition cost. As of the balance sheet date, the true value of 
the assets is evaluated at their price on the last trading day of the year, while the assets 
reported at accrued acquisition cost are the difference between acquisition cost and 
redemption price periodised as interest revenue for the remaining time to maturity. 
Fund insurance assets refer to the investments in funds by pension savers and are 
reported at redemption price for fund assets. Temporary management is made up of 
pension contributions paid in periodically during the year in which pension credit is 
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earned and are reported at their accrued acquisition value. Conventional insurance 
assets are invested in equity and interest funds and are reported at their true value. 
The balance sheet for the Swedish funded pension as the percentage of GDP is 
illustrated in Table 3.1. The insurance assets have continuously increased since 2007 
and in 2015 the value of the insurance assets was SEK 896 billion, accounting for 
21.44 percent of GDP. The main component of the insurance assets of the fully-funded 
system is fund insurance amounted to almost 94 percent of total assets, which is 
invested 90 percent in stocks and shares and 10 percent in bond and other interest-
bearing securities. The change in insurance assets chiefly refers to newly-earned 
pension credit, positive changes in value, allocated management fees and pension 
disbursements.  
The pension liability to pension savers and retirees is related primarily to fund shares 
and is affected by the development of the market value of the funds chosen. With 
traditional insurance, the pension liability is determined for each insurance policy as 
the capital value of the remaining guaranteed disbursements in which their value is 
computed on assumptions about the future returns, life expectancy and operating 
expenses. The return is dependent on the market rates of interest on government bonds 
of varying maturities. Pension liability in 2015 increased SEK 84 billion, about 10 
percent.  
In the funded pension scheme, all payments in and out of the system and all changes 
in value have in principle the same effect on the assets and liabilities of the system. 
Changes in the value of fund shares affects the assets of participants and pensioners in 
the system. The positive result of the scheme belongs to the pension savers and the 
pensioners, and is invested in the consolidation fund as owner equity. The amount in 
the consolidation fund for traditional insurance with profit annuity are disbursed as a 
bonus rate in connection with pension disbursements. Money in the consolidation fund 
for fund insurance is deducted from the following year’s contributions to cover 
operational costs. 
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Table 3.1: Balance sheet of the Swedish FDC pension system on December 31, 2007–2015 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Assets (% of GDP) 
         
Insurance assets 10.27 7.72 11.29 12.59 11.86 13.97 17.20 20.63 21.44 
Fund insurance 9.38 6.84 10.38 11.64 10.79 12.82 16.01 19.33 20.12 
Traditional insurance 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.46 0.50 
Temporary management 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.82 
Other assets 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Total assets 10.33 7.76 11.35 12.67 11.93 14.05 17.30 20.74 21.54 
Liabilities and results brought forward (% of GDP) 
Closing results brought 
forward 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.15 
Opening results brought 
forward 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 
Net income/loss for the year 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 
Liabilities 10.36 7.80 11.37 12.65 11.89 13.99 17.20 20.59 21.39 
Pension liability 9.41 6.88 10.43 11.73 11.79 13.88 17.08 20.46 21.27 
Other liabilities 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.92 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Total Liabilities and results 
brought forward 
10.33 7.76 11.35 12.67 11.93 14.05 17.30 20.74 21.54 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
3.3.2 Individual information to participants: The orange envelope 
In 1999, as part of the reform of the Swedish pension system, a so-called orange 
envelope (see Appendix B.1 for the sample of Orange envelope) was introduced to 
provide information to the participants as well as projection of benefits. All insured 
persons who have not started to receive a full pension receive an annual statement with 
four pages containing account information on the changes and current status of their 
notional and fully-funded accounts as well as a projection of pension benefits. In 
addition to providing information on the expected benefits, the orange envelope 
summarises how the new pension system works and highlights to participants that 
benefits are determined by lifetime earnings. The pension account is presented as a 
bank account so that the participants see the public pension system as savings for 
retirement. 
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The first page displays the monthly national public pension forecast that the member 
is expected to receive before tax with the different age when the participant decides to 
retire, e.g. age 61, 65, 68 and 3 months or 70. This page also illustrates the hierarchy 
of the pension sources that the participant would earn. The first order indicates the 
national public pension, both NDC and FDC, while the occupational pension is in the 
middle of the hierarchy and followed by the private pension. Moreover, the participant 
can see her entire pension through the website8 by using the personal code attached in 
this page to log in.  
In the second page, the evolution of the pension values of each account – income 
pension and premium pension account – during the year is presented (based on 
information from two years before). The statement consists of the account value of the 
previous year, the contributions assigned, the amount received for the survivor 
dividend – the pension balance of contributors who have died before reaching the age 
of retirement, which is distributed among the surviving members of their birth cohorts 
– and together with the administrative and fund fees charged. Furthermore, this page 
illustrates the values of the premium pension account with the breakdown of the 
portfolio, the allocation of each fund that the accountholder chooses and the actual 
distribution. The contributor will know the development of the premium pension funds 
in more details, in particular where the money is invested and how much she pays in 
fees. The changes in the value are also shown in percent which can be compared with 
the data for the average participant. 
The third page provides forecasts of the individual monthly pension amount with 
different retirement ages, i.e. 61, 65, 68 and 3 months and 70 under the assumption 
made on that there is the same pensionable income per year – 0 percent wage growth.9  
                                                          
8 The Swedish Social Insurance Agency and the Premium Pension Authority together with the insurance 
companies for the occupational plans launched the website https://secure.pensionsmyndigheten.se/B3. 
This website presents individual projections of both the public pension and occupational pension 
benefits and the total projected pensions. 
9 Before 2011, the statement presented estimates under two scenarios: (1) 0 percent wage growth and 
(2) 2 percent wage growth. However, the higher assumption was removed in 2011 because surveys 
indicated that it was too confusing. 
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The last page gives the total pension credits, which basically means the money paid in 
during the year, and decomposes the contributions made for each account. The 
pensionable income from different sources is also contained. 
3.3.3 Information on pension projections 
The pension projection is perhaps the most important line of communication between 
the pension provider and pension savers. A projection is also the only thing that gives 
the insured persons a rational basis for decision making on matters affecting their work 
and savings. The projection must be easy to understand and to communicate and it 
must be calculated as accurately as possible. Under a notional scheme, projections are 
needed to give information on expected benefits to the system’s contributors. 
The forecasts in the orange envelope since 2011has been based on only one scenario, 
0 percent average wage growth. The rate of return on the funded individual account is 
assumed to be 3.5 percentage points higher than salary growth. All calculations are 
made in fixed prices, i.e. inflation is set to zero. 
Consequently, this wage growth influences the size of contributions, or pension rights 
paid to notional or funded pensions. Within the national pension scheme, the growth 
is also employed as interest rate in the notional pension that means the pension balance 
(accumulated pension rights) is recalculated upwards each year by an interest rate 
equal to the assumed growth.10  
If the real calculation is done without growth, this is, the projection uses zero growth, 
the forecasted pension amount is expressed in terms of the same price and wages levels 
as at time of the projection. In this scenario, there is no income or standard increase 
during the time leading up to retirement. Zero growth over a longer period is highly 
improbable; however, the reason of using this scenario is simply to provide a 
                                                          
10 The growth is measured in the national pension scheme by the income index, which is the 
development of average pensionable income in Sweden, including income above the earnings ceiling. 
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projection amount expressed in current price and wage terms which can be directly 
associated with the current income. 
When the automatic balancing mechanism is activated within the public pension 
scheme, it is unclear how long and how fast the financial balance is recovering and 
when income indexation should apply again. Only known values of balance ratio and 
balance index are used in the projection for the national pension.  
Every year since 1999, the pension projection in the orange envelope has used the 
retirement ages of 61, 65 and 70 with the following reasons: The age of 61 is the 
earliest possible age at which old-age pension may be received. The age of 65 is chosen 
because it was the ‘normal’ retirement age, being the retirement age under the old 
system. The age of 65 is also the age at which certain social insurance benefits, such 
as sickness and activity compensation and unemployment insurance come to an end 
and others such as guarantee pension and housing supplement for pensioners start. The 
age of 70 was chosen to provide a retirement age after 65 corresponding to the 61-year 
alternative. Having several different retirement ages is to show how the retirement age 
impacts the size of monthly pension payments. This reminds the fact that the longer 
the contributor works the higher the amount of pension will be and also that remaining 
life expectancy at retirement greatly influences the size of pension. 
Life-expectancy assumptions and projection interest rates are used to ensure a desired 
payment profile during retirement. The Swedish Pensions Agency’s projection 
assumptions concerning life expectancy are based on Statistics Sweden’s projections 
of future mortality, which means projections for younger generations are based on the 
longer lifespans these are expected to have. The forecasted divisors set by the Swedish 
Pensions Agency are different for the notional pension and the funded pension that 
rely on actual divisors for the public pension but taking into account Statistics 
Sweden’s mortality projections. The new projection divisors are determined each year 
in November. 
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3.3.4 The role of the Swedish Pensions Agency 
In 2010, the Swedish Pensions Agency was established, taking over administration of 
the national retirement pension, which was previously Försäkringskassan’s 
responsibility, and the premium pension, which had previously been handled by the 
Premium Pensions Agency. The information challenge was one of the main reasons to 
establish the new Agency. Therefore, an important task for the Swedish Pensions 
Agency is to work towards accessible and simple information on the total pension 
(including public pension, occupational pensions and private pensions).  
To meet the needs on information the operational customer service operations of the 
Agency provide face-to-face meetings, telephone customer services, e-services and 
printed reports such as the orange envelope, annual report, statistics, amongst others. 
The Swedish Pensions Agency has also made the webpage www.minpension.se 
(containing information on both public and occupational schemes), available as an 
embedded service from their own site www.pensionmyndigheten.se. 
3.4 Survey results: Does the information work? 
Since 1999 the Swedish Social Insurance Agency11 conducts an annual survey about 
the orange envelope to evaluate to what extent the participants open the envelope, read 
and understand the contents. The sample consists of 2,200 individuals interviewed by 
telephone and includes three different target groups such as old-age pensioners (27 
percent of the sample), general pension savers (46 percent of the sample) and new 
pension savers (27 percent of the sample). 
Currently, three-fourths of participants confirm that they have opened the orange 
envelope and half of them read some of the content. Figure 3.1 shows that the reported 
confidence in the Pensions Agency has been slowly but steadily increasing over time 
for both retirees and workers. In particular, in 2016, more than half of retirees and a 
                                                          
11 The name was changed to ‘Swedish Pensions Agency’ in 2010. 
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third of workers had some or great confidence in the pension system administration 
(including information and service) while the share of those with no confidence has 
slightly decreased. 
Figure 3.1: Level of confidence in the Swedish Pensions Agency, 2010–2016 
 
Source: Annual Orange Envelope Survey 
Note: The grades to answer this question are 1-5. Grade 1 and 2 are grouped as negative while 
4 and 5 as positive. Grade 3 is rated as neutral as is disregarded from the graphics. 
However, the share of participants with confidence in the pension system, Figure 3.2, 
only reaches the value of 38 percent for pensioners and 26 percent for contributors in 
2016. At the same time, the share of participants with no confidence has slightly 
decreased over the period 2010–2016. 
We can observe, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, that the confidence level on both the 
pension system and the pension system administration got worse in 2011 because of 
the negative income indexation that year (and the year before) as a result of the 
automatic balancing mechanism being triggered. 
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Figure 3.2: Level of confidence in the Swedish Pension System, 2010–2016 
 
Source: Annual Orange Envelope Survey 
Note: The grades to answer this question are 1-5. Grade 1 and 2 are grouped as negative while 
4 and 5 as positive. Grade 3 is rated as neutral as is disregarded from the graphics. 
The survey also includes a set of questions to gauge the support provided by the 
Swedish Pensions Agency and understanding and use of the information received by 
the participants. The share of participants who value the information and support 
provided has been continuously increasing. In 2016, 59 percent of respondents 
reported that the Swedish Pensions Agency has provided information and support 
needed to make decisions on retirement as shown in Figure 3.3-a. The survey contains 
a question to categorise workers into three different target groups based on their 
understanding and interest in financial and pension issues. Studies show that these 
questions predict ability and probability of gathering and understanding information 
regarding pensions. As shown in Figure 3.3-b, knowledge on issues relating to pension 
savings is increasing over time and the share of workers with some knowledge on 
pension issues in 2016 is 88 percent. According to this 88 percent, the percentage of 
respondents with enough or good knowledge to make active choice is 43 while 45 per 
cent of workers report to have some grasp on economic and financial concepts. 
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Figure 3.3: Questions to assess the knowledge about the pension system, 2013–2016 
a. Do you, today, have the information and support need to make decision on retirement? 
 
b. Self-reporting understanding in financial and pension issues 2013–2016 
 
Source: Annual Orange Envelope Survey 
3.5 Conclusions  
The notional and financial defined contribution scheme puts more risk – or at least 
does so more explicitly than a defined benefit scheme. It places more (explicitly) 
responsibility on participants to plan for retirement. Therefore, it is possible to argue 
that in DC schemes it is more important that participants of the system are well 
informed and understand pension rules from an economic and financial point of view, 
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than it is in a DB scheme. We realise that this judgment is not free from criticism, same 
or similar information might be argued is equally relevant in DB schemes and only 
partly for different reasons. 
This chapter shows the main channels of communication used by the Swedish 
administration, i.e. the annual report on the solvency of the public system and the 
orange envelope with information on the individual accumulated capital and forecasts 
of expected benefits. 
The main challenge for the Swedish Pensions Agency is to know how the participants 
use the information provided and how well it communicates information about the 
pension system. At the same time, the new notional system puts additional demands 
on participants about how the level of benefits varies according to the number of years 
of contributions – or more exactly their life earnings, the number of years is not a direct 
parameter, it is only relevant in the impact it has on life earnings – and the retirement 
age. Projections of future pension benefits and how the amount of benefits changes 
with retirement ages is necessary information for contributors in order to make good 
decisions about number of years at work and savings. 
The chapter shows that self-reporting use and understanding of the information 
received has been slowly increasing. However, the confidence on both the pension 
system and the pension system administration gets worse when the automatic 
balancing mechanism is triggered. It seems that there is still a lack of understanding 
on how the system works and why the activation of the mechanism is needed when the 
solvency is compromised. It is not surprising that to most people the abstract issue of 
the financial situation of the public pension plan is not understood or accepted as a 
viable argument for reducing what for most people amounts to an important benefit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Fairness and Annuitisation Divisors for 
Notional Defined Contribution Pension 
Schemes1 
The use of a gender-neutral annuity divisor in the conversion of the accumulated 
contributions into the initial pension introduces an intra-generational redistribution 
from short-lived toward long-lived individuals; that entails a transfer of wealth from 
males (who on average live shorter) to females (who on average live longer) and from 
low-socioeconomic groups (who live shorter) to high classes. The aim of this study is 
to quantify the lifetime redistribution of a generic NDC system using two types of 
divisors – the demographic and the economic – to compute the amount of the initial 
pension. With this in mind, we first build differential mortality tables, by both level of 
education and gender, to compute the annuity divisors. Second, by calculating the ratio 
between the present value of expected pension benefits and contributions we assess 
the redistribution between the different subgroups of the system under the different 
divisors. 
Keywords: annuity divisor, notional defined contribution, mortality forecasts, pay-as-
you-go, public pension, redistribution, socioeconomic groups 
                                                          
1 A version of the paper (joint work with María del Carmen Boado-Penas and Steven Haberman) was 
presented at the 3rd European Actuarial Journal (EAJ) Conference, Lyon, France, September 5–8, 2016 
and the 21st International Congress on Insurance: Mathematics and Economics (IME 2017), Vienna, 
Austria, July 3–5, 2017. 
CHAPTER 4. Fairness and Annuitisation Divisors for Notional Defined Contribution  48 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
On the basis of gender equality, all countries with NDC schemes in place use unisex 
(average) life tables to compute the annuity divisor, instead of using gender-specific 
life tables. Consequently, the use of unisex life expectancy introduces an explicit intra-
generational redistribution from short-lived towards long-lived individuals that entails 
a transfer of wealth from males (who on average live shorter) to females (who on 
average live longer) (Palmer, 2006b; Alho et al., 2013; James, 2013). 
Another heterogeneity in life expectancy, in addition to age and gender, arises from 
socioeconomic classes – normally assessed through income, education or occupation. 
A close link between level of education and mortality has been well documented 
(Borrell et al., 1999; Huisman et al., 2004; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Miech et al., 2011; 
Kaplan et al., 2014) and we focus on education attainment in this study2. The evidence 
suggests that the mortality rates are inversely correlated to social-economic status, i.e. 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status live longer than those belonging to lower 
socioeconomic groups and the size of the mortality differential across subgroups has 
increased over time3. The net effect of considering both gender and socioeconomic 
group differential mortality rates is not clear for subgroups such as females with low 
socioeconomic status or men from a high socioeconomic class. 
Although the evaluation of redistributive impacts on the pension system has attracted 
wide attention among scholars4, there has been a little recent literature on the lifetime 
income redistribution in the NDC scheme. Several studies have compared the 
                                                          
2 Education can capture both direct and indirect effects on mortality. Typically, individuals with an 
advanced education degree, having better knowledge on how to behave and enjoying a healthier 
lifestyle, are likely to live longer than those with lower education (Friedman et al., 1995; Kern and 
Friedman, 2008; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010). In addition, education can be used as a proxy for an 
individual’s lifetime resources since more highly educated people earn, on average, higher incomes 
(Brown, 2003). 
3 Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008) and Ayuso et al. (2016) provide comprehensive reviews of mortality 
differentials across socioeconomic groups and the implications of heterogeneity for pension reform and 
design. 
4 See for example of the works on measuring distributional effects in the pension system Cubeddu 
(2000), Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001), Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), Barnay (2007), Cremer 
et al. (2010), Forteza and Ourens (2012), Le Garrec (2012), Gustman et al. (2013), Platanakis and 
Sutcliffe (2016). 
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distributional impacts between the old defined benefit and the new NDC scheme5. 
Also, the other related researches have investigated the income redistribution that 
occurs from differential mortality across the population when annuities are priced 
uniformly in the social insurance programmes with mandatory retirment saving 
accounts (Brown, 2002; 2003; Gong and Webb, 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2009) and the 
collective pension schemes (Hári et al., 2006; Bonenkamp, 2009; Hoevenaars and 
Ponds, 2008). 
Due to lack of exploring the in-depth analysis with respect to the magnitude and the 
direction of the intra-generational transfers under a generic NDC pension scheme in 
the earlier studies, we then intend to complete this gap. Also, the idea of using another 
annuity divisor, called as an economic annuity divisor, reflecting the expected number 
of years that the pension benefits will be disbursed rather than the number of years that 
a person will survive stimulates our attention. We, therefore, aim to quantify 
redistribution arising from the use of gender-neutral annuity divisors for various 
socioeconomic groups. In this study, each subpopulation is distinguished by gender 
and level of education to measure cross-gender redistribution – between males and 
females – together with intereducational redistribution – between individuals with 
different levels of education. The full life cycle is incorporated in the analysis, rather 
than the annual effects, by using an indicator namely the present value ratio that 
enables us to assess the expected money’s worth of participation to the pension system. 
In addition to focusing on the effect of the demographic annuity divisor related to the 
remaining life expectancy, we examine the distributional impact of an alternative 
divisor – an economic annuity divisor – that is currently applied for the valuation of 
liabilities in the Swedish NDC system and associated with the size of pensions and the 
expected number of years that pension will be disbursed. We also contruct the gender- 
and education-specific cohort life tables to be used for the computations of the 
annuitisation divisors and the expected lifetime income cash flows. 
                                                          
5 See for example Borella (2004), Borella and Coda Moscarola (2006), Belloni and Maccheroni (2013) 
for the Italian case. 
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The chapter is organised as follows; we describe the framework of a generic NDC 
scheme on how to calculate notional capital, demographic annuity divisor, and 
economic annuity divisor in Section 4.2. The next section discusses the measurement 
of income redistribution in the pension scheme with the gender-neutral annuity pricing 
when the heterogeneity in mortality exists in the population. In the subsequent section, 
we provide a numerical illustration of the money’s worth of using the average (unisex) 
annuity divisors for each subpopulation under different scenarios. Finally, the chapter 
ends with conclusions. 
4.2 Methodology to calculate initial pension under an NDC 
framework: Demographic versus economic divisors 
The amount of pension benefits under an NDC pension scheme is based on the concept 
of an individual lifetime account. Contributions are periodically noted on the personal 
account over the whole life career and the account balance is credited with a (notional) 
rate of return. At retirement, the amount of the account balance is converted into a 
lifetime pension according to actuarial practice. The initial pension at retirement can 
be expressed in the general form as: 
 
  
     
 
Accumulated notional capital
Initial pension at retirement
Annuity divisor
  (4.1) 
This section describes the mathematical formulae used to calculate the notional 
account balance and the demographic annuity divisor. As an alternative to the 
demographic divisor, we explain the concept of economic annuity divisor, currently 
used by the Swedish NDC system to calculate retirees’ pension liability. 
4.2.1 Notional capital 
Under an NDC scheme, the individual notional account grows with new contributions 
plus the (notional) returns on the account. Additionally, among countries 
implementing this system, Sweden is the only country which distributes the notional 
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capital of persons who die during the accumulation phase to the account values of 
those survivors belonging to the same birth cohort. This capital,  known as ‘inheritance 
gains’ or  ‘survivor dividend’6,  constitutes a part of notional capital used to calculate 
the initial pension when people retire. Following Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá 
(2014), we describe the calculation of the accumulated capital at retirement age with 
both the inclusion and non-inclusion of the survivor dividend. Contributions and 
pension benefits are assumed to be payable yearly in advance. 
• Notional capital, excluding  the survivor dividend 
If the accumulated survivor dividend is not included, the accumulated notional capital 
at retirement age ex n  in year t n  for an individual with gender i  and level of 
education j , denoted as 
 
,
,e
i j
x n t n
K
 
, can be calculated as 
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K s r    



       (4.2) 
where 
i  denotes the gender indicator with man ( )m and woman ( )w ; 
j  denotes the indicator with respect to educational attainment: low ( )L , medium 
( )M  and high ( )H  education; 
n  represents the number of year that contributions are paid from the age of entry 
into the system ex   in year t  until reaching retirement age ex n  in year t n ; 
 
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
 
  is the contribution paid in year t k  by an individual with gender i  
and education j  at age ex k . The contribution is as a fixed fraction   of the annual 
earnings (or salary) 
 
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
 
; 
t kr  is the (notional) annual rate of return in year t k . 
                                                          
6 This entitlement, Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012), is different from the inheritance options in a 
prefunded scheme, where the assets of deceased participants are distributed to inheritors. For more 
details of survivor dividend in the Swedish NDC system, see Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014), 
Arnold et al. (2016), Vidal-Meliá et al. (2016). 
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• Notional capital, including the survivor dividend 
If the survivor dividend is included, then the individual amount of notional capital at 
retirement increases in line with the accumulated survivor dividend at retirement age. 
Thus, the accumulated notional capital including the survivor dividend at retirement 
age ex n  in year t n  for an individual with gender i  and level of education j , 
denoted 
 
* ,
,e
i j
x n t n
K
 
 can be calculated as follows: 
     
* , ,
,, , ee e
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where 
  ,e
ac
x n t n
D    is the accumulated survivor dividend at retirement age for an 
individual who has contributed for n  years since entering the system; 
  ,ex k t k
s   is the average earnings (salary) for an individual aged ex k  in year 
t k ; 
 ,en k x k t k
p    is the probability that an individual aged ex k  in year t k  will be 
alive at age ex n  in year t n . 
4.2.2 Annuity divisor 
Two different types of divisors are studied. First, the demographic divisor that takes 
into account the remaining future lifetime at retirement is described. Second, we show 
the mathematical formulae of the economic divisor associated to the expected number 
of years of pension disbursements. 
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• Demographic annuity divisor 
The demographic annuity divisor is equivalent to the present value of a whole life 
annuity-due at retirement age ex n  in year t n  and is calculated as 
   
 
 
1 1
,
, ,
0 0 ,
1 1
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e
e e
e
k km m
x n k t n kt n k t n k
kx n t n x n t n
t n k t n kk k x n t n
l
DD p
r l r
         
   
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    
      
     
  (4.5) 
where the pension benefits are disbursed for m  years from the retirement age until the 
maximum age that an individual can survive. The pensions settled after the first 
payment are revalued by the indexation rate, t n k    and discounted with the technical 
interest rate t n kr   . Also,  ,ex n k t n k
l      is the number of individuals surviving at age 
ex n k   in year t n k  . 
In practice7, the annuity divisors are equal for both sexes, being based on unisex 
(average) life tables for that particular cohort. 
• Economic annuity divisor8 
The Swedish NDC system is the only country that applies the economic divisor to 
calculate the pension liability toward a retiree. For the calculation of the economic 
annuity divisor it both the size of pensions and the pay-out period are considered. 
According to Swedish Pensions Agency (2017), the formula for the demographic 
annuity divisor is modified to get the formula for the economic divisor. The formula 
to calculate the economic divisor at retirement age ex n  in year t n  on a birth 
cohort basis, denoted by  ,ex n t n
ED   , is calculated as follows: 
                                                          
7 The formulae of the annuity divisor are differentiated among countries; for example, in Latvia and 
Poland (called a G-value), this factor corresponds to the life expectancy of the retirees in the individual’s 
birth cohort at retirement age. In Italy and Sweden, the divisor includes the assumed rate of real GDP 
growth (or wage growth) with 1.5% in Italy and 1.6% in Sweden, respectively (Chłoń-Domińczak et 
al., 2012).  
8 See formula B.7.5 in Appendix B, Swedish Pensions Agency (2017). 
CHAPTER 4. Fairness and Annuitisation Divisors for Notional Defined Contribution  54 
 
 
 
*1
,
, *
0 ,
1
1
e
e
e
km
x n k t n k
x n t n
t n kk x n t n
l
ED
rl

   
 
   
 
  
 
    (4.6) 
where         
1*
, , ,
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l l P 
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 * ,ex n k t n kl      represents the total pension disbursements at time t n k   for all 
retirees at age ex n k  ; 
  ,ex n t n
P    is the average initial pension at retirement age ex n . The amount of 
pension benefits is indexed by 
ex n k
   . 
4.3 Measurement of income redistribution 
NDCs narrow the ratio between benefits and contributions, achieving greater actuarial 
fairness. Participants who have paid the same amount of contributions and retire at the 
same age should be entitled to the same pension benefits, while the individuals with 
longer earnings histories, or higher earnings who have been contributing more will 
receive higher benefits. 
A pension scheme is viewed as actuarially fair if for all individuals the (expected) 
present value of lifetime contributions is equal to the (expected) present value of 
pension benefits. Any difference between these two present values is defined as an 
income redistribution towards or away from the individual. 
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014) and Alonso-García et al. (2017) have 
demonstrated that the NDC scheme considering the survivor dividend is actuarially 
fair – pension rights equivalent to contributions actually paid – on a cohort basis when 
the population is closed – neither immigration nor emigration occurs. Due to the 
heterogeneity in mortality across the population, the use of average (unisex) life 
expectancy as one factor of the actuarial divisor would introduce the explicit income 
redistribution from high-mortality risk to low-mortality risk groups within the same 
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generation (also known as intra-generational redistribution). People who expect to live 
longer would get a better deal out of the pension system than those who are expected 
to die earlier, given that they receive the same amount of initial pension at the same 
retirement age. 
The measurement of the lifetime redistribution from an individual’s perspective can 
be investigated through the difference between an individual’s lifetime contributions 
and lifetime retirement benefits – in this way, we would capture the money’s worth of 
participating to the pension system. This concept is expressed in absolute term and 
known as the Social Security Wealth (SSW) (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001; 
Bonenkamp, 2009; Belloni and Maccheroni, 2013). However, we use its variant based 
on the principle of relative equivalence, called as the benefit to cost ratio (or present 
value ratio) defined as the ratio between the present value of benefits paid during the 
retirement and the contributions paid during their working career (Brown, 2002; 
Liebman, 2002; Brown, 2003; Borella and Coda Moscarola, 2006; Barnay, 2007; 
Mazzaferro et al., 2012; Belloni and Maccheroni, 2013). Thus, this ratio shows how 
much the system returns to the participant for each euro paid. 
A value of 1 indicates that the system is actuarially fair for an individual, i.e. she 
received pension benefits which correspond to her contributions – by definition, there 
is no redistribution towards or away from any person (Queisser and Whitehouse, 
2006). A value greater (lower) than 1 indicates that an individual receives more (less) 
than she has been contributing – an individual faces an expected gain (loss) from the 
pension system. 
The present value ratio, PVR, for a specific individual with gender i  and level of 
education j  who pays the contributions in the scheme for n  years throughout the 
working life and receives the pension benefits at any age ex n k   in year t n k   
denoted as 
 
,
,e
i j
x n k t n k
P
   
 for m  years from retirement age until the maximum age of 
surviving, is evaluated at the age of entry into the system ex  in year t  and is given by 
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where   
 
,
,e
i j
k x t
p is the probability that an individual entering into the scheme at age ex  
in year t  will be surviving at age ex k  in year t k  and 
*1 t kr   is the real discount 
rate in year t k . 
4.4 Numerical illustration 
This section presents a numerical example to quantify the redistributive effects 
between subgroups within the same cohort of using the unisex (average) demographic 
and economic divisor in the calculation of the initial pension. We discuss the data, 
based on the Swedish data, in the first sub-section. Then, the main results of income 
redistribution by using the demographic and the economic divisors are presented. This 
section also provides a sensitivity analysis of the underlying assumptions. 
4.4.1 Data 
The participants in this study are classified by gender and educational attainment with 
three groupings: low, medium and high level of education9. These persons have 
differences in terms of income profiles and survival probabilities which are the main 
factors to determine the direction and magnitude of the intra-generational transfers. 
 
                                                          
9 According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011) classification, the 
Eurostat provides data by education into three categories: 1) less than primary, primary and lower 
secondary education (levels 0-2); 2) Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 
3-4); and 3) Tertiary education (levels 5-8). We then refer those three groups as low, medium and high 
level of education, respectively. 
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The main assumptions and the data sources made for this numerical example are: 
• A participant joins the labour market at the age of  25ex   with a particular 
level of education that does not change over her working life. 
• The retirement age rx  is equal to 65. Therefore, a participant pays contributions 
for 40n   years as no unemployment is considered. 
• The maximum age that an individual can survive is 9510 so the pension benefits 
are disbursed for 31m   years. 
• The contribution rate   is fixed at 16%11 of the individual’s earnings. 
• The notional rate of return r  for the accumulated notional capital, the discount 
rate r  credited in the annuity divisor, the discount rate *r  for the present value 
ratio (PVR) and the indexation rate   to revalue the pension benefits are set 
equal to 1.6% and constant over time. 
• The cross-sectional average annual income for the Swedish population by age 
group, gender and level of education in 201312 provided in the Eurostat 
Database has been used13. 
• The projected group-specific cohort life tables for an individual who was born 
in 1988 and started working at age 25 in 2013 explained in the next sub section 
are used to calculate the annuity divisors and the present value ratio (PVR). 
 
 
                                                          
10 This is the maximum age at which mortality data by level of education is available in the Eurostat 
Database. 
11 This value is coherent to the contribution rate of the Swedish NDC system. 
12 We consider the year of 2013 as the base year because the latest data on mortality by socioeconomic 
status (level of education) provided by the Eurostat has been updated until this year. 
13 As shown in Figure 4.1, the pattern of age-earnings profile is an inverted U-shape where the annual 
income increases in the early stages of a worker’s career, peaks around the middle-age and finally 
declines as a worker approaches retirement. Women earn less than men at all educational levels and the 
gender gap is wider for persons with high school education than those with advanced degrees. Also, see 
more details of the estimation of age-earnings profile in Appendix C.4. 
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Figure 4.1: Age-earnings profile estimates during working life, age 25-69 by gender and level 
of education (in EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2  Results 
• Modelling and forecasting mortality heterogeneity across socioeconomic 
groups 
When projecting the heterogeneity in mortality among socioeconomic groups (e.g. 
income, occupation, or level of education), we require the methods that enable 
capturing both mortality level differentials and mortality improvement differentials 
between subpopulations. Some studies applied the survival models under the different 
mortality laws, e.g. Gompertz, Makeham, Perks and Makeham-Perks etc. (Richards, 
2008) and the generalised linear models (Madrigal et al., 2011) to assess the level of 
mortality differentials but ignoring the mortality improvement by socioeconomic 
profiles and the projection of their future evolution. However, several papers use 
multiple population extensions of the Lee-Carter Model (Lee and Carter, 1992) 
allowing to model and forecast mortality for two or more related populations 
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simultaneously14. Additionally, Villegas and Haberman (2014) introduced a relative 
modelling approach where the mortality of socioeconomic subgroups is modelled 
relative to the mortality of a larger reference population (generally referred to the 
national population). Their study concludes that mortality level differentials have a 
stronger impact on expectations of life and annuity values than mortality improvement. 
In this study, we employ the extension of the Lee-Carter model, known as the 
‘common factor’ model proposed by Li and Lee (2005) to estimate and forecast age- 
and gender-specific mortality rates across three levels of education. This model 
assumes all subpopulations have the same mortality improvements at all times, 
described by the common factor x  and tK . In practice, it is unlikely that all subgroups 
would have the identical tendency, however, because of the restriction of the available 
mortality statistics across socioeconomic status (only for five years, 2009-2013) it is 
necessary to make the assumption that the related populations share a common time 
trend in the long run15.  
The mortality data of this analysis consist of the national mortality experience for 
calendar years 1960–2013 covering the age range 25–95 obtained from the Human 
Mortality Database (HMD), and the subpopulation dataset by educational attainment 
from the Eurostat having a shorter observation period 2009–2013 with the age range 
25-95. The set of calendar years of subpopulation data is a subset of the corresponding 
calendar years in the national population and the ages available within each subgroup 
is a subset of those available in the national population as well. Then, we can apply the 
common factor model in the form of the relative mortality approach between the 
reference (national) population and the subpopulation introduced by Haberman et al. 
(2014). The procedures for the estimation and projections of the group-specific 
                                                          
14 For instance, the quantification of mortality differentials across countries (Li and Lee, 2005; Li and 
Hardy, 2011; Enchev et al., 2017), regions within a country (Debón et al., 2011; Danesi et al., 2015) 
and socioeconomic subgroups (Villegas and Haberman, 2014; van Baal et al., 2016). 
15 We have also modelled the mortality rates by using the other extensions of Lee and Carter (1997), 
which is known as the Joint- model assuming the differential mortality improvements among groups, 
described in Appendix C.2. However, the forecasted rates are unreasonable in the long run; for example, 
the forecasted mortality rates of the low-educated group will be less than those of medium-educated. 
With regard to the papers of Haberman et al. (2014) Villegas et al. (2017) that comment on the 
difficulties with small data sets and less than about 8-10 years of data, our results might be caused by 
the very short time period of available data on education-specific mortality. 
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mortality rates and the construction of the cohort life tables are described in Appendix 
C.1. 
The Statistics Sweden reports that life expectancy at birth in 2015 is 84.0 years for 
women and 80.3 years for men, while at age 65 these values are 21.3 and 18.7, 
respectively. During the last five years, the life expectancy for men has grown up by 1 
year, while a rise in women has been by 0.6 years. There are clear and growing 
differences in remaining life expectancy between groups with different educational 
levels. Specifically, over the period 2012-2014, remaining life expectancy at age 65 
for males with compulsory education (primary school) was 17.9 years and those with 
a degree were expected to live 20.2 years. Low educated women at age 65 are expected 
to survive 20.4 years and the life expectancy will rise to 22.9 years for those women 
graduated from the university. Apparently, the difference between the groups with the 
highest and the lowest educational level was about 5.5 years throughout the country 
(The Statistics Sweden, 2016). 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the mortality across subgroups of males (females) is above 
(below) the average mortality. Furthermore, Figure 4.2 shows that the average 
mortality rates for men and women are quite close to those with medium education 
and the mortality in high-educated men and low-educated women are similar to the 
rates for the overall population. 
In 2083, the age-specific mortality rates for all subgroups are projected to continuously 
decline, while maintaining the existing patterns of differential mortality. Also, because 
of the coherent approach to modelling the mortality trends for subpopulations, 
independently for each gender, the projected future subgroup-specific mortality rates 
do not diverge in the long run and the education- and age-specific mortality rates for 
each gender deviate constantly from the general (reference) mortality rates over time. 
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of mortality rates across gender and three levels of education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Application of the demographic annuity divisor 
Under the conditions defined above, the unisex demographic annuity divisor for an 
individual aged 65 is equal to 24.2630. Since we define the indexation rate,  , to be 
identical to the discount rate, r  , for the divisor, then the annuity divisor is equivalent 
to the remaining life expectancy at age 65. The values of this annuity divisor across 
subpopulations compared to the unisex (average) annuity divisor are illustrated in 
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Figure 4.3. It is noticeable that the value of the demographic divisors for all subgroups 
of women (men) are greater (lower) than the unisex divisor. The values of the 
demographic annuity divisors across the subgroups have a pattern that is consistent 
with mortality. The value of the divisor for the medium-educated women group, i.e. 
25.7773, is close to the value of overall women, i.e. 25.6425. As expected, the value 
of the divisor for women with high-education is the greatest with the value of 26.5524 
as they have the lowest mortality among the whole population. In a similar way, the 
annuity divisor for men in the group of medium education with the value of 23.2062 
is quite close to the value for all men, i.e. 23.0102 while the lowest value corresponds 
to the low-educated group with the value of 22.3640 as those individuals have the 
highest mortality compared to all subpopulations. We can expect that the groups of 
participants, particularly all females and probably the high-educated males, who have 
the divisor greater than the unisex (average) divisor would have a PVR higher than 1 
and receive a greater income transfer than the others. 
Figure 4.3: Annuity divisors under the baseline assumptions by gender and education 
 
The money’s worth of the pension benefits for an individual who retires at age 65, 
given the unisex (average) annuity divisor at 24.2630, is measured through the PVR 
as exhibited in Figure 4.4. When the survivor dividend (SD) is included in the 
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calculation of the initial pension and if there is no heterogeneity in mortality across 
populations, the PVR is equal to 1 indicating that the individuals will receive pension 
benefits identical to what they have been contributing over their working lives. 
Figure 4.4: PVR across subpopulations in the cases of notional capital including and 
excluding survivor dividend 
 
Considering differences in levels of mortality rates per groups, the PVR is higher for 
females than for males and it increases with the level of education, ranging from 
0.9024 for a low-educated man to 1.1127 for a high-educated female worker. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that for most of the subgroups of females (males) 
participants, the PVRs are higher (less) than 1 as shown in Figure 4.4, what implies 
that they receive (pay for) a pension transfer.  
A low-educated man worker is the largest loser, with the PVR of 0.9024 which is about 
4.96% less than the PVR for the average man and 9.76% less than the average 
population, while a high-educated man receives a transfer of income from the system 
of 1.54%. In contrast, all women obtain welfare gains when the unisex (average) 
demographic annuity divisor is used, i.e. 1.35% of transfer for a low-educated woman, 
6.99% for medium-educated and 11.72% for high-educated. 
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If the unisex (average) demographic divisor is used, it is remarkable that the gender 
has a larger impact on the income redistribution as even for women with low education 
the PVR is higher than the case for the average population. 
Figure 4.4, when the survivor dividend is not included in the calculation of the pension 
benefits, the PVR for each subgroup decreases by 4.4% compared to the case of 
including the survivor dividend. However, even without the inclusion of the survivor 
dividend, women – specifically with medium and high education – are still benefitted 
by the system with a PVR higher than 1. 
• Application of the economic annuity divisor 
The value of the economic divisor for a particular cohort corresponding to the equation 
(4.6) depends on the population composition. Therefore, some plausible assumptions 
on the size of the different subgroups are needed. As stated in Section 4.2, the value of 
the economic divisor increases when the pension disbursement is higher and the pay-
out period is longer. 
Table 4.1 shows the results when the number of females increases (decreases) by 20% 
with respect to the number of males, i.e 1.2
ee
female male
x nx n
l l    (or 0.8 ee
female male
x nx n
l l   ), 
keeping the equal proportion of each level of education. If we calculate the economic 
divisor only considering gender differences in mortality, we see that the value of the 
economic annuity, 24.4383, is higher than the demographic divisor when the number 
of women is larger since the number of years that pensions will be disbursed increases 
– women are generally living longer than men. In contrast, when the number of women 
is smaller, the value of the economic divisor is lower than the demographic divisor. 
Consequently, as shown in Table 4.1, when the value of the economic divisor is higher 
(lower), both the amount of the pension and the PVR decrease (increase) compared to 
the case of using the unisex demographic annuity divisor. 
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Table 4.1: PVR for different subgroups when only gender differences in mortality taking into 
account in the calculation of the divisors 
Sup-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
Females < Males Females = Males Females > Males 
Divisor 24.2630 24.1725 24.3186 24.4383 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.9530 0.37% 0.9473 -0.23% 0.9427 -0.72% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9058 0.37% 0.9003 -0.23% 0.8959 -0.72% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9602 0.37% 0.9544 -0.23% 0.9497 -0.72% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0192 0.37% 1.0131 -0.23% 1.0081 -0.72% 
Women 1.0640 1.0680 0.37% 1.0616 -0.23% 1.0564 -0.72% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0173 0.37% 1.0112 -0.23% 1.0062 -0.72% 
W-M 1.0699 1.0739 0.37% 1.0675 -0.23% 1.0623 -0.72% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1214 0.37% 1.1146 -0.23% 1.1092 -0.72% 
 
The economic annuity divisor is also associated with the different sizes of the 
socioeconomic groups in the total population. As expected, if the economic divisor 
considers that all individuals are low-educated, its value would be lower, i.e. 23.5324, 
than the unisex demographic divisor, as illustrated in Table 4.2. The use of the 
economic divisor, in this particular case, provides a higher initial pension and 
consequently all subgroups would be benefitting from the application of the economic 
divisor. Conversely, the value of the economic divisor increases when its calculation 
considers that all individuals are high-educated people and thus the PVRs for all 
subpopulations decrease 4.38% compared to the case of using demographic annuity 
divisor. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. Fairness and Annuitisation Divisors for Notional Defined Contribution  66 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: PVR for different subgroups when all individuals are considered to have the same 
education level (low, medium or high education) for the calculation of the economic divisor 
Sup-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
Low education 
Medium 
education 
High education 
Divisor 24.2630 23.5324 24.4664 25.3731 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.9789 3.10% 0.9416 -0.83% 0.9079 -4.38% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9304 3.10% 0.8949 -0.83% 0.8629 -4.38% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9863 3.10% 0.9486 -0.83% 0.9147 -4.38% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0469 3.10% 1.0069 -0.83% 0.9710 -4.38% 
Women 1.0640 1.0971 3.10% 1.0552 -0.83% 1.0175 -4.38% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0450 3.10% 1.0051 -0.83% 0.9692 -4.38% 
W-M 1.0699 1.1032 3.10% 1.0610 -0.83% 1.0231 -4.38% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1519 3.10% 1.1079 -0.83% 1.0683 -4.38% 
Table 4.3 extends Table 4.2 and assumes six different compositions of the population 
when calculating the economic divisor16. As shown in Table 4.3, the values of the 
economic divisor increase with a high level of education in the population. 
Specifically, the lowest value of the economic divisor, i.e. 23.9604, results for a 
combination of medium-educated males together with low-educated females. The 
values of economic divisors increase with level of education and we can categorise the 
results into three groups: the combination of population structure of low- and medium-
educated (23.9604 and 24.0893), the low and high education (24.5034 and 24.6203) 
and the medium and high education (24.9382 and 24.9482), respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Table 4.3 involves the women with different education level from men, while Table 4.2 assumes that 
both males and females are having the same level of education. 
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Table 4.3: PVR for different subgroups when six different combinations of population are 
considered for the calculation of the economic divisor17 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
ML&WM ML&WH MM&WL MM&WH MH&WL MH&WM 
Divisor 24.2630 24.0983 24.6203 23.9604 24.9489 24.5034 24.9382 
PVR 
Men 0.9495 0.9560 0.9357 0.9615 0.9234 0.9401 0.9238 
M-L 0.9024 0.9085 0.8893 0.9138 0.8776 0.8935 0.8779 
M-M 0.9566 0.9631 0.9427 0.9687 0.9303 0.9472 0.9307 
M-H 1.0154 1.0223 1.0006 1.0282 0.9875 1.0054 0.9879 
Women 1.0640 1.0713 1.0486 1.0775 1.0348 1.0536 1.0352 
W-L 1.0135 1.0204 0.9988 1.0263 0.9857 1.0036 0.9861 
W-M 1.0699 1.0772 1.0544 1.0834 1.0405 1.0594 1.0410 
W-H 1.1172 1.1248 1.1010 1.1313 1.0865 1.1062 1.0869 
Furthermore, we show that there are slight differences in the economic divisor values 
when the population consists of the same combination of level of education no matter 
the gender. For example, the value of economic divisor for the case of a population 
consisting of high-educated males and low-educated females in the system, 24.5034, 
is quite similar than the case of low-educated males and high-educated females, 
24.6203. With the same combination of education, the value of the economic divisor 
is lower for the case where women have lower level of education than men due to their 
longer life expectancy. 
As expected, the lower the value of the economic divisor is, the higher the amount of 
the initial pension and it leads to the higher PVR for all subgroups and vice versa. 
Although, the values of economic divisors vary depending on the population structure, 
                                                          
17 Each case represents that (1) ML&WM – all men are low-educated and all women are medium-
educated; (2) ML&WH – all men are low-educated and all women are high-educated; (3) MM&WL – 
all men are medium-educated and all women are low-educated; (4) MM&WH – all men are medium-
educated and all women are high-educated; (5) MH&WL – all men are high-educated and all women 
are low-educated; (6) MH&WM – all men are high-educated and all women are medium-educated. 
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females with medium and high education benefit from the system no matter which 
assumptions are made to calculate the divisor. 
4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
This section presents a sensitivity analysis of some variables that might affect the 
redistribution of the NDC scheme such as the retirement age, notional rate, discount 
rate and indexation of pensions in payment. The results are illustrated only for the case 
of the unisex demographic divisor. 18 
• Changes in retirement age 
As seen in the equation (4.2), (4.3) and (4.5), when the retirement age increases the 
accumulated notional capital increases and the demographic annuity divisor decreases 
due to a shorter remaining life expectancy. As a result, the amount of the initial pension 
increases but the effect on the PVR is not clear. When the survivor dividend is not 
distributed, the PVR would decrease if the retirement age is delayed (see Figure 4.5b). 
Surprisingly, when the survivor dividend is considered, Figure 4.5a, the PVRs for all 
subgroups of females increase with retirement age due to the higher value of the 
notional capital after the inclusion of the dividend. For males, we see that the higher 
values of the accumulated balances – resulting to the higher pensions – do not 
compensate the shorter lifespan of a late retirement and therefore the PVRs decrease 
when the retirement age increases. 
                                                          
18 Although the results of the sensitivity analysis using the economic divisor are different in absolute 
terms, the conclusions are the same as for the demographic divisor.  
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Figure 4.5: PVR when using unisex demographic divisors by different retirement ages in the 
case of including and excluding survivor dividend 
• Changes in notional rate 
Changes in the notional rate have a positive effect on the amount of the accumulated 
notional capital at retirement age and as a result there is a direct change in the amount 
of the initial pension. As expected, when the notional rate increases, the expected 
present value of pension benefits would also increase, while the expected present value 
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of contribution payments remains unchanged. Consequently, the PVRs increase with 
the (almost) same percentage for all subgroups as shown in Table 4.4 and there will be 
more favourable in welfare. 
Table 4.4: PVR with different notional rates and % of relative change compared to the case 
of using demographic divisor under the main assumption 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Notional rate 
1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 24.2630 24.2630 24.2630 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.8380 -11.74% 1.0340 8.91% 1.2891 35.78% 
M-L 0.9024 0.7965 -11.74% 0.9828 8.91% 1.2252 35.78% 
M-M 0.9566 0.8443 -11.74% 1.0418 8.91% 1.2988 35.78% 
M-H 1.0154 0.8962 -11.74% 1.1058 8.91% 1.3786 35.78% 
Women 1.0640 0.9393 -11.72% 1.1587 8.90% 1.4441 35.72% 
W-L 1.0135 0.8947 -11.72% 1.1037 8.90% 1.3755 35.72% 
W-M 1.0699 0.9445 -11.72% 1.1651 8.90% 1.4521 35.72% 
W-H 1.1172 0.9862 -11.72% 1.2166 8.90% 1.5162 35.72% 
 
• Changes in discount rate 
A higher discount rate will reduce the value of demographic annuity divisor and both 
the expected present value of contribution payments and pension benefits would 
decrease. This would lead to the reduction in the PVRs as exhibited in Table 4.5. The 
changes in the discount rate have the relatively larger effect on the pension rights of 
females than males and the same happens for individuals with high education relative 
to those who are poorly educated. 
When the discount rate increases to 2%, the cross-gender redistribution declines by 
7.97% for males and by 8.33% for females and considering within females, the PVR 
drops by 8.30% for the low-educated and 8.41% for those with high-educated. 
Therefore, an increase in the rate of discount brings about more welfare loss for all 
subgroups of population. 
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Table 4.5: PVR with different discount rates and % relative change compared to the case of 
using demographic divisor under the main assumption 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Discount rate 
1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 26.1943 23.0914 20.5127 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 1.0719 12.89% 0.8738 -7.97% 0.7047 -25.78% 
M-L 0.9024 1.0181 12.83% 0.8308 -7.94% 0.6706 -25.69% 
M-M 0.9566 1.0805 12.95% 0.8801 -8.00% 0.7091 -25.87% 
M-H 1.0154 1.1486 13.12% 0.9332 -8.09% 0.7502 -26.11% 
Women 1.0640 1.2086 13.59% 0.9754 -8.33% 0.7793 -26.76% 
W-L 1.0135 1.1506 13.52% 0.9294 -8.30% 0.7433 -26.66% 
W-M 1.0699 1.2158 13.63% 0.9806 -8.35% 0.7830 -26.81% 
W-H 1.1172 1.2708 13.75% 1.0232 -8.41% 0.8157 -26.98% 
 
• Changes in indexation rate 
We finally present the distributional effects if we change the rate of indexation to 
adjust the amount of pension benefits in each year. As expected, the higher indexation 
rate gives the higher values of the annuity divisor and therefore the amount of the 
initial pension would be made to be lower. In particular, in the case that there is no 
indexation – the pension benefits remain constant over time – the unisex annuity 
divisor decreases from 24.2630 to 19.9924 as illustrated in Table 4.6.  
However, we show that the PVRs do not change in the same direction for males and 
females, i.e. PVRs decrease for males and increase for women when indexation of 
pension increases. This is due to the fact that the EPV of pensions for women increases 
with high value of indexation since this group benefitted from having life expectancy 
longer than average. 
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Table 4.6: PVR with different indexation rates and % relative change compared to the case of 
using demographic divisor under the main assumption 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Indexation rate 
0% 1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 19.9924 22.5277 25.5208 29.0658 
PVR and % relative change         
Men 0.9495 0.9578 0.88% 0.9527 0.34% 0.9472 -0.23% 0.9415 -0.84% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9133 1.21% 0.9066 0.47% 0.8995 -0.32% 0.8921 -1.14% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9638 0.75% 0.9594 0.29% 0.9547 -0.20% 0.9497 -0.72% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0181 0.27% 1.0165 0.11% 1.0146 -0.07% 1.0126 -0.27% 
Women 1.0640 1.0563 -0.73% 1.0610 -0.28% 1.0661 0.19% 1.0713 0.68% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0091 -0.44% 1.0118 -0.17% 1.0147 0.12% 1.0177 0.41% 
W-M 1.0699 1.0612 -0.82% 1.0666 -0.31% 1.0722 0.21% 1.0782 0.77% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1043 -1.15% 1.1122 -0.44% 1.1206 0.30% 1.1293 1.08% 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The use of gender-neutral annuity divisor in the conversion of the accumulated 
notional capital into a whole life annuity under the NDC pension scheme introduces 
an intra-generational income redistribution when heterogeneity in mortality exists in 
the population. This chapter examines the redistributive effects across subpopulations 
– differentiated by gender and educational attainment – of using the unisex 
demographic annuity divisor – related to the remaining life expectancy – and the 
alternative divisor, namely the economic annuity divisor – involving the size of 
pension disbursements and the pay-out period. 
The value of the alternative divisor, used in Sweden to calculate the pension liabilities, 
depends on the composition of the population. In this respect, for a particular gender 
or level of education, the values of economic divisors tend to be higher if the pension 
system has a large size of population with low-mortality risk, i.e. females or high-
educated people. Moreover, we demonstrate that when mortality differential by gender 
and level of education are taken into account, the economic divisors are mostly driven 
by the longevity effect corresponding to the gender. 
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The income redistribution is measured through the concept of the money’s worth for 
participation in the pension system on a lifetime basis. As expected, the numerical 
illustration strongly confirms that the expected transfer of wealth away from high-
mortality risk groups to low-mortality risk groups. Also, all subgroups of women and 
high-educated men are benefitted from the use of unisex annuity divisors – both 
demographic and economic divisors – as their lifespans are longer than the average 
life expectancy. This leads to present value ratios greater than the case for the average 
population.  
The other consequence of using the economic divisor is that, with changes in the value 
of economic divisor, the amount of initial pension and the PVRs would change in the 
opposite direction with the same relative percentage of change for all subgroups.  
In addition, the initial pension taking into account the survivor dividend would create 
an actuarially fair pension system – an individual will receive pension benefits 
identical to what she has been contributing over her working life – if there is no 
heterogeneity in mortality across subpopulations. Surprisingly, the survivor dividend 
also produces a trade-off between the PVRs for males and females at the different ages 
of retirement. Specifically, the PVRs for all subgroups of females increase if the 
retirement age is delayed due to the higher value of the notional capital distributed by 
more capital from the deceased participants. In contrast, the higher values of the 
accumulated balances for males do not compensate the shorter lifespan of a late 
retirement and thus the PVRs decrease when the retirement age increases. 
Furthermore, the distribution of survivor dividend would reduce the effect of 
differential mortality on the income transfer since the PVRs when including the 
survivor dividend for all subgroups are higher than those of without the survivor 
dividend. 
This chapter evaluates income redistribution on a purely financial basis. One potential 
direction for future research would be to investigate the effect of mortality 
heterogeneity on the utility gains associated to the use of unisex annuity divisors. 
Different policy options could also be designed along the contribution-benefit lifecycle 
with the aim of reducing the distributional effects of the system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) 
Pension Schemes: Construction of Annuity 
Divisors Using the Direct Method1 
Under the non-financial (notional) defined contribution (NDC) pension scheme, the 
accumulated contributions of an individual are converted into a life annuity by a so-
called annuity divisor regularly taking into account life expectancy at retirement, 
indexation of pension and interest rate. The annuity divisor, however, is differently 
formulated among countries depending on the types of benefits. In particular, the 
Italian NDC scheme combines the old-age with the survivors’ benefits in the 
calculation of the annuity divisor that makes the actuarial value of pension benefits 
related to multiple lives. This paper aims to construct the annuity divisors for the Italian 
NDC scheme using a simulation technique, a so-called the direct method, which works 
on the mean values of the variables. The direct method follows all possible trajectories 
and its probability is known, hence we can compute the actuarial value of annuity 
being paid to a pensioner and her dependents. 
Keywords: annuity divisor, notional defined contribution, retirement, simulation, 
survivors’ benefits, multiple state model 
                                                          
1 A version of the paper (joint work with María del Carmen Boado-Penas, Jacques Janssen and 
Raimondo Manca) was presented at the International Actuarial Association (IAA) Life Colloquium, 
Barcelona, Spain, October 22–23, 2017. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The annuity divisor, according to the actuarial principles, is typically referred to the 
expected present value (also known as the actuarial value) of a life annuity payable 
periodically – usually monthly or annually – throughout the pensioner’s life. Although 
the four pioneer NDC countries share the same idea of using unisex (average) annuity 
divisors, these countries consider different elements in the divisor’s calculation based 
on the provision of pension benefits2 . Specifically, Italy is the only country that 
combines the old-age with survivors’ benefits – involving life contingencies of more 
than two lives, e.g. pensioner, spouse, and children – in the computation of the annuity 
divisor.  
After the reform in 1995, the Italian pension system has still retained the previous rules 
for survivors. On the death of the pensioner, his/her remaining notional balance is 
transferred to the family members in the form of life annuity. The surviving spouse 
receives 60 percent of the deceased’s entitlement. The pension amount is enlarged to 
70 percent if the recipient has only one child. If there are more dependents, the pension 
will be allocated depending on the number of dependents, with the ceiling becoming 
100 percent of the original pension. However, the method for computing the 
transformation coefficients created by the Italian government assumes that the insured 
person has only a spouse and the transformation coefficients, thus, rely on the 
probabilities of the survival of the pensioner and his/her spouse (Chłoń-Domińczak et 
al., 2012). 
It is commonly known that the actuarial value of the whole life annuity for a single life 
is always less than those actuarial values for two lives or more. Thus, if the annuity 
divisor considering a single life is used to determine the initial pension benefits related 
to multiple beneficiaries, the amount of pension payment (and therefore the liabilities 
of the system) will be higher  than it should be. We, therefore, aim to fill in this gap 
                                                          
2 These NDC countries provide old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions but most of them do not 
include other than death of the pensioner in the calculation of the annuity divisor. In particular, Latvia, 
Poland and Sweden take into account the remaining future lifetime for a single life – a pensioner only, 
while Italy incorporates the survival probabilities of a pensioner and of his/her spouse after a pensioner’s 
death (Gronchi and Nistico, 2006; Chłoń-Domińczak et al., 2012). 
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by developing a complex actuarial model for the annuity divisor of the NDC scheme 
that includes the old-age and all possible survivors’ benefits. We also explore the 
differences of the annuity divisors obtained under the current Italian rule and the 
proposed model. 
In the model, we incorporate the survivors’ pensions for the widow and the orphan 
together with the old-age benefits in the multiple state framework, and the formulae of 
the expected present values of the annuity paid to each beneficiary are constructed in 
terms of the one-year transition probabilities. In the computation of the annuity 
divisors, we apply the simulation technique called the ‘direct method’, which works 
on the mean values of the variables rather than their distribution functions. The direct 
method follows all possible trajectories that a person would occupy during his/her 
lifetime, and its probability is known. The results acheived in the numerical example 
endorse the fact that the model does really work, and show the evolution of the 
longevity improvement affecting the annuity divisors. 
The chapter is organised as follows; after this introduction, Section 5.2 presents the 
formula underlying the annuity divisors of the Italian rule. In the next section, we 
describe the model to value the unitary pension of  the old-age together with the 
survivors’ benefits based on the discrete time multiple state framework. Then, the 
details of how to construct the algorithm of the expected payments for each type of the 
pension recipient by using the direct method are given in Section 5.4. Afterwards, 
Section 5.5 shows the results of the annuity divisors obtained from the numerical 
example representative of the Italian rule and of the proposed model. The paper ends 
with the main conclusions and the possible directions for the future research. 
5.2 The transformation coefficients of the Dini reform 
The Italian state pension system was shifted from a DB PAYG to an NDC scheme in 
1995 as a part of the so-called Dini reform (Law335/95) in which the pension at 
retirement age rx  can be calculated as the product of the accumulated notional capital 
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over the course of working life and the transformation coefficient3, 
rx
TC , expressed 
as: 
        
rr x
Initial pension at age x Accumulated notional capital TC   (5.1) 
This transformation coefficient, according to the actuarial rules, takes into account the 
life expectancy of both a pensioner and her spouse (after her death). Although the 
scheme provides the orphan benefits as well, the formula (5.3) is not very theoretical 
since it does not include the actuarial value of the annuity paid to the children. 
The formulae underlying the transformation coefficient of the Dini reform for the 
retirement at age rx  is defined as following: 
1
r
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x
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where: 
rx
TC  is the average (unisex) transformation coefficient at retirement age rx ; 
                                                          
3 It is the inverse form of an annuity divisor. In this study, we focus mainly on the annuity divisor – the 
actuarial present value of a whole life annuity – rather than the transformation coefficient. 
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rx
AD  is the average (unisex) annuity divisor at retirement age rx , which 
represents the average expected present value of a lifelong annuity consisting of old-
age and survivors’ benefits for males and females; 
old-age
,rx g
a  is the expected present value of a life annuity of 1 monetary unit for a 
pensioner (old-age benefits) at retirement age rx  and gender g  that will be paid as 
long as he/she is alive; 
survivor
,rx g
a  is the expected present value of a life annuity of 1 monetary unit for a 
surviving spouse (if there is any) after a pensioner’s death, conditional on that a 
pensioner has been received the old-age benefits since retirement age rx . The pension 
will be paid as long as a spouse is alive; 
k  is the actuarial adjustment factor to take into account the frequencies of pension 
payments (e.g. annually, quarterly, monthly and semi-monthly) made to the pensioner 
each year and it is specified by law4; 
,rx g
l is the number of people surviving at age rx  and gender g ; 
w  is the maximum reachable age; 
  is the percentage of pension paid to the surviving spouse and in Italy it is defined 
at 0.6  ;  
g  is the earning-related reduction factor for the widow/widower having the 
survivor pension entitlement, a value of 0.9 for a male pensioner (paid to the widow) 
and 0.7 for a female pensioner (paid to the widower). Thus, g  represents the fraction 
of the pension paid to the widow/widower; 
,rx g
  is the probability that the pensioner aged rx  and gender g  got married; 
                                                          
4 In the Italian case, it was previously considered bimonthly with the value of 0.4231k  and since 
2006 it has been payable monthly with the value of 0.4615k  . 
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spouse
1,rx t g
a    is the expected present value of a whole life annuity of 1 monetary unit 
paid to the surviving spouse when the age of a pensioner is 1rx t . If a pensioner 
is gender g , then the gender of his/her spouse is g ; 
g  is the age difference between a pensioner and his/her spouse with the value of 
3 for a male pensioner and -3 for a female pensioner. This assumption is made by law; 
r  is the technical rate of return;  
 is the inflation rate to adjust the amount of pension in payment; 
1
1
r



 is assumed constant over time with 1.015 and is equivalent to the long-run 
expected GDP growth rate (as a five-year moving average); 
g  denotes the gender of the pensioner with     ,g male m female f ; 
g  denotes the gender of his/her spouse with   if g ,  if gg f m m f    ; 
It is noticeable from the formula (5.3) that the annuity divisor of the unitary pension 
benefits is derived from two components: the expected present value of a lifetime 
annuity for a pensioner and the expected present value of a whole life annuity for a 
surviving spouse. Also, due to the gender equality, the expected present values of the 
unitary annuity for males and females are averaged to obtain the single value for both 
genders at the same age. 
The transformation coefficients of the Dini reform were initially computed in 1995 
(Law335/95), and should be updated every ten years, but the first revision in 2005 was 
not made. However, the new coefficients were established during the 2007 reform 
(Law247/07), and were in force between 2010–12. The coefficients are expected to be 
revised every three years, depending on the changes in life expectancy and the new 
GDP growth rates projections. According to the 2011 reform (Law214/11), the revised 
coefficients were in force between 2013–15, and the latest available coefficients are 
applicable from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018. Table 5.1 reports the previous 
and current transformation coefficients at retirement age 57–65. 
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Table 5.1: The official Italian transformation coefficients (in %) 
Age 1995–2009 2010–2012 2013–2015 2016–2018 
57 4.720 4.419 4.304 4.246 
58 4.860 4.538 4.416 4.354 
59 5.006 4.664 4.535 4.468 
60 5.163 4.798 4.661 4.589 
61 5.334 4.940 4.796 4.719 
62 5.514 5.093 4.940 4.856 
63 5.706 5.257 5.094 5.003 
64 5.911 5.432 5.259 5.159 
65 6.136 5.620 5.435 5.326 
Source: Aben (2011), OECD (2015) and The Research Center of Itinerari Previdenziali (2017) 
5.3 The theoretical model to value old-age and survivors’ 
benefits 
This section describes a theoretical model including both retirement and survivors’ 
benefits. First, we describe the multiple state model related to a general pension plan. 
Then, the actuarial values – also called as the expected present values or the annuity 
divisors – of those pension benefits are then presented. 
5.3.1 The multiple state model for old-age combined with survivors’ 
benefits 
When a worker reaches retirement age, the pension is paid periodically throughout 
his/her life. In addition, upon the pensioner’s death, the reversibility pension – a 
proportion of the original pension transferred to the survivors –  will be paid to his/his 
family members either spouse or children. The pension transition diagram is shown in 
Figure 5.1. The state of being a retiree is denoted as ' 'r and he/she can have survivors 
who are classified into three groups: i) spouse and children (complete family), ii) only 
spouse and iii) only children. If the death of a retiree occurs, the benefit entitlement 
can be changed into four different options: 
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i) In case of a complete family, the reversibility pension will be paid to the 
surviving members of a family consisting of a spouse and the children denoted as the 
complete family state, ' 'f . The transition from the state r  to f  is activated if the 
pensioner has the surviving spouse and young children and the average age of the 
children does not exceed the maximum age of having the pension right. 
 ii) In case of only spouse, the reversibility pension will be paid to the only 
surviving spouse denoted as the spouse state, ' 's . The transition from the state r  to s  
is activated if the pensioner got married – the spouse is still being alive – and either 
he/she has no children or the average age of the children exceeds the maximum age of 
eligibility for the pension benefits. 
 iii) In case of only children, the reversibility pension will be paid to the only 
children denoted as the children state, ' 'c . The transition from the state r  to c  is 
activated if the pensioner has a family with only children and the age of children does 
not exceed the maximum age of having the right for the pension. 
 iv) No reversibility pension (the termination of the pension plan) is denoted as 
the exit state, ' 'e . The transition from the state r  to e  is activated if the pensioner has 
no family. 
Figure 5.1: The pension transition for old-age combined with survivors' benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spouse  
Children  
Family  Retiree  Exit  
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Additionally, the transition from the complete family, f , state to the spouse, s , state 
will occur when the children reach the maximum age of having the pension right. On 
the other side, the complete family, f , state will transfer to the children, c , state if the 
spouse dies. The survivors’ benefit payments will be terminated when all children 
reach the maximum age of receiving the pension and the spouse dies. Then, their 
occupied states will be changed to the absorbing exit, e , state. 
Mathematically, we consider a time-discrete stochastic process of the random state 
occupied by the pension recipient  ( ) : 0,1,2,...Y t t  , with state space 
 , , , ,r f s c e  . For states ,i j  in a multiple state model and for the integer age 
ix  at time 0t  , we define 
 Pr ( ) | ( )
i
ij
t i ix
p Y x t j Y x i       (5.7) 
where 
i
ij
t x
p  is the probability that a person aged ix  in state i  is in state j  at age ix t  
and j  can be equal to i .  
Our model involves more than two lives including the pensioner, the spouse and the 
children and we assume that the future lifetime of each person is not affected in any 
way by the other life. For a one-year period, the relationships of the probabilities for 
each type of an annuitant, conditional on that he/she is in his/her own state i  at age ix  
are given by: 
Pensioner aged rx  : 1r r r rr
rr rf rs rc re
x x x xx
p p p p p       (5.8) 
Spouse aged sx  : 1s s
ss se
x xp p       (5.9) 
Children aged cx  : 1c
cc
xp       (5.10) 
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We suppose the transition from state i  into state j  and i j  will occur in the middle 
of the year. Under the uniform distribution of the transition assumption, for an integer 
age ix  and for 0 1a  , we can obtain 
i i
ij ij
a x x
p a p       (5.11) 
Thus, the mid-year transition probability for an annuitant aged ix  and i j  is defined 
as: 
    1 2
1
2i i
ij ij
x x
p p      (5.12) 
With regard to the one-year probabilities of remaining in the same state i  for any age 
ix n , i
ii
x np  , the following multi-year probabilities can be derived: 
1
0
i i
t
ii ii
t x x n
n
p p



     (5.13) 
and     0 1i
ii
xp       (5.14) 
5.3.2 Actuarial values of unitary pension benefits 
With the aim of calculating the actuarial present value of the unitary pension benefits, 
we initially compute the actuarial values of the life annuity for the spouse, for the 
children and for the complete family separately. Then, these three actuarial values are 
incorporated in the calculation of the annuity divisor for the retired person at a 
particular retirement age. 
We assume that an annuity of 1 monetary unit is payable annually in the middle of the 
year throughout the lifetime of a retired person aged rx . If he/she dies during the pay-
out period, the reduced (reversibility) annuity, as a fraction of the basic amount of 1 
monetary unit, will be paid to the surviving members of the family during their 
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lifetime. For the case of the surviving spouse pension, the initial payment of %SB  of 
the basic amount of 1 is paid in the mid-year after the pensioner’s death and the life 
annuity of SB  monetary unit per annum continues to be paid as long as the spouse 
aged sx  is still being alive. For the children benefits, the annuity of %CB  of the basic 
amount of 1 is payable annually until the children aged cx  have reached the maximum 
age denoted as M  and we suppose that they do not die during the pay-out period. For 
the case of the complete family pension, the annuity of %FB  of the basic amount of 1 
is paid to the family in which a spouse aged sx  is considered as a chief recipient for 
the benefit valuation and the payments will be terminated if either the children reach 
the maximum age or the spouse dies. 
 
    r  
    f  
  r   s  
    c  
    e  
    f  
r     s  
  f   c  
    e  
  s   s  
    e  
  c   c  
    e  
  e    
 
 
Figure 5.2: The pension benefits’ trajectory tree 
The time-line diagram for possible events of the benefit payments since an individual 
has retired at age rx  until she has reached the maximum age of surviving, denoted as 
w , is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The expected benefit payments are evaluated at time 
0t   and discounted with the fixed annual interest rate, set as r  . The expected 
Time 
... w  2rx   1rx   rx  Age 
rw x  1 0 2 ... 
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(actuarial) present value of the whole unitary pension benefits for a retired person aged 
rx , rxEPV , can be expressed as: 
 
The expected pension payments for a pensioner paid until the mid-year of deat
( 0.5)
0
it is equivalent to 1
1
2
r
r r r r r rr
rr
x tr
w x
rr rr rf rs rc re t
x t x x t x t x t x tx t
t
p
EPV p p p p p p v



   


 
 
     
 
 
 

h 
 
 
The expected payments for dependents in the mid-year of a pensioner's death
( 0.5)
0
1
2
r
r r rr
w x
rr rf rs rc t
t x x t x tx t
t
p FB p SB p CB p v


 

        
   
The expected pension for a family after a pensioner's death
( 0.5)
1 1
1
r
r r s
w x
rr rf f t
t x x t x t
t
p FB p EPV v


   

   
   
The expected pension for a spouse after a pensioner's death
( 0.5)
1 1
1
r
r r s
w x
rr rs s t
t x x t x t
t
p SB p EPV v


   

   
     
    
The expected annuities-certain for children after a pensioner's death
( 0.5)
1 1
1
r
r r c
w x
rr rc c t
t x x t x t
t
p CB p EPV v


   

   
    (5.15) 
Note that while a pensioner is aged rx , his/her spouse is aged sx  and the average age 
of children is cx . The payments are discounted with 
1
1
v
r


. The
r
rr
t xp is the 
probability that a pensioner aged rx  is being alive at time t . The r
rf
x t
p
 , r
rs
x tp   and 
r
rc
x tp  represents the probability that a pensioner aged rx t  dies within one year and 
the benefit payments will be transferred to the family, to the spouse, and to the 
children, respectively. The 
r
re
x tp   is the probability that a pensioner aged rx t  dies 
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within one year and no payment is made to the survivors because a pensioner has no 
family. 
After the pensioner’s death, the amount of an annuity paid to his/her family, spouse 
and children is reduced to FB , SB and CB  as a percentage of the 1 monetary unit, 
respectively. In addition, the benefit cash flows will depend on the expected payments 
made to the pensioner’s dependents, which are composed of three components: i) the 
expected present value of a lifelong annuity for the complete family, denoted as 
s
f
x t
EPV
 , that we mainly evaluate at the spouse’s age sx t ; ii) the expected present 
value of a lifelong annuity for the spouse aged sx t , denoted as s
s
x tEPV  ; and iii) the 
expected present value of an annuity-certain paid to the children from age cx t  until 
reaching the maximum age M  of having the pension right, denoted as 
c
c
x tEPV  . The 
formulae of the expected present values of the survivor pension for each type of a 
beneficiary plugged in the above formula (5.15) are defined as follows: 
• The case of spouse 
The expected present value of a lifetime annuity of 1 monetary unit payable annually 
in the middle of the year for a spouse aged sx t  is given by 
( )
( 0.5)
0
1
2
s
s s s s
w x t
s ss ss se h
x t h x t x t h x t h
h
EPV p p p v
 

     

 
  
 
   (5.16) 
As we suppose that the transition occurs in the middle of the year, the probability of 
an annuity paid to a spouse aged sx t  at time 0h   is 
1
2s s
ss se
x t x tp p  . At any time 
0h  , the payment is made with the probability of 
1
2s s s
ss ss se
h x t x t h x t hp p p    
 
 
 
. The
s
ss
h x tp   represents the probability that a spouse aged sx t  survives to at least age 
sx t h   and the s
se
x t hp    is the probability that a spouse aged sx t h   dies within 
one year. 
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• The case of children 
The annuity is paid to the children up to a given maximum age, M  and during the 
pay-out period we assume the children are being alive – the probability of survival is 
set as equal to 1. Thus, the expected present value of an annuity-certain of 1 monetary 
unit payable annually in the mid-year for ( )cM x t   years paid to the children aged 
cx t  can be determined as 
 ( ) 0.50.5 1.5 2.5 ... cc c
M x tc
x t x tEPV v v v v no
  
        
  
( ) cc
x tM x t r
a no          (5.17) 
We also take into account the average number of children at a given age without 
distinguishing the sex of the child, denoted as 
cx t
no  , in the formula of the expected 
present value for the children benefits. The age of children cx t  used in this study 
represents the average age of children of the pensioner aged rx t . The expected 
present value of an annuity-certain of 1 payable annually in the middle of the year for 
n  year discounted with the rate of interest r  can be also defined in the term of the 
actuarial notation as 
n r
a

. 
• The case of complete family 
In this case, the annuity valuation is considered until the year when the children have 
reached the maximum age M . The actuarial values can be divided into two parts: the 
first is the expected present value of the annuity before the children have reached the 
maximum age M , denoted as 1
s
f
x tEPV  , and the second is the expected present value 
of the annuity during the year when the children have reached the maximum age M , 
denoted as 2
s
f
x tEPV  . Since the probabilities of payments to the family depend mainly 
on the spouse’s life contingency, we use the age of a spouse sx t  representing the 
age of the family in this valuation. The actuarial value of a life annuity of 1 monetary 
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unit payable annually in the middle of the year for the complete family formed by the 
spouse and the children can be expressed as: 
    
1 2
s s s
f f f
x t x t x t
EPV EPV EPV
  
     (5.18) 
Before the children have reached the maximum age, the life annuity is paid to the 
family as long as the spouse survives and the transition can move to the children state, 
f c , when the spouse dies. For 0,1,2,..., ( 1) ( )ch M x t    , the expected present 
value of the pension payments made to the family is given by 
 
The expected pension payments made to a family until a spouse's death
( 1) ( )
1 ( 0.5)
0
1
2
c
s s s s
M x t
f ff ff fc h
hx t x t x t h x t h
h
EPV p p p v
  

     

 
  
 
  
   
The expected payments made to children at time of a spouse's death
( 1) ( )
( 0.5)
0
1
2
c
s s
M x t
ff fc h
h x t x t h
h
CB p p v
  

  

    
          
The expected pension payments made to children after a spouse's death
( 1) ( ) 1
( 0.5)
1 0
c
s s
M x t h
h ff fc
k x t x t k
h k
CB v p p
   

  
 
      (5.19) 
When the children have reached the maximum age, for ( )ch M x t   , the expected 
present value of the benefit payments made to the family can be defined as 
The expected payments made to a family in the year reaching the maximun age of the children
2 ( 0.5)
1 1 1
2 4 4
1 1
2 4
s s s
s s
s s
ff fc fc
x t h x t h x t h
f ff h
hx t x t
fs fe
x t h x t h
p p CB p
EPV p v
SB p SB p
     

 
   
 
   
  
    
  
 
   
The expected payments made to children after a spouse's death 
at the first half year of reaching the maximum age of children
1
( 0.5)
0
1
2 s s
h
ff fc h
k x t x t k
k
CB p p v


  

    
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The expected pension payments made to the spouse once children exit
ss s
ff fs s h
h x t hx t x t h
SB p p EPV v          (5.20) 
In the year ( )ch M x t    when the children have reached the maximum age, the 
payment is made to the family in the middle of the year with the probability of 
1 1
2 4s s s
ff ff fc
h x t x t h x t h
p p p
    
 
 
 
 meaning that the spouse is still alive until time 
1
2
h   
or dies within the second quarter after time h . After the spouse’s death, the payment 
is transferred to the children with the probability of 
1
4 s s
ff fc
h x t x t h
CB p p     . During the 
second half of the year, the recipient is changed from the complete family to the spouse 
and the payment is made with the probabilities that the spouse is alive for the half-year 
or die within a quarter of the year, set as  
1 1
2 4s s s
ff fs fe
h x t x t h x t h
p SB p SB p
    
 
   
 
.  
Once the children have reached the maximum age (the termination of their pension 
right), the subsequent disbursements are multiplied by the expected present value of 
the pension paid to the spouse aged sx t h  , s
s
x t hEPV   , obtained in the equation 
(5.16) with the probability that the spouse survives from the beginning of the period 
up to the time when the children exit the system. 
We can outline that 
s s
ff fs
x t h x t h
p p
   
  represents the probability that a spouse aged 
sx t h   is alive for one year. Also,  s s
fc fe
x t h x t h
p p
   
  refers to the probability of 
transition to the children state or the termination of the payments that occurs when the 
spouse dies. It is equivalent to the probability of dying within one year of the spouse. 
The behaviour of the last year of a complete family – the year when children have 
reached the maximum age M  – can be displayed as Figure 5.3. For the first half of 
the year, the system considers that the annuity is paid to the family in the f  state, and 
is paid to the spouse in the s  state for the other half of the year. Hence, the probability 
of changing the state in this year can be divided into four parts: the first quarter belongs 
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f c s e 
f s 
to the f state, the second quarter moves to the c  state, the third quarter transfers to the 
s  state, and the last quarter goes to the e  state. 
 
    
  
Figure 5.3: Behaviour of the last year of a complete family 
5.4 Simulation method 
The expected present value of pension benefits paid to a retired person, the so-called 
annuity divisor (the inverse of the transformation coefficient), can be viewed as the 
pension liabilities – the future pension payments will be made to the retiree and his/her 
dependents (if provided). In the valuation of the pension liabilities, the model can be 
run in the different simulation methods depending on the assumptions used to generate 
the liabilities that can be either deterministic or stochastic. We can apply the simulation 
technique used in the construction of algorithms for the valuation of pension liabilities 
to compute the actuarial values of the unitary pension described in the previous section. 
The actuarial model of pension benefits in our study is related to many random 
variables, especially mortality, interest rate, age of retirement and family composition. 
A stochastic process environment proposed by Balcer and Sahin (1983), Balcer and 
Sahin (1986), De Dominicis et al. (1991), Janssen and Manca (1997), and Janssen and 
Manca (1998) can simulate all aspects of the pension scheme but these models are very 
complicated and quite theoretical. As a result, they have not been yet totally applied in 
the practical way. For these reasons, the professionals usually employ the two 
fundamental approaches: the Monte Carlo method and the other known as the semi-
deterministic model, also named the ‘direct method’, to analyse the future benefit 
payments of the pension system. 
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The Monte Carlo method is commonly used to simulate the evolution of assets and 
liabilities of a pension scheme (see, e.g. Racinello, 1988; Chang and Cheng, 2002; 
Joshi and Pitt, 2010; Kryger, 2010; Müller and Wagner, 2017). This technique builds 
the model by substituting a range of random values from the distribution functions and 
deals with thousands or tens of thousands of recalculations to obtain the possible 
results; however, it requires a more time-consuming algorithm for a more accurate 
outcome.  
On the contrary, the direct method works on the mean values of the variables rather 
than their distribution functions. In the case of the computation of the actuarial value 
of the unitary pension annuity, this method follows all possible trajectories that a 
person would occupy during his/her lifetime and its probability is known. The 
simulation model begins with the computation of the expected first year cost which is 
the product of the related pension payment and the corresponding survival probability. 
This cost is discounted at the beginning of the period of study, 0t  . We then compute 
the expected cost of the second year and discount it at time 0. In this way, these two 
results will be summed to obtain the mean cost of the first two years. Iterating the 
algorithm up to w  (maximum reachable age) the total mean present value of the 
pension benefits will be obtained. The Monte Carlo, conversely, considers only one 
possible trajectory for the whole period to compute the present value of the total cost 
in each repetition and the calculation of the random variables given by each payment 
level and the related probability is repeated in a loop of a great number of times. We 
thus employ the direct method to compute the actuarial present values of the multiple 
life contingent annuities in this study since this technique is relatively simple and less 
time-consuming. More details of the direct method for the computation of the pension 
funds can be found in Volpe di Prignano and Manca (1988) and Devolder et al. (2012). 
As the formulae of the expected present values of the pension benefits were explained 
in the previous section, we illustrate how to construct the algorithm path of the 
expected annual pension payment of 1 monetary unit paid to the retiree aged rx  in the 
middle of the year t , denoted as ( , )
r
rY x t . Each row of Table 5.2 represents the age 
of retiree and contains all pensions that the scheme will pay to the retiree of a given 
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age during his/her lifetime. All expected payment elements in each cell, corresponding 
to the same row of a specified age rx , are discounted at time 0t   and these results 
are summed to obtain the actuarial value of the annuities for the pensioner who retires 
at age rx . 
Table 5.2: The algorithm path of the annual unitary pension for a pensioner 
Age 
Time ( t ) 
0 1 2  1rw x   rw x  
       
rx  
( ,0)r rY x  ( ,1)
r
rY x  ( ,2)
r
rY x   ( , 1)
r
r rY x w x   ( , )
r
r rY x w x  
1rx   
( 1,0)r rY x   ( 1,1)
r
rY x   ( 1,2)
r
rY x    ( 1, 1)
r
r rY x w x     
       
3w  ( 3,0)
rY w  ( 3,1)rY w  ( 3,2)rY w  ( 3,3)rY w    
2w   ( 2,0)
rY w  ( 2,1)rY w  ( 2,2)rY w     
1w   ( 1,0)
rY w  ( 1,1)rY w      
w  ( ,0)
rY w       
In the computation of the expected annual pension in each cell, we use the backward 
recursion by starting from the expected payment for the maximum reachable age, w . 
Then, the expected payment for a pensioner aged 1w  at time 1t   is related to 
( ,0)rY w with the probability that a pensioner aged 1w  has been alive for one year 
and is given by 
1 1 1 1 1 11
( 1,1) ( ,0)
s cs
r rr r rf f rs s rc c
w w w wx xx
Y w p Y w FB p EPV SB p EPV CB p EPV                  
We also show some relations of the last three rows of the Table 5.2 as follows: 
2 2 2 1 2 11
( 2,1) ( 1,0)
s cs
r rr r rf f rs s rc c
w w w x w xx
Y w p Y w FB p EPV SB p EPV CB p EPV                   
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2( 2, 2) ( 1,1)
r rr r
wY w p Y w     
3( 3, 2) ( 2,1)
r rr r
wY w p Y w     
3 2 1 3( 3,3) ( ,0) ( 2, 2)
r rr rr rr r rr r
w w w wY w p p p Y w p Y w            
Recalling the formula (5.15), the expected present value of the entire pension covering 
the old-age and survivor benefits for the pensioner aged rx  can be expressed in the 
term of the expected annual payment at time t , ( , )rY x t  as: 
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For the case of the surviving spouse and the complete family, we can construct the 
related algorithm of the annuity by the similar way as presented in the previous case 
of the pensioner. Thus, the expected present values of the pension benefits paid to the 
spouse and the complete family defined in the equation (5.16) and (5.18) can be 
rewritten as: 
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where ( , )
s
s
x t sY x t h   is the expected annual survivor pension of 1 monetary unit for 
the spouse aged sx t  at time h  and  ( , )s
f
sx t
Y x t h

  is the expected annual payment 
for the complete family at time h , conditional on that the main recipient is the spouse 
aged sx t , 0,1,2,..., rt w x   and 0,1,2,..., ( )sh w x t   . 
The expected annual pension for the pensioner, the spouse and the complete family 
expressed in the form of the related survival probabilities and the other triangular 
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matrices of all future payments to the surviving spouse and the complete family are 
demonstrated in Appendix D.1. We do not construct the algorithm path of the annual 
payment for the children because the calculation of the annuity-certain is simpler and 
is not associated with the survival probabilities. 
Finally, the average (unisex) expected present value of the unitary pension benefits for 
the pensioner aged rx  is the mean value between males and females, according to the 
current Italian rule, defined as: 
    
, ,
2
r r
r
x male x female
x
EPV EPV
EPV

    (5.24) 
5.5 Numerical illustration 
This section presents a numerical example using Italian data to calculate the values of 
the annuity divisors – the actuarial (expected) present values or the inverse of the 
transformation coefficients – of the old-age together with survivors’ pensions 
according to our proposed model by using the direct method described in Section 5.4. 
Additionally, we compare the results of the actuarial values between our proposed 
formulae and the Italian rules explained in Section 5.2. An additional objective of this 
section is to assess the changes in the value of divisors if some of the key features of 
the plan vary. Thus, the results are divided into two different parts: the divisors under 
the baseline assumptions and the changes in the features of the pension benefits. 
5.5.1 Baseline case 
The main assumptions according to the Italian rule and the data sources made for this 
numerical example are follows: 
• The annuity divisors are calculated over the period 1995–2015. 
• The retirement age, rx , is a range from 57 to 65. 
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• The maximum age of surviving, w , is 110. 
• The maximum age of children receiving the benefits, M , is 23. 
• Average number of children is set as 1. 
• The percentage of pension paid to the surviving spouse, SB , is 60% of the basic 
pension. 
• The percentage of pension paid to the children, CB , is 70% of the basic 
pension. 
• The percentage of pension paid to the complete family, FB  is 60% of the basic 
pension. 
• The reduction factor of the survival probability of the spouse (also representing 
the probability of having the right to receive the survivor benefits) is set at 0.7 
for male and 0.9 for female. 
• The age difference between the pensioner and his/her spouse is 3 for male and 
-3 for female. 
• The technical interest rate, r  , is fixed at 1.5% over time. 
• We use the official period life tables provided by the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT) and the transition probabilities are estimated from the 
rates of having a family, the rates of living with spouse only, the rates of living 
with children only and the rates of living with spouse and children carried out 
by the latest available data from the Italian 2001 Census Population and 
Household reported in the Eurostat Database. We summarise how to obtain the 
related transition probabilities as follows: 
▪ 
r
rf
x
p is calculated by the probability that a pensioner aged rx  dies within 
one year, 
rx
q , multiplied by the rate that a pensioner aged rx  has a family 
and the rate that a pensioner aged rx  lives with his/her spouse and 
children, conditional on having a family. 
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▪ 
r
rs
xp is calculated by the probability that a pensioner aged rx  dies within 
one year, 
rx
q , multiplied by the rate that a pensioner aged rx  has a family 
and the rate that a pensioner aged rx  lives with his/her spouse only, 
conditional on having a family. 
▪ 
r
rc
xp is calculated by the probability that a pensioner aged rx  dies within 
one year, 
rx
q , multiplied by the rate that a pensioner aged rx  has a family 
and the rate that a pensioner aged rx  lives with his/her children only, 
conditional on having a family. 
▪ 
r
re
xp is calculated by the probability that a pensioner aged rx  dies within 
one year, 
rx
q , multiplied by the rate that a pensioner aged rx  has no a 
family, equivalent to one minus the rate of having a family. 
▪ 
r
rr
xp  ( s
ss
xp ) is the probability that a pensioner (a spouse) aged rx  ( sx ) is 
alive at age 1rx   ( 1sx  ), equivalent to xp in the life table, and the 
ss
ff ss
xx
p p . 
▪ 
s
se
xp  is the probability that a spouse aged sx  dies within one year, 
equivalent to xq  in the life table, and the ss s
fc fe se
xx x
p p p  . 
The information on the family structure that we use to estimate the transition 
probabilities is shown in Figure 5.4. A family is defined as a couple without children, 
or a couple with one or more children, or a lone parent with one or more children. 
Obviously, the rates of having a family are higher for men than women and gradually 
decrease with age, from the rate of 0.89 to 0.55 for men and 0.87 dropping to 0.15 for 
women (see in Figure 5.4-a). It can imply that most of elderly women are living alone 
due to the widowhood circumstance. Women are more likely to be widowed than men 
because women outlive men. 
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Moreover, those people who live in a family can be classified by their family status, 
according to the 2001 Census: Population and Household, into three groups: i) children 
living with their parents – a person living with his/her spouse and children, ii) 
husband/wife in a couple married – a person living with only spouse, and iii) children 
living with lone father/mother – a person living with only children. The rates of people 
living in the complete family with their spouse and children are relatively low, and 
there is a very small difference between males and females as shown in Figure 5.4-b. 
The rates also slightly drop with age from 0.04 to 0.015 for males and 0.03 to 0.011 
for females. There are a lot of individuals living with either only spouse or only 
children. 
Figure 5.4: Rates related to family structure by age and gender 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Italian 2001 Census: Population and Household 
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Figure 5.4-c displays the rates that the married couple stays together but without 
children. The husbands usually predecease their wives; hence the rates of men living 
with their wives are higher than the rates of women living with their husbands. There 
is a small decrease in the rates for men from 0.95 to 0.85, and the rates for women 
significantly drop with age from 0.87 to 0.28. In contrast to the rates of living with 
only children, females are more likely to live with her children than males. It is the 
consequence of the husband’s death before his wife. After the father’s death, the 
parenting will be taken by the single mother. Thus, the rates that females are living 
with her children are higher than those for males, and increase with age from 0.03 to 
0.09 for males and 0.10 to 0.59 for females as displayed in Figure 5.4-d. 
Next, we show the average (unisex) annuity divisors of the proposed model using the 
direct method in the calculation as exhibited in Table 5.3. The unisex annuity divisor 
for the pensioners in Italy is computed by averaging two divisors for males and 
females, see in the formula (5.24). We plot the gender- and age-specific annuity 
divisors comparing with the unisex value in a selected year of 2015 to illustrate the 
differences of the divisors among genders and ages shown in Figure 5.5. Apparently, 
the annuity divisors of the pension benefits for females are higher than the divisors for 
males – since females outlive males – and the unisex divisors are in between both 
genders. The annuity divisors are also highly age-linked representing that the actuarial 
values decrease with age because of the reduction in remaining life expectancy. At age 
57, the average (unisex) annuity divisor equals to 23.003 and drops to 18.247 at age 
65. 
We, furthermore, illustrate the average annuity divisors from the Italian rule in Table 
5.4 to compare with the results obtained from our proposed model – the direct method. 
Remarkably, the actuarial values computed from the Italian rule (Dini reform) are 
always greater than those values from our proposed formulae because the model 
supposes that the annuity and the transition of the payment from the pensioner to the 
dependents occur in the middle of the year whilst the Italian case is assumed payable 
annually in advance. As a consequence, the amount of the initial pension from the 
direct method is higher than the pension payments under the Italian rule. In addition, 
when we consider the different ages of retirement, the annuity divisors of both rules 
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decrease with age due to the decline in the survival probabilities, and in this way the 
workers who decide to extend their working life will receive a great amount of pension. 
Figure 5.5: Annuity divisors obtained by the direct method, age 57-65 in 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Average annuity divisors obtained from the direct method 
Year 
Retirement age 
57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 
1995 21.077 20.490 19.902 19.314 18.727 18.141 17.556 16.971 16.386 
1996 21.182 20.595 20.007 19.419 18.834 18.248 17.660 17.074 16.491 
1997 21.275 20.689 20.098 19.507 18.915 18.326 17.738 17.151 16.565 
1998 21.279 20.693 20.104 19.511 18.917 18.323 17.731 17.141 16.551 
1999 21.454 20.871 20.283 19.693 19.100 18.503 17.907 17.311 16.718 
2000 21.683 21.103 20.518 19.928 19.335 18.739 18.142 17.546 16.951 
2001 21.923 21.340 20.757 20.172 19.583 18.991 18.393 17.795 17.196 
2002 21.971 21.387 20.800 20.213 19.622 19.027 18.430 17.829 17.227 
2003 21.859 21.270 20.680 20.088 19.498 18.904 18.307 17.707 17.102 
2004 22.283 21.696 21.107 20.519 19.928 19.340 18.749 18.154 17.555 
2005 22.277 21.691 21.100 20.508 19.916 19.321 18.726 18.127 17.526 
2006 22.474 21.892 21.304 20.713 20.119 19.524 18.927 18.331 17.733 
2007 22.513 21.927 21.341 20.749 20.153 19.555 18.956 18.355 17.756 
2008 22.531 21.948 21.360 20.771 20.177 19.577 18.976 18.374 17.770 
2009 22.592 22.007 21.419 20.828 20.235 19.638 19.038 18.437 17.836 
2010 22.769 22.184 21.596 21.005 20.412 19.817 19.216 18.611 18.005 
2011 22.832 22.248 21.662 21.073 20.482 19.889 19.293 18.691 18.086 
2012 22.833 22.248 21.658 21.066 20.472 19.878 19.281 18.683 18.078 
2013 22.971 22.388 21.801 21.209 20.616 20.021 19.426 18.829 18.231 
2014 23.182 22.600 22.014 21.425 20.832 20.238 19.642 19.045 18.446 
2015 23.003 22.418 21.830 21.240 20.645 20.048 19.450 18.849 18.247 
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Table 5.4: Average annuity divisors obtained from the Italian rule 
Year 
Retirement age 
57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 
1995 21.507 20.920 20.332 19.743 19.156 18.569 17.983 17.397 16.812 
1996 21.613 21.026 20.438 19.850 19.265 18.678 18.089 17.502 16.918 
1997 21.706 21.120 20.529 19.937 19.345 18.755 18.166 17.578 16.991 
1998 21.709 21.124 20.534 19.941 19.345 18.751 18.158 17.568 16.977 
1999 21.887 21.303 20.715 20.124 19.530 18.933 18.336 17.740 17.145 
2000 22.118 21.538 20.952 20.361 19.768 19.171 18.573 17.977 17.381 
2001 22.362 21.778 21.195 20.609 20.020 19.427 18.829 18.230 17.631 
2002 22.409 21.825 21.238 20.650 20.059 19.463 18.865 18.263 17.661 
2003 22.292 21.702 21.111 20.519 19.928 19.334 18.736 18.135 17.529 
2004 22.724 22.137 21.548 20.959 20.368 19.780 19.188 18.592 17.993 
2005 22.715 22.127 21.537 20.943 20.351 19.755 19.159 18.560 17.958 
2006 22.915 22.333 21.745 21.153 20.558 19.963 19.364 18.768 18.169 
2007 22.952 22.366 21.779 21.187 20.590 19.992 19.392 18.790 18.191 
2008 22.969 22.386 21.798 21.208 20.613 20.013 19.410 18.808 18.203 
2009 23.032 22.446 21.858 21.266 20.673 20.074 19.474 18.872 18.271 
2010 23.211 22.625 22.036 21.445 20.851 20.256 19.654 19.048 18.441 
2011 23.275 22.691 22.105 21.515 20.924 20.330 19.734 19.131 18.526 
2012 23.275 22.689 22.100 21.507 20.913 20.318 19.720 19.121 18.515 
2013 23.416 22.833 22.245 21.653 21.059 20.464 19.869 19.271 18.672 
2014 23.631 23.048 22.462 21.872 21.280 20.685 20.089 19.491 18.891 
2015 23.446 22.861 22.272 21.681 21.086 20.489 19.890 19.288 18.686 
 
It is widely known that nowadays people are living longer and the probability of 
survival tends to expand and, therefore, leads to a continuous increase in the values of 
annuity divisor. As shown in Figure 5.6, we depict the annuity divisors obtained from 
the Italian rule versus the direct method for a selected age of 61 to present the evolution 
of the longevity risk during the year 1995-2015. There have been the upward 
tendencies in the annuity divisors for both formulae. In the case of the Italian rule, the 
actuarial values have increased from 19.156 in 1995 to 21.086 in 2015, accounting for 
10.07 percent of surge, while the values of the annuity divisor from the direct method 
have been 18.55 in 1995 and 20.485 in 2015, growing up by 10.24 percent. We can 
also see that the annuity divisors based on the Italian rule are a bit higher than those 
values of the direct method by around 0.4 units. It presents that the amount of the initial 
pension computing from the Italian rule is less than the pension payment under our 
proposed plan which offers more survivors’ benefits by about 2 percent when 
assuming that other things being equal. 
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Figure 5.6: Average annuity divisors of a selected age of 61, in 1995–2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the transformation coefficients under the 2011 reform (Law214/11) 
presented in Table 5.1, we convert those coefficients into the annuity divisors, and 
compare them with our own calculations corresponding to the Italian rule in a selected 
year of 2015 as displayed in Figure 5.7. The annuity divisors followed by Law 214/11 
were used to transform the accumulated contributions paid throughout working life 
into the initial pension for the pensioners who retired between 2013 and 2015. Clearly, 
the annuity divisors published by the government are lower than our own results5. 
Hence, the retirees have received more amount of pension than they should get. As a 
result, the incurred pensions by law would be higher than the pension amount with 
respect to our own calculation based on the Italian rule by around 1 percent in 2015. 
In principle, the actuarial values of the annuity for a single life are always less than 
those actuarial values for multiple lives. From Figure 5.7, it is obvious that the average 
annuity divisors of the pension plan offering the old-age together with survivors’ 
benefits for both cases of the Italian rule and the direct method are significantly greater 
                                                          
5 As the transformation coefficients for the people who retired in 2013–15 reported by the law were 
calculated by using the life table in the earlier period – probably before 2013 – than the life table that 
our calculation was used – in 2015, and thus the survival probabilities of the prior year are lower than 
the following year – due to the effect of mortality improvement. 
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than the divisors of the only old-age pension6 since the former case must be escalated 
by the weight of the continuation of the pension payment to the survivors. The Italian 
rule and the direct method7, for instance, give higher values of annuity divisors than 
the case of old-age pension in 2015, with a range of 4-6 percent (about 1 unit) and 2-
3 percent (about 0.6 units), respectively. 
Figure 5.7: Average annuity divisors from the Italian rule, the direct method and the old-age 
benefits in a selected year of 2015 versus the Law 214/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 We aim to illustrate the actuarial value of the whole life annuity-due paid to a pensioner as long as she 
survives, representing the divisor of the old-age pension, in order to compared with the actuarial values 
of the life annuity paid to the multiple lives – the old-age combined with the survivors’ benefits. 
7 We also consider the same time point of the pension payable annually in the middle of the year for all 
three cases of the pension plan. The average annuity divisors of our proposed model (the direct method) 
are higher than those divisors of the old-age pension around 1.09 unit and just only 0.14 unit for the 
Italian rule at retirement age 61 in 2015, see more details in Appendix D.2. 
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5.5.2 Annuity divisors when benefit structure changes 
We also examine how the size and direction of the average annuity divisors of our 
proposed model change with respect to the assumptions on the different features of the 
benefit levels. Firstly, the reduction rates of the widow benefits for each gender vary 
as shown in Figure 5.8. Under the baseline case, the reduction rates used to multiply 
the age-specific probabilities of survival of the spouse, in a similar way representing 
the probabilities of having the right to receive the survivor benefits, are equal to 70 
percent for the widower (the spouse of the female pensioner) and 90 percent for the 
widow (the spouse of the male pensioner). 
Figure 5.8: Average annuity divisors with different reduction rates in a selected year of 2015 
 
If the reduction rates of receiving the widow benefits is set at 70 percent for males and 
females, the average divisors are slightly dropping by 0.5 units, around 2-3 percent for 
the retirement ages interval of 57-65, comparing to the baseline values (see Figure 5.8). 
With regard to the annuity divisors by gender, we found that the divisors for females 
remain unchanged while the values for males are significantly decreasing by 
approximately 1 unit, or almost 6 percent. In the case that the reduction rate is set at 
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90 percent for all spouses, the average annuity divisors are slightly higher than the 
divisors of the baseline case by approximately 0.1 units, or 0.5 percent. The annuity 
divisors are increasing for females only while the values for males keep constant. We 
also suppose that there is no reduction rate, which means that all spouses are eligible 
for the widow benefits once the pensioner dies. The annuity divisors are definitely 
increasing because the pension is expected to be paid more. The divisors are higher 
than the baseline case by almost 1.3 units, increasing by 6 percent. It is clear that the 
reduction rate crucially affects the gender-specific annuity divisors, particularly for the 
male pensioners. 
Figure 5.9: Average annuity divisors with different percentages of survivor benefits in a 
selected year of 2015 
 
Also, we investigate the changes in the levels of survivor benefits for the spouse, the 
children and the complete family as illustrated in Figure 5.9. Comparing to the baseline 
case where the survivors’ benefits are 60 percent of the basic pension for the spouse, 
70 percent for the children and 60 percent for the complete family respectively, the 
annuity divisors are smaller than the baseline case by around 0.007 units if all 
percentages of survivors’ benefits are set at 60 percent. Moreover, there will be a very 
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small increase in the annuity divisors, by approximately 0.09 units, if the levels of the 
survivors’ benefits for all three types of recipients are equal to 100 percent of the 
original pension. We can conclude that the changes in the percentages of the survivor 
benefits hardly influence the values of the annuity divisor. 
5.6 Conclusions 
Under the NDC pension scheme, the annuity divisor, which is mainly determined by 
the average life expectancy of the retiree and an assumed rate of return (an expected 
long-term real growth rate of the economy set by the policymaker), is used to convert 
the individual notional capital at retirement into the whole life annuity. However, the 
annuitisation divisor rules to calculate the annuity pension are constructed differently 
among countries. Specifically, Italy is taking into account both old-age and survivors’ 
benefits in the calculation of the initial pension. The Italian NDC system provides the 
survivors’ pensions for the surviving spouse and children once the retiree dies, but the 
official formula of the transformation coefficients considers the probabilities of paying 
benefits to the spouse only. Thus, this chapter develops a complex actuarial model for 
valuing the pension benefits covering for the retiree and all members of his/her family. 
The computation of the annuity divisors in this study involves the probabilities that the 
pension will be paid to the retiree, the surviving spouse, the surviving children and the 
complete family if both spouse and children are still alive. The multiple life contingent 
model is complex and requires transition probabilities that we estimate from the 
observed data related to having family consisting of the rates of having family, the 
rates of living with spouse, the rates of living with children, and the rates of living 
together with spouse and children. We use the direct method to obtain the actuarial 
values since the probabilities of all possible trajectories that a person would occupy 
during his/her lifetime are known. This simulation technique is more flexible and less 
time-consuming. 
In our proposed model, the unisex annuity divisors, which are derived from the mean 
of divisors between males and females in the Italian NDC system, decrease with age 
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because of the reduction in the remaining future lifetime of the retiree and his/her 
spouse. As a consequence, if the workers decide to extend their working life, they will 
receive greater amount of pension. Furthermore, the human mortality improvement 
over the past few decades has influenced the continuous increase in the annuity 
divisors, with more than 10 percent of the growth in the divisors from 1995 until 2015. 
In addition, the comparative results of the annuity divisors between the Italian rule and 
the Law 214/11 indicate that our own calculations under the Italian rule are higher than 
those values published by the government. It results in the current retirees receiving 5 
percent more of initial pension than they should actually receive. If the annuity divisors 
are underestimated, the pension liabilities of the system will increase and could be a 
disaster for the Italian public budget. Therefore, the government needs to revise the 
divisors more often to reflect the rapid changes in life expectancy and to maintain the 
financial sustainability. 
Another main result that can be highlighted is that the annuity divisors of the pension 
benefits involving multiple lives are greater than divisors considering merely a single 
life. However, as the time of payment of the two methods – Italian rule versus direct 
method – are different, the divisors of our proposed model are lower than the divisors 
based on the Italian rule. In order to make the direct method comparable to the Italian 
rule, we adjust the time of payment to the middle of the year for both methods. After 
this adjustment, the divisors under the direct method are higher than the Italian rule by 
around 0.14 units. This means that the current retirees are benefitting from the Italian 
rule gaining approximately 1 percent more of initial pension than the corresponding 
value under the direct method.  
The further valuable lesson to be drawn from the numerical example is transition 
probabilities that require to be estimated accurately before developing the model into 
the practice. It is really difficult to find the accurate and up-to-date data on relevant 
aspects of the family structure, for instance, the rates of having a family, the rates of 
living with either a spouse or children, the average age of children living in a family, 
and the average number of children per family.  
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In practice, the results achieved in the numerical illustration make sense and provide 
us with some useful guidance regarding the effect of changes in the benefits structure 
on the actuarial values. It confirms that our model works reasonably well and is close 
to the reality of the social insurance. Combining the survivors’ benefits with the old-
age pension in the determination of the initial pension, thus, would enhance the 
political attractiveness of the pension design. However, the policymaker must realise 
the social acceptability of the idea that the government would introduce the new higher 
annuity divisors along with the drop in the pension payments. 
Finally, based on the model presented in this paper, we suggest a few important 
directions for the future research. First, the effect of longevity risk on the annuity 
divisors would be studied by applying the stochastic mortality model to capture the 
evolution of the life expectancy. The model would also be extended to consider the 
probability of remarriage of the widow/widower and the reduction in the spouse’s 
pension if the survivors’ benefits are his/her additional income. The last direction 
would be incorporating the permanent disability with old-age and survivors’ benefits 
in the model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A Multiple State Model for Working-Age 
Disabled Population Using Cross-Sectional 
Data 
A multiple state model describes the transitions of the disability risk among the states 
of active, disabled and dead. Ideally, the estimations of the transition probabilities and 
the transition intensities rely on longitudinal data; however, most of the national 
surveys of disability are based on cross-sectional data measuring the disabled status of 
an individual at one point in time. This chapter aims to propose a generic method of 
the estimation of the transition probabilities when the model allows recovery from 
disability using the UK cross-sectional data. The disability prevalence rates are 
modelled by taking into consideration the effect of age and time. Under some plausible 
assumptions concerning the probabilities of death between disabled and non-disabled 
people and the estimated prevalence rates of disability are used to decompose the 
survival probabilities in each state. 
Keywords: cross-sectional data, disability, multiple state model, transition 
probabilities, working-age people 
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6.1 Introduction 
Public social spending, which comprises 21% of GDP in 2016 on average across the 
OECD, is mostly spent on cash benefits related to old age and survivor pensions, 
incapacity benefits, unemployment, family cash benefits and other social benefits 
(OECD, 2017c). On average, cash income support for the working-age population 
amounted to 4.4% of GDP in 2013, consisting of 1.8% for disability benefits, 1.3% for 
family cash benefits, 1% for unemployment benefits and 0.3% for other social cash 
support (OECD, 2014). Notably, for the working-age population, the fiscal cost of 
incapacity benefit or disability insurance – defined as a periodic income, usually 
weekly or monthly, paid to an individual who is unable to work due to illness or 
disablement – has been increasing in several countries, such as Australia, Belgium, 
France, Iceland, Netherlands, and the United States, due to a substantial growth in 
disability beneficiary rates (OECD, 2017c).  
Disability and poor health conditions lead to a decline in labour force participation. 
Many workers leave the labour market permanently due to health problems or 
disability, while there are few people with reduced work capacity who remain 
employed (Jones, 2008; OECD, 2010; Webber and Bjelland, 2015). Very few 
recipients of disability benefits return to the labour market, even if they have a 
significant remaining work capacity (OECD, 2009). In the late 2000s, only around 
40% of disabled people in OECD countries were employed, and unemployment rates 
of disabled individuals doubled those of people with no disability (OECD, 2010). At 
the same time, the high level of unemployment among the disabled population as well 
as the increasing/larger number of individuals who are receiving long-term sickness 
and disability benefits raises serious concerns about the sustainability of the public 
finance of such benefits (Bell and Smith, 2004; McVicar, 2008). 
A thorough understanding of the transition of an individual into and out of a disability 
state and the accurate estimation of the probability of becoming and remaining 
disabled are the essential information for the government to design the provision of a 
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disability benefit programme, to determine the demand for such programme and to 
project public expenditure on incapacity benefits.  
The logical concept used to describe the transition of disability risk is commonly 
provided by a multiple state model1 with relevant states of active (or healthy), disabled 
(or invalid) and dead (Haberman and Pitacco, 1999; Pitacco, 2014). Although the 
model typically relies on longitudinal data, most of the national surveys of disability 
or poor health conditions are cross-sectional data measuring the disabled/invalid status 
of a person at one point in time. Also, the data required for the estimation of the 
transition rates are often missing.  
Several researchers have recently shown how to derive transition rates across active 
and disabled states by using disability prevalence rates from cross-sectional data in 
order to overcome the limited data for the use of multiple state models. Rickayzen and 
Walsh (2002), Leung (2004), Leung (2006) and Hariyanto et al. (2014) have identified 
the functional forms for the one-year deterioration probabilities, i.e. the probabilities 
of moving to any worse disability level state. The parameters for each function type 
have been chosen to replicate the observed prevalence rates closely while assuming of 
a stationary population structure2. Nuttall et al. (1994) suggested a multiple state model 
of health among the elderly considering three states – healthy, disabled and dead – 
with no transition from the disabled to the healthy state. The disability incidence rates 
were calculated from the disability prevalence rates and disabled mortality rates. By 
using the disability prevalence rates, Albarran et al. (2005) computed the probabilities 
of transition, of survival and of death for the ageing population under the active and 
disabled states. Also, they employed the annual national probabilities of death to 
decompose the subgroup-specific probabilities of death between disabled and non-
disabled people under some plausible assumptions regarding the relative risk of 
mortality for each group of individuals. 
                                                          
1 Estimations of the transition probabilities and the intensities require the total number of transitions 
from one state to another (e.g. active to disabled, disabled to active, active to dead and disabled to dead), 
time at transition occurrences and the exposure to risk in each state. 
2 The age structure, mortality and birth are constant. The rate of variation between birth and mortality 
is also constant. Therefore, the number of population, of births and of deaths of any single age are the 
fraction of the number of population at an initial age (United Nations, 1968). 
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The abovementioned recent studies have mostly modelled disability rates among the 
elderly, whereas this chapter aims to investigate the evolution among working-age 
people. We develop a generic estimation method for calculating the transition 
probabilities in a one-year multiple state model based on disability prevalence rates, 
hence our method is an extension of Albarran et al.’s (2005) modelling. Our method 
is applied to the UK working-age population using the cross-sectional Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) to identify employment circumstances and disability prevalence. We 
then model the disability prevalence rates and the recovery rates from disability to an 
active state taking into consideration the effect of age and time trends. 
Following this introduction, the chapter is structured as follows; Section 6.2 first 
describes the LFS dataset used to estimate gender- and age-specific disability 
prevalence and recovery rates and then reports the probabilities of death within one 
year provided by the Human Mortality Database. Section 6.3 describes our multiple 
state model and the multiple logistic regression models to estimate disability 
prevalence rates and the one-year recovery rates. Section 6.4 the estimated disability 
rates, one-year recovery rates and transition probabilities are illustrated. Lastly, 
Section 6.5 provides conclusions and additional comments. 
6.2 Data description 
The UK LFS is a quarterly survey of the employment circumstances of the UK 
working-age population, aged 16–59 for women and 16–64 for men3. This survey4 
contains self-reported disability data incorporating two definitions of disability: the 
Disability Discrimination Act5 (DDA) and the work-limiting disabled. The former 
                                                          
3 Until April 2010, the state pension age in the UK was 60 for women and 65 for men. 
4 There are a few national surveys on disability in the UK. For example, in 1986 the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) classified disabled children and adults according to ten degrees of 
disability. However, this dataset is out of date and given that it was carried out only in a single year is 
unable to illustrate trends in disability. The Understanding Society panel, wave 1-6, 2009-2015 is one 
of longitudinal study covering the questions on self-reported longstanding illness or disability and 
activity limiting condition; however, at the time we are conducting this research only three consecutive 
waves have been released. 
5 The Disability Discrimination Act (1995) (DDA), which protects disabled people from discrimination, 
was repealed and replaced by the Equality Act 2010, except in Northern Ireland where this Act is still 
applied. 
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applies to any person that currently has a long-term health problem or disability and 
whose impairments have a substantial and long-term adverse effect6 on his/her ability 
to undertake normal day-to-day activities7. The latter applies to any work-limiting 
disabled individual who has a long-term health problem or disability relating 
specifically to working life and whose impairments affect either the kind or amount of 
work he/she might do. 
The LFS surveys any respondent every three months for five consecutive quarters. 
This allows us to have a one-year observation of transitions among the different states. 
The LFS provides information on the individual’s labour force status, i.e. employed, 
unemployed or economically inactive. The overall sample size of the cross-sectional 
LFS dataset over the period 1999–2011 consists of 576,402 people, of which 288,576 
are males aged 16–64 and 287,826 are females aged 16–59. In each dataset, we use the 
given person-weight variable to gross up the survey estimates to population totals. This 
sampling weight is based on the number of similar people in the whole population in 
the particular time of the survey and controlling for age and sex. We estimate the total 
number of people in the working-age population and the disabled population as shown 
in Table 6.18. 
In this paper, we link self-assessed disabled people with the labour force status – 
unemployed or economically inactive – as a proxy for the number of disabled 
individuals who are entitled to receive incapacity benefits (state ‘Disabled’ in Figure 
6.1). The remaining individuals, i.e. non-disabled people and employed disabled 
people, act as a proxy for the number of non-recipients of disability/incapacity benefits 
(state ‘Active/Non-disabled’ in Figure 6.1). We use the cross-sectional dataset of each 
first quarter (January–March) over the period 1999–2011 to model trends in disability 
                                                          
6 See Equality Act 2010: Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating 
to the definition of disability, Section B: Substantial, p. 14–26. 
7 See Equality Act 2010: Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating 
to the definition of disability, Section D: Normal day-to-day activities, p. 34–47. 
8 The estimator for the number of individuals in the population is the sum of person-weight provided in 
the LFS dataset. It can be expressed as 
1
ˆ
n
j
j
Y w

 ; where jw is a sampling weight for the j-th sampled 
individual from the population, 1,2,...,j n and n  is the number of observations in the sample. 
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prevalence rates, while we estimate one-year recovery rates for disabled people using 
the status information drawn from interviews in the 1st and 5th quarter9. 
Table 6.1: Number of disabled working-age population estimates and disability prevalence 
rates by gender and year 1999–2011 
Year 
Male Female 
Disabled 
Population 
Total 
Population10 
Disability 
rate (%) 
Disabled 
Population 
Total 
Population 
Disability 
rate (%) 
1999 1,776,477 18,323,457 9.6951 1,722,695 17,213,707 10.0077 
2000 1,772,596 18,422,980 9.6217 1,803,039 17,327,492 10.4057 
2001 1,797,411 18,556,952 9.6859 1,786,135 17,462,581 10.2284 
2002 1,880,029 18,680,082 10.0643 1,802,317 17,539,222 10.2759 
2003 1,778,020 18,818,881 9.4481 1,888,851 17,668,803 10.6903 
2004 1,789,503 18,946,537 9.4450 1,831,128 17,798,479 10.2881 
2005 1,800,498 19,145,553 9.4043 1,790,341 17,954,150 9.9717 
2006 1,812,026 19,339,180 9.3697 1,825,118 18,107,852 10.0792 
2007 1,849,885 19,532,406 9.4708 1,836,278 18,189,036 10.0955 
2008 1,870,487 19,704,044 9.4929 1,737,931 18,256,260 9.5196 
2009 1,842,044 19,814,587 9.2964 1,811,686 18,331,005 9.8832 
2010 1,951,609 19,910,234 9.8020 1,851,813 18,408,702 10.0594 
2011 2,088,107 19,955,266 10.4639 1,816,924 18,241,314 9.9605 
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS dataset 
In the following subsection, we clarify the characteristics of the datasets, including the 
disability prevalence rates, the recovery rates and the one-year probabilities of death 
of the working-age population that are used in this study. 
 
 
                                                          
9 We merge all five-quarter longitudinal datasets over the period 1999–2011 since the sample size for 
disabled people within a year is relatively small. As a result, the modelling of gender- and age-specific 
recovery rates (explained in Section 6.2.2) ignores time effects and the rates remain constant over time. 
10 The total number of working-age population estimates in each year are approximately equal to the 
number of population estimates provided by the Human Mortality Database (HMD). 
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Figure 6.1: Three-state model of working-age people 
 
6.2.1 Disability prevalence rates of the working-age population 
The prevalence rate of disability at age x  is computed as the total number of disabled 
individuals aged x  divided by the total population of age x . On average, disability 
prevalence rates have remained quite constant (between 9–10%) for overall men and 
women during the period of analysis and the rates of women are higher than men (see 
Table 6.1). 
As shown in Figure 6.2, there is a noticeable age pattern in the disability rates, with 
lower rates among the young individuals and an increase in older ages. In early 
adulthood, aged 16–25, the disability prevalence rates for males are slightly larger than 
for females, whereas the prevalence rates tend to be larger among women during the 
middle age, i.e. around age 40. As a result, the disability prevalence rates are associated 
with age and gender. The time effect might also have an influence on changes in rates, 
although the trends in disability rates are quite unclear over time. 
6.2.2 One-year recovery rates of the working-age population 
The one-year recovery rate from the disabled state at age x  is represented by the ratio 
between the total number of disabled population aged x  transferring to the active state 
over one year and the total number of the disabled population of age x . The recovery 
rates, as shown in Figure 6.3, decline with age, from around 4% to 0.5% for males and 
Active/ Non-disabled 
 
1. Non-disabled people with all labour 
force status, and 
2. Disabled people with employment  
Dead  
Disabled 
 
Disabled people with unemployment 
or economically inactive 
(non-working disabled people)  
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females; however, it is unclear whether there are gender differences in the recovery 
rates. 
Figure 6.2: Observed disability prevalence rates by gender in 1999 and 2011 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS dataset 
6.2.3 One-year probabilities of death 
The annual probabilities of death for the whole population will be used to decompose 
the probabilities of death among people with and without disability under the multiple 
state model explained in the next section. The death probabilities for males, as shown 
in Figure 6.4, are higher than females while those of both sexes have dropped gradually 
at all ages over the period 1999–201111. 
 
                                                          
11 The mortality improvement arises from economic development, progress in health technology, better 
access to health care services, rising living standards, improved lifestyles and a shift in the leading 
causes of death and illness from the infectious and parasitic diseases to non-communicable diseases and 
chronic conditions, especially cancers and diseases of the circulatory system (Howse, 2006; Soubbotina 
and Sheram, 2000; WHO, 2011). 
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Figure 6.3: Observed one-year recovery rates among men and women, 1999–2011 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS dataset 
Figure 6.4: Age-specific probabilities of death ( xq ) among men and women in 1999 and 2011 
 
Source: Human Mortality Database (HMD) 
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6.3 Model specification 
This section describes a discrete-time multiple state model to compute for each of the 
three states, particularly the following two types of probabilities: those associated with 
remaining in the same state and the other related to transition between states. Our 
model allows for recovery from a disabled to an active state by extending Albarran et 
al.’s (2005) approach, which introduced some assumptions about the relative mortality 
ratio among disabled and non-disabled people to decompose the probability of death 
in any state. 
6.3.1 The multiple state model for working-age disabled people 
In the three-state model of disability, as shown in Figure 6.1, the possible transitions 
are as follows: 
 i) disablement, i.e. transition from an ‘active’ to a ‘disabled’ state, a i ;  
 ii) recovery, i.e. transition from a ‘disabled’ to an ‘active’ state, i a ;  
 iii) death of an active individual, i.e. transition from an ‘active’ to a ‘dead’ state, 
a d ; 
 iv) death of a disabled person, i.e. transition from a ‘disabled’ to a ‘dead’ state, 
i d .  
The actuarial notations of one-year transition probabilities and the equations used to 
estimate the transition probabilities and probabilities in any state are included in the 
following subsections. 
6.3.1.1 One-year transition probabilities 
We apply a discrete-time of three-state disability model in a one-year period according 
to Haberman and Pitacco (1999) and Pitacco (2014). We also assume that, except the 
possible death of an individual, no more than one transition occurs during one 
particular year. The fundamental relations of one-year transition probabilities related 
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to an active individual and a disabled individual aged x  are explained in the following 
notations (see more details in Appendix E.1): 
jj jk j
x x xp p p        (6.1) 
jj jk j
x x xq q q        (6.2) 
1j jx xp q        (6.3) 
jk jk jk
x x xp q w       (6.4) 
1jj jj jkx x xp q w        (6.5) 
where jk
xp denotes the probability that a person aged x  in a state j  is alive in a state 
k  at age 1x ; 
 jk
xq denotes the probability that a person aged x  in a state j  dies within one 
year in a state k ; 
 j
xp  denotes the probability that a person aged x  in a state j  is alive at age 
1x ; 
 j
xq  denotes the probability that a person aged x  in a state j  dies within one 
year; 
 jk
xw  denotes the probability that a person aged x  in a state j  moves to a state 
k ; 
,j k  represent any state of a = active and i = disabled, j k . 
As we assume that there is no more than one transition occurring during one year, apart 
from the possible death, consequently the aaxp and 
ii
xp  represent the probabilities of 
remaining active and disabled, respectively, from age x  to 1x .  
Furthermore, the probability of becoming disabled within one year, equivalently to 
ai
xw , is unknown while the probability of recovery from a disabled to an active state 
within one year ( ia
xw ) is represented by the estimated one-year recovery rate from the 
logistic regression model in Section 6.2. 
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6.3.1.2 Estimating the survival and transition probabilities 
In this subsection, we explain how to estimate the transition probabilities and the 
probabilities of remaining in the same state over one year, thereby extending Albarran 
et al.’s (2005) approach. Due to the lack of information on the probabilities of death 
across subpopulation, Albarran et al. (2005) disaggregated the probability of dying for 
the national population at age x  ( xq ) into the probabilities of dying for the disabled 
and the non-disabled people. The assumptions about the relative risk12 of death among 
subgroups are then made to approximate the related probabilities of dying and 
transition between the active and the disabled population. 
Initially, the probability of death for the entire population aged x  ( xq ) is decomposed 
into the probability of death for the non-disabled  people ( a
xq ) and the probability of 
death for the disabled people ( i
xq ) by the weighted average with the proportion of the 
disabled and the non-disabled population, respectively (Majer et al., 2013) that can be 
expressed as: 
  (1 ) (1 )( ) ( )a i aa ai ii iax x x x x x x x x x xq v q v q v q q v q q          (6.6) 
The gender- and age-specific probabilities of death for the UK working-age population 
are obtained from the Human Mortality Database13. The proportion of the disabled 
people at any age x  is measured by the age-specific prevalence rate of disability ( xv ) 
which is modelled by the multiple logistic regression explained in Section 6.2. 
 
 
                                                          
12 The relative risk (also called as risk ratio, RR ) of death is treated as the relative mortality risk of 
disabled people versus non-disabled people:  /i a
x x
RR q q  where ixq  and 
a
xq  denote the probability 
of death for the disabled and the non-disabled people at age x , respectively. 
13 The Human Mortality Database (2017) is available in www.mortality.org. 
CHAPTER 6. A Multiple State Model for Working-Age Disabled Population  120 
 
 
 
Also, the probability that an individual aged x  survives up to age 1x  ( xp ) is 
identified as: 
    (1 )( ) ( )aa ai ii iax x x x x x xp v p p v p p       (6.7) 
We then make three assumptions regarding the risk ratio between the probabilities of 
death for the disabled and non-disabled people. The three common assumptions are 
defined as follows: 
 Assumption 1:  1 1 ;  0 1
ai ai ii
x x xq k w q k    
 Assumption 2:  2 2 ; 0 1
ia ia aa
x x xq k w q k    
 Assumption 3:  3 3 ; 0 1
aa ii
x xq k q k    
According to Albarran et al. (2005), we follow their Assumption 1 in term of the age 
distribution of becoming disabled. For Assumption 2, we establish additionally the 
ratio between the two death probabilities of iaxq and of 
aa
xq as a function of the age 
distribution of recovery. Because of the work of Albarran et al. (2005) focusing on the 
elderly, they assume the ratio between aa
xq relative to 
ii
xq  is a function of age and the 
gap of both probabilities tends to increase with age among the old-age group. However, 
they point out that this may not be true for the whole population. Majer et al. (2013) 
also found that there was no significant age interaction or time trend in the Cox 
proportional hazard ratios between the death of the Dutch non-disabled and disabled 
populations, with the constant ratio of 0.54 and 0.58 for men and women, respectively. 
As a result, in Assumption 3, we suppose that the relative ratios for the mortality risk 
among working-age people with non-disability and disability are constant over age. 
The probabilities of death for the disabled persons are generally higher than those for 
the non-disabled people, i.e. 
ii aa
x xq q , meaning that the relative mortality ratios 
between non-disabled versus disabled people are lower than 1. Also, the probabilities 
of dying in the different state are likely to be lower than the probabilities of death in 
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the same state, i.e. 
ii ai
x xq q and 
aa ia
x xq q . Therefore, the range of 1k , 2k , and 3k  is set 
between 0 and 1. 
Next, the assumption about a stationary population is required in which the number of 
disabled people at age 1x  is equal to the number of disabled people aged x  surviving 
in the same disabled state at age 1x  plus the number of active people aged x  
surviving in the disabled state at age 1x . It is expressed as follows: 
1 (1 )
ii ai
x x x x x xv p v p v p        (6.8) 
Substituting the expression (6.5) and Assumption 1 in the above expression (6.8), we 
obtain the relationship: 
 
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )( )
ia ii ai ai ii
x x x x x x x x xv q v w q v w k w q          (6.9) 
which yields the probability of becoming disabled between age x  and 1x : 
   
   
  
1
1
1 1
1 1
ia ii
x x x x xai
x ii
x x
v q v w q
w
v k q
    

 
   (6.10) 
Substituting Assumption 1, 2 and 3 in the expression (6.6), the probability that a 
disabled person aged x  dies within one year while he/she is still being disabled is  
  
   3 1 2 31 1
ii x
x ai ia
x x x x x x
q
q
v k v k w v v k k w

    
  (6.11) 
Finally, replacing the aixw  from the expression (6.10) into (6.11), a quadratic equation 
of iixq can be expressed as  
 
2
0ii iix x xA q Bq q       (6.12) 
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where  1 3 1 21
ia
x x xA k k v v k k w     
  
and       3 2 1 1 11 1ia iax x x x x x x x x xB k v v k w k v q k q v v w v          
The equation admits two real positive solutions. However, we choose the unique 
solution that lies in the (0, 1) interval, as shown in Appendix E.2. 
Substituting the known values of xq , xv and 
ia
xw  with the different values of 1k , 2k  and 
3k  in the solution of equation (6.12), we obtain the probability that a disabled person 
dies while he/she is in a disabled state ( ii
xq ). We then compute the probability of 
becoming disabled ( ai
xw ) following the equation (6.10) and the probability of death in 
any state ai
xq , 
ia
xq  and 
aa
xq  from Assumption 1, 2 and 3. 
6.3.2 Multiple logistic regression model 
The LFS dataset contain a binary outcome indicator of the disability event occurrence 
(i.e. active or disabled status) and of the case of recovery from a disabled to an active 
status (i.e. non-recovery or recovery status). The logistic regression is a popular model 
for the binary dependent variables that allows us to estimate the probability of the event 
of interest (De Jong and Heller, 2008; Frees, 2009; Hosmer et al., 2013; Guillen, 2014). 
We apply the logistic regression models to capture the occurrence of disability and 
recovery events separately for males and females by taking into account the effect of 
age as a polynomial function (Renshaw and Haberman, 1995; Fong et al., 2015) and 
of time trends (Renshaw and Haberman, 2000). The estimations of disability 
prevalence rates and one-year recovery rates are explained in the following subsection. 
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6.3.2.1 Estimating the disability prevalence rates, xv  
The logistic regression with age and time trend as the predictor variables is applied for 
estimating the gender- and age-specific disability prevalence rates of the working-age 
population in each calendar year over the period 1999–2011. The binary outcome of 
the event that the n-th person is being disabled, ny , is defined as follows: 
1    if the n-th person is disabled with probability 
0   if the n-th person is non-disabled with probability 1-
n
n
n
v
y
v

 

 
The logistic regression model of disability prevalence rates is based on a polynomial 
of age with degree 4 and a time trend, as shown in the next equation below14. The 
model is analysed for males and females separately. 
The logistic regression of estimation disability prevalence rates is defined as 
, 2 3 4
, 1 2 3 4 5
,
logit ( ) ln
1
n t
n t
n t
v
v age age age age t
v
     
 
         
 (6.13) 
where 
,n tv  represents the disability prevalence rate of the n-th person in calendar year 
t , age  denotes the age of an individual and t  is the calendar year, i.e. 0, 1, …, 12 
corresponding to the year between 1999–2011. 
The fitted gender- and age-specific disability prevalence rate at age x  in each calendar 
year over the period 1999–2011 is expressed as follows: 
2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
, 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆexp( )
ˆ  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ1 exp( )
x t
age age age age t
v
age age age age t
     
     
    

     
   (6.14) 
 
                                                          
14 Different polynomial forms have been carried out but we only show results for the best fit to the 
data, see the model selection in Appendix E.3. 
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6.3.2.2 Estimating the one-year recovery rates, ia
xw  
The binary outcome of the event that the n-th disabled person recovers to an active 
state over a one-year period, nz , is defined as follows: 
1    if the n-th disabled person recovers to an active state with probability w
0   if the n-th disabled person is still disabled with probability 1-w
ia
n
n ia
n
z

 

 
The logistic regression model is explained by gender and a quadratic function of age 
using the following equation15: 
2
1 2logit ( ) ln
1
ia
ia n
n ia
n
w
w gender age
w
  
 
      
  (6.15) 
where gender is a dummy variable with 1 for males and 2 for females and age  is the 
age of the n-th disabled individual. 
The constant estimated gender-specific one-year recovery rate at age x  over the period 
1999–2011 is expressed as 
2
1 2
2
1 2
ˆ ˆˆexp( )
ˆ  
ˆ ˆˆ1 exp( )
ia
x
gender age
w
gender age
  
  
 

  
    (6.16) 
The logistic regression of both equations (6.13) and (6.15) are fitted to the data by 
using maximum likelihood methods to obtain the estimates of parameters, i.e. the 
intercept ( ) and coefficients ( )β . Then, we compute the fitted disability prevalence 
rates from the equation (6.14) and the fitted one-year recovery rates from the equation 
(6.16) by substituting the estimated parameters   and β , which are illustrated in the 
following section. 
                                                          
15 Different polynomial forms have been carried out but the model with gender and degree 2 of age as 
predictors is the best fit to the data, see the model selection in Appendix E.4. 
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6.4 Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of the estimated gender- and age-specific 
disability prevalence rates and the estimated one-year recovery rates over the period 
of 1999–2011. All estimated rates are included in the one-year multiple state model to 
generate the transition probabilities in each state, i.e. active, disabled and dead. The 
probabilities of death among each state are also computed, based on the assumptions 
about the relative ratio of mortality between the disabled and non-disabled people. 
6.4.1 The estimated disability prevalence rates, xv  
The results of the estimates for the unknown parameters for men and women are shown 
in Table 6.2. In the logistic regression model, parameters are interpreted in terms of 
logit rather than directly in the response variable. Then, these estimated parameters are 
calculated following the equation (6.14) to produce the fitted disability prevalence 
rates by age and gender in each calendar year. 
As shown in Table 6.2, all parameters are statistically significant at the 90% confidence 
level and both models give the lowest AIC values (see Appendix E.3 for the six model 
variants). The prevalence rates of disability rise with age and are higher for women 
than men. Conversely, the young men aged 18–27 have higher disability prevalence 
rates than the young women. The trends in disability rates among men and women 
have dropped slightly over time due to the negative value of the coefficient of t . 
In Figure 6.5, the fitted disability rates of young men aged 16–28 in 1999 decreased 
from 0.0795 to 0.0483, whereas the rates of men aged 29–64 increased from 0.0486 to 
0.3723. For females, the fitted rates were lower, i.e. ranging between 0.0565–0.2808 
for the age interval 16–59. The disability rates in 2011 slightly decreased from 1999 
for both sexes. The fitted rates have the same trend as the disability living allowance 
– the social welfare for the UK disabled people – claimant rates. However, for all age 
groups the fitted rates from our model produce higher values than the rates of claimants 
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since beneficiaries who are entitled to receive benefits have to meet strict conditions16. 
As a result, the number of benefit recipients is likely to be lower than the number of 
people with self-reported disability. 
Table 6.2: The logistic regression model of disability prevalence rates 
Parameter Estimate Std.Error z value Pr > |z| 
     
Male     
α (intercept) 1.9380 0.5292 3.6600 0.0000*** 
β1 (age) -0.4964 0.0615 -8.0700 0.0000*** 
β2 (age2) 0.0179 0.0025 7.2000 0.0000*** 
β3 (age3/1000) -0.2790 0.0421 -6.6300 0.0000*** 
β4 (age4/10000) 0.0174 0.0025 6.8200 0.0000*** 
β5 (t) -0.0038 0.0019 -2.0400 0.0420** 
     
Female     
α (intercept) -1.1506 0.6586 -1.7500 0.0810* 
β1 (age) -0.2339 0.0792 -2.9500 0.0030*** 
β2 (age2) 0.0111 0.0034 3.3000 0.0010*** 
β3 (age3/1000) -0.2000 0.0001 -3.4800 0.0000*** 
β4 (age4/10000) 0.0154 0.0004 3.9400 0.0000*** 
β5 (t) -0.0057 0.0018 -3.1200 0.0020** 
          
Source: Own illustration using the LFS dataset and the logistic regression in equation (6.13) 
Note: * 0.10;   ** 0.05;   *** 0.01p value p value p value       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 See the rates of claimants receiving Disability Living Allowance (DLA) from the Department for 
Work & Pensions (DWP) statistics tabulation tool over the period 2002-2011. The values of the 
disability rates differ due to the different nature of both datasets, i.e. while LFS is a self-assessed dataset, 
the claimants of DWP are examined by an independent healthcare professional. Also, under the DWP, 
the claimants must have a long-term health condition or disability and face difficulties with ‘daily living’ 
or getting around. These difficulties must be longer than 3 months and are expected to last at least 9 
months. 
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Figure 6.5: Estimated disability prevalence rates by age and gender in 1999 and 2011 
 
Source: Own illustration from the logistic regression model in equation (6.14) 
6.4.2 The estimated one-year recovery rates, ia
xw  
As shown in Table 6.3, the variables age and gender are statistically significant to 
model the one-year recovery rates for disabled people and the model gives the lowest 
AIC values (see Appendix E.4 for the six model variants). We can see that the one-
year recovery rates gradually decrease with the quadratic form of ages. The coefficient 
of gender variable is negative, which means that more men recover their health and 
get a job during the course of one year than women. This is not surprising since most 
women with disabilities encounter barriers in entering the labour market and often 
experience employment disadvantages, such as inequality in hiring, promotion 
standards and payment (O'Reilly, 2007). As a result, many women do not desire to 
return to work. 
The fitted recovery rates over one year, as shown in Figure 6.6, decrease from 0.2071 
to 0.0194 for men and from 0.1707 to 0.0230 for women. Our fitted rates are consistent 
with the one-year claim duration recovery rates provided by the Society of Actuaries: 
2008 Long Term Disability Experience Study Report. The report gathers and analyses 
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historical industry data on long-term disability claims of the US insurance companies 
between 1997 and 2006. The analysis shows that, on average, the rates decreased with 
increasing age, 0.1973 for under the age of 25, and dropped to 0.0306 for the 60–64 
age band. The fitted rates from our model for males and females are approximate to 
these experience rates. 
Table 6.3: The logistic regression model of one-year recovery rates 
Parameter Estimate Std.Error z value Pr > |z| 
     
α (intercept) -1.1705 0.1071 -10.9300 0.0000*** 
β1 (gender) -0.2379 0.0959 -2.4800 0.0130** 
β2 (age2) -0.0007 0.0000 -15.7100 0.0000*** 
     
Source: Own illustration using the LFS dataset and the logistic regression in equation (6.15) 
Note: * 0.10;   ** 0.05;   *** 0.01p value p value p value       
Figure 6.6: Estimated one-year recovery rates by age and gender over 1999–2011 
 
Source: Own illustration from the logistic regression model in equation (6.16) 
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6.4.3 The estimated annual survival and transition probabilities 
Taking into account the one-year multiple state model to estimate the transition 
probabilities and the probabilities of remaining in the same state, we employ the annual 
probabilities of death for the general population ( )xq obtained from the HMD and the 
estimated disability prevalence rates ( xv ) and one-year recovery rates (
ia
xw ) from the 
logistic regression models. Then, we calculate the probabilities of becoming disabled 
( aixw ), the probabilities of death in any state ( , ,  
ai ia ii
x x xq q q and 
aa
xq ) and the 
probabilities of remaining in the same state ( iixp and 
aa
xp ). In this paper, we illustrate 
only a selected year of 2011, to perform the results in accordance with the various 
values of 1 2,k k and 3k  from Assumption 1, 2 and 3. 
The probabilities of death in any state with the different values of 1 2 3k k k   and 
1 2 3k k k   are shown in Figure 6.7. The graphic of the probabilities of disabled 
people aged x  dying in a disabled state ( iixq ) shows that the value of 3k , which is 
equivalent to the relative mortality risk ratio between the non-disabled and disabled 
people, is negatively correlated with the value of iixq . The lower value of 3k  produces 
the higher value of iixq ; for example, the value of 
ii
xq  under the scenario of the lowest 
3 0.2k   together with 1 0.5k   and 2 0.5k  is higher than the other scenarios. 
Conversely, there is a positive relationship between the value of 3k  and the probability 
of death of a non-disabled person. The higher value of 3k  gives the lower 
aa
xq .  
In the case of changes in the values of 1k  and 2k while keeping the same value of 3k  
at 0.5, the values of iixq  and 
aa
xq  are almost unchanged; for example, the results given  
1 2 30.5, 0.5, 0.5k k k    against 1 2 30.2, 0.8, 0.5k k k    are very similar. Thus, 
the 1k  and 2k  have very minor effect on the probabilities of death in the same state 
ii
xq and 
aa
xq . 
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Figure 6.7: Estimates of annual probabilities of death with any various scenarios of 1 2,k k  
and 3k  for males in 2011 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the one-year multiple state model 
Additionally, the values of ixq  in all scenarios are almost exactly equal to the values of 
ii
xq , whereas the values of 
ia
xq  are extremely small, i.e. nearly zero. It means the 
probability that a disabled person dies in the same state ( )iixq  is likely to be the main 
component of the probability of dying of disabled people ( )ixq . As expected, in the 
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case of an active individual, the probability of dying for active people aged x ( )axq is 
also mostly determined by the probability of dying when individuals are still in the 
active state ( )aaxq . 
Figure 6.8 plots the decomposition of the estimated probability of death between the 
contribution of i
x xv q  and (1 )
a
x xv q , the probabilities of becoming disabled ( )
ai
xw  and 
the probabilities of surviving in the same state aa
xp and 
ii
xp  with the different scenarios 
of 1 2,k k and 3k . The graphic of the decomposition of the estimated probability of death 
shows that the value of xq  is largely affected by the mortality of the active people 
(1 ) ax xv q  with the higher value of 3k . For example, the value of 3 0.8k   produces the 
highest value of (1 ) ax xv q  and the lowest value of 
i
x xv q . 
Figure 6.8: Decomposition of the estimated probability of death, the probability of becoming 
disabled and the probability of surviving in the same state with various scenarios of 1 2,k k  and 
3k  among males in 2011 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the one-year multiple state model 
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Furthermore, the probability of becoming disabled within one year ( )aixw increases with 
age and steeply rises over the age of 50, in contrast to the probability of aa
xp  (see Figure 
6.8). The value of ii
xp  also rises continuously with age and is associated adversely with 
the probability of recovering from a disabled to an active state within one year ( )iaxw . 
Regarding the differential mortality across gender, the probabilities of death in any 
state of a person aged x , i.e. , ,ii aa iax x xq q q  and 
ai
xq  for men are greater than women, as 
shown in Figure 6.9. The probabilities of death in the same state ii
xq  and 
aa
xq  for both 
genders have the same pattern as the probabilities of death for the general population 
( xq ) that are increasing with age, but the disabled people have a higher probability of 
death than the general population and the active people. Moreover, it is still rare for 
anyone to die in a different state within one year of a transition; as a result, the 
probabilities that the non-disabled and disable people die in the different state ia
xq  and 
ai
xq  are almost zero. 
The probabilities of becoming disabled ( )aixw  are increasing with age and higher 
among females than males. On the other hand, the probabilities of recovering from a 
disabled to an active state ( )iaxw  have been decreasing with age and are lower for 
females than males. We also compare the probability of surviving in the same state ii
xp  
and aa
xp  for both genders. The probabilities that the disabled people are still being 
disabled ( )iixp  rise with age and the values are higher for females than males. In 
contrast, the probabilities of the active people being in an active state ( )aaxp  decrease 
with age and the active males have more chance to stay in the same state than females.  
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Figure 6.9: Estimates of annual probabilities in any state with 1 2 3 0.5k k k    by age and 
gender in 2011 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the one-year multiple state model 
Figure 6.10 shows the probability forecasts in any state in 2020, 2030 and 2050 with 
the scenario of 1 2 3 0.5k k k   . We use the Lee-Carter model to forecast the national 
mortality rates xm  and then approximate the probabilities of death xq
17. The disability 
prevalence rates and all transition probabilities are also projected. 
                                                          
17 See Lee and Carter (1992) and following Renshaw and Haberman (2003) and Wilmoth et al. (2007), 
we fix 
1
2
x
f   for all single ages. Hence, the approximation of 
,x t
q  is expressed as 
 
,
,
,1 1 x
x t
x t
x t
m
q
f m

 
for 16,17, ..., 64x   in the calendar year t = 2020, 2030 and 2050. 
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Figure 6.10: The projections of transition probabilities in 2020, 2030 and 2050 compared with 
2011 in the case of males with the 1 2 3 0.5k k k    
Source: Own calculation based on the one-year multiple state model 
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Due to the improvement of mortality in the future, the probabilities of death among 
the disabled and active people have also been decreasing over time. Moreover, the 
trends in the disability prevalence rates would fall since the sign of time effect 
parameter in the logistic regression model is negative. The drop in the mortality and 
disability prevalence rates would bring about the fall in the probabilities of becoming 
disabled and the rise in the probabilities of being in the same state in the future. Also, 
the expected lifetime (or average number of years) of the disabled people in a disabled 
state ( )iixe  before reaching the retirement age of 65, as shown in Figure 6.10, increases 
at younger ages and slightly falls at older ages until retirement. 
6.5  Conclusions 
This paper proposes the one-year discrete time multiple state model for the working-
age disabled people using the self-reported cross-sectional disability data. We also 
allow for the recovery from a disabled to an active state in the model, whereas several 
previous researches focused on the elderly and does not consider their recovery. The 
disability prevalence rates, the probabilities of death for the national population and 
the assumptions made on the relative mortality ratio between non-disabled and 
disabled individuals are used to estimate the probabilities of dying, of surviving and 
of transition among states. 
The estimated gender- and age-specific disability prevalence rates representing the 
probability of being disabled increase with age and are greater for women than men. 
On the other hand, the one-year recovery rates as a proxy of the probability of recovery 
from a disabled to an active state decrease with age and men recover their health and 
get back to work at a greater rate than women. The probabilities of becoming disabled 
are almost equal for younger ages and then rise rapidly at older ages. Moreover, the 
size of the relative mortality ratio among non-disabled and disabled people remaining 
in the same state is the main determinant of the probabilities of dying in the same state 
ii
xq  and 
aa
xq . In contrast, the probabilities of death in the different state hardly occur –
the values of ai
xq  and 
ia
xq  are almost zero. Consequently, the probabilities of death 
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among each subgroup i
xq  and 
a
xq  would be approximated by the probability of dying 
in the same state. 
The disability prevalence rates in the future are predicted to drop by 6% in 2030. The 
fall in the probability of becoming disabled by 7% would reduce the number of new 
claimants of the incapacity benefits, which implies the fiscal spending on the social 
insurance to support income for these unemployed disabled people would decrease as 
well. Additionally, the government would spend the budget to pay the incapacity 
benefits for the working-age population, on average, for 7.6 years per individual, 
measured by the expected lifetime of disabled people without employment. In 2030, 
the average number of year is predicted to increase to 7.7 years due to the effect of 
mortality improvement. 
The model framework presented in this paper is applicable only when the disability 
prevalence rates are available. However, the disability rates might be replaced with the 
other prevalence measures of long-term health problems, such as activities living daily 
(ADL) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). Our proposed method could 
be applied to project the size of the different groups of population; active, disabled and 
dead, and also to evaluate the demand for the incapacity benefits. In a future study, we 
will focus on using these estimated transition probabilities to measure the future cost 
of government spending on disability benefits. 
In addition, a more realistic model could be built using a semi-Markov process if the 
longitudinal data providing the time spent in any state are available – our study is 
unable working on this model because of a lack of such longitudinal data. Under the 
semi-Markov model, disability duration effects – the duration of stay in a certain state 
has an effect on the occurrence of future transitions between states – of recovery and 
mortality are taken into account. Particularly, the probabilities of both recovery and 
dying for a disabled person decrease with increasing duration of disability and we 
would apply the parametric method described by Haberman and Pitacco (1999) to 
estimate transition intensities. Also, the steps of estimating the cumulative transition 
intensities, the transition probability matrix and the probability in any state could 
follow the work of Christiansen (2012). 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
This thesis mainly is based on the major aspects of the old-age benefits, especially the 
new innovative pension scheme, known as the notional (non-financial) defined 
contribution (NDC). The scheme is currently approaching its adulthood, and it is time 
to investigate lessons learned and to explore important issues that need to be addressed 
to enhance the existing scheme.  
Sweden is a pioneer country where the idea of the NDC public pension model has been 
introduced in 1994. Also, among the countries with NDCs, an automatic balancing 
mechanism with the calculation of a financial solvency indicator that emerges from an 
actuarial balance sheet has only been uniquely found in Sweden. Chapter 2 describes 
the experience of the Swedish NDC pension system during the period of 2007-2015 
through its accounting method, with special attention to the balance ratio under the 
economic and financial crises. The solvency of the pension system dropped and the 
balance ratio was below one – pension liabilities are greater than assets – in the post-
2008 recession and as a consequence, the automatic balancing mechanism was 
triggered and the amount of pension was reduced in 2010, 2011 and 2014. 
The policy responses have been executed as follows: firstly, the smoothed buffer fund 
– the average of the buffer fund as of 31 December in the last three years – has been 
used in the balance ratio rather than using the value of the buffer fund as of 31 
December in a specific year. The Swedish Pensions Agency also proposed that the 
effect of the solvency deficit on the pensions should be smoothed. Considering all 
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sources of solvency volatility – not only the volatility resulting from the value of the 
buffer fund – would lead to more efficient smoothing. As of the reduction in the 
pensions under the notional model, the second policy response was the cut of taxes on 
pensions to counteract the net effect of the negative indexation. However, this policy 
response implies that one of main objective of NDC design – to safeguard government 
finances from the development of the public pension plan – was not achieved. Lastly, 
the volatility of the solvency measure, i.e. the balance ratio, has motivated the Swedish 
agency analysing the reasons for the unanticipated level of volatility. The results 
revealed that the three-year smoothing of the income index caused a delay with respect 
to the development of the contributions of the plan that resulted in a significant real 
volatility in the ratio of the contribution assets to the pension liabilities. 
The Swedish agency also suggests that the (projected) change in income in the coming 
year relative to the current one should be used instead of the change in income in the 
current year relative to the previous one to eliminate the volatility caused by the 
indexation. The difference between the projected and the actual income growth should 
affect the indexation of the following year as well. This solution would completely 
eliminate the avoidable solvency volatility caused by the delay in the indexation 
relative to the contribution development. With the aim of the further reduction in 
volatility, the policymaker pointed out that balancing should only come into effect if 
the balance ratio has been below the unity for the three consecutive years and that in 
balancing, the new rule, in which the indexation is reduced by only one-third of the 
adjustment necessary to achieve 100 percent solvency ratio, was introduced in 2015 
and the new (damped) balance has been applied from 2016 onwards. 
In addition, Chapter 3 explores the main channels of communication via the annual 
report on the solvency of the public system and the orange envelope with information 
on the individual accumulated capital and forecasts of expected benefits. The main 
challenge for the Swedish Pensions Agency is to know how the participants use the 
information provided and how well it communicates information about the pension 
system. At the same time, the new notional system puts additional demands on 
participants about how the level of benefits varies according to the number of years of 
contributions and the retirement age. Projections of future pension benefits and how 
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the amount of benefits changes with retirement ages are necessary information for 
contributors in order to make good decisions about a number of years at work and 
savings. 
For the members’ perception, understanding of the information received has been 
continuously increasing since the orange envelope was introduced. However, the 
confidence on both the pension system and the pension system administration gets 
worse when the automatic balancing mechanism is triggered that might cause from a 
lack of the knowledge on how the system works and why the activation of the 
mechanism is needed the solvency of the system is worsened. 
Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis focus on the annuity divisors used to convert an 
accumulated notional capital into a lifelong annuity at retirement age. Under the 
annuitisation divisor rules, all NDC countries share the same principle with respect to 
the use of gender-neutral annuity divisor. This introduces an intra-generational income 
redistribution when heterogeneity in mortality exists within the population. Chapter 4 
quantifies the redistribution effects of using the two types of unisex (average) divisor; 
the traditional demographic annuity divisor and the economic annuity divisor, across 
the Swedish subpopulations assessed through gender and educational attainment. 
The alternative economic divisors that are used to calculate the pension liabilities of 
the Swedish NDC system are based on the composition of the population. With respect 
to a particular gender or level of education, the values of economic divisors tend to be 
high if the pension system has a large size of population with low-mortality risk. 
Moreover, when the combination of gender and level of education is taken into 
consideration, the economic divisors are mainly driven by the longevity effect 
belonging to gender rather than educational attainment. 
The concept of money’s worth for participation in the pension system on a lifetime 
basis is used to measure the income redistribution. Numerical results strongly confirm 
that the expected transfer of wealth away from high-mortality risk groups to low-
mortality risk groups. The subgroup-specific present value ratio also shows that all 
subgroups of women and high-educated men get welfare gain from the use of both 
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types of unisex divisors, i.e. the PVRs are greater than 1, as those of people are, in 
general, expected to live longer than the average population. 
The other consequence on the redistribution occurring from the use of economic 
divisor instead of the demographic divisor is that when the value of economic divisor 
changes, the amount of initial pension and the PVRs would change in the opposite 
direction with the same relative percentage of change compared to the case of using 
the demographic annuity divisor for all subgroups. 
Furthermore, if there is no mortality differential across subpopulations, the pension 
with the inclusion of the survivor dividend would create an actuarially fair pension 
system. Interestingly, the survivor dividend produces a trade-off between the expected 
transfer of wealth between men and women at the different retirement ages. The PVRs 
for all subgroups of women increase if the retirement is delayed while the PVRs for 
men decrease when the retirement age increases. The results also indicate that the 
distribution of the survivor dividend would lessen the effect of mortality heterogeneity 
on the income transfer. 
Chapter 5 develops a complex actuarial model for computing the annuity divisors of a 
notional pension scheme that provides both old-age and survivors’ benefits. The 
multiple state framework incorporates the survivors’ pension for the widow and the 
orphan together with the old-age benefits and involves the probabilities that the 
pension benefits will be paid to the retiree and all surviving members of her family, 
i.e. a spouse and children. The direct method, that works on the mean values of the 
variables rather than their distribution functions and follows all possible trajectories 
that a person would occupy during her lifetime and its probability is known, is 
employed to compute the actuarial present values of the multiple life contingent 
annuities. This simulation technique is relatively simple and less time-consuming. 
The values of unisex annuity divisor of the proposed model decrease with age due to 
the decline in the life expectancy of both pensioner and her spouse. Also, the effect of 
longevity risk implies a gradual increase in the values of annuity divisor over the last 
two decades. The comparative results of the annuity divisors under the current Italian 
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rules also show that the values established by law are lower than our own results using 
more updated data. In this case, it would lead to the current retirees receiving more 
amount of pension than they should actually earn. The underestimated annuity divisors 
would cause an increase in the pension liabilities of the system that would deteriorate 
the finances of the public pension scheme.  
Moreover, the findings highlight the fact that the annuity divisors of the pension 
benefits covering multiple beneficiaries are significantly greater than the divisors of 
the annuity covering only a single beneficiary. From the results, we confirm that the 
values of divisor under the Italian rules – considering the probabilities of payments for 
both a pensioner and her spouse – are lower than those values obtained by the direct 
method – considering the probabilities of payments for a pensioner, a spouse and 
children, when the annuities of both cases are payable annually at the same moment in 
time set in the middle of the year. This means that the current retirees are benefitting 
from the Italian rule and receiving more amount of pension than the corresponding 
values under the direct method. 
The actuarial values of the unitary pension benefits achieved in the numerical example 
endorse the fact that the proposed model works well and is close to the reality of the 
social insurance. The integration of the old-age and survivors’ benefits to determine 
the initial pension would enhance the political attractiveness of the pension design. In 
a similar way, it is necessary to be aware of the social acceptability of the new rule 
along with the drop in the pension payments. 
Apart from the studies relevant to the old-age pension, Chapter 6 proposes a generic 
method for estimating the one-year transition probabilities among the working-age 
non-disabled and disabled population by using the self-reported cross-sectional 
disability data. The estimated prevalence rates of disabilities, the probabilities of death 
for the general population and the assumptions made on the relative mortality ratio 
between active and disabled people are used to obtain the probabilities of death, of 
survival and of transition among the states of active and disabled. 
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The main findings show that the disability prevalence rates increase with age and the 
rates for women are higher than men. Similarly, the probabilities of becoming disabled 
are increasing with age and higher for women than men, whereas the probabilities of 
recovery from a disabled to an active state are decreasing when rising age and men 
recover their health and get back to work sooner than women. Furthermore, the 
probabilities that the disabled people are alive in a disabled state rise with age and the 
values are higher for women than men. In contrast, the probabilities of active people 
being alive in an active state decrease with age and the active men have more chance 
to be healthy than women. 
In regard to the differential mortality across subgroups, the probabilities of death in 
any state illustrate that the values for men are greater than women. In particular, the 
probabilities that the active and disabled people die in the same state have the same 
pattern as the probabilities of death for the general population – the probabilities of 
death increase with age – but the disabled people have the probability of death higher 
than the general population and the active people. There is also a very small chance for 
everyone dying in the different state within one year, as a result, the probabilities that 
the non-disabled and disabled people die in the different state are almost zero. 
Although the model framework proposed in Chapter 6 is applicable when the cross-
sectional prevalence rates of disability are available, a possible extension could be the 
use of other indicators measuring the long-term health problems, such as the activities 
living daily (ADL) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). Also, a more 
realistic model could be built by applying a semi-Markov process in which disability 
duration effects of recovery and mortality are taken into account and then the transition 
intensities, the transition probability matrix and the probability in any state would be 
estimated by following the work of Christiansen (2012). 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendices to Chapter 2 
A.1 Balance sheets and income statements in Swedish 
kronor 
The balance sheets and income statements from 2007–2015 are shown in Swedish 
kronor in Table A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
Table A.1: Balance sheets, December 31, 2007–2015 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Assets (SKr billions) 
       
Fund assets 898 707 827 895 873 958 1,058 1,184 1,230 
Contribution asset 6,116 6,477 6,362 6,575 6,828 6,915 7,123 7,380 7,457 
Total assets 7,014 7,184 7,189 7,469 7,700 7,873 8,180 8,565 8,688 
Liabilities and results brought forward (SKr billions) 
   
Opening results brought forward 100 18 -243 -323 103 157 -80 127 423 
Net income or loss for the year -82 -261 -79 425 54 -237 207 296 -252 
Closing results brought forward 18 -243 -323 103 157 -80 127 423 171 
Pension liability 6,996 7,428 7,512 7,367 7,543 7,952 8,053 8,141 8,517 
Total liabilities and results brought 
forwarda 
7,014 7,184 7,189 7,469 7,700 7,873 8,180 8,565 8,688 
Source: Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
a Total liabilities and result brought forward is the summation of “Opening results brought forward”, 
“Net income or loss for the year” and “Pension liability”. 
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Table A.2: Income statements, 2007–2015 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Change in fund assets (SKr billions) 
     
Pension contributions 190 203 203 205 216 222 227 236 246 
Pension disbursements -186 -199 -217 -220 -220 -236 -254 -255 -265 
Return on funded capital 38 -194 136 85 -17 101 128 148 67 
Administrative costs -2 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
Total 41 -191 120 68 -22 85 100 127 46 
Change in contribution assets (SKr billions) 
    
Value of change in contribution revenue 193 395 -115 232 255 120 215 266 333 
Value of change in turnover duration -22 -33 -1 -19 -2 -33 -6 -8 -256 
Total 171 361 -115 213 253 87 208 257 77 
Change in pension liabilitya (SKr billions) 
     
New pension credits and ATP points -194 -218 -214 -215 -207 -228 -242 -230 -246 
Pension disbursements 186 199 217 220 220 236 254 255 265 
Indexation or change in value -268 -385 -64 165 -175 -403 -96 -92 -378 
Value of change in life expectancy -17 -27 -23 -25 -14 -13 -16 -20 -15 
Inheritance gains arising 10 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 
Inheritance gains distributed -11 -12 -13 -13 -12 -13 -14 -14 -14 
Deduction for administrative costs 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Total -293 -431 -84 145 -177 -409 -101 -88 -375 
Net income or loss for the year 
(SKr billions) 
-82 -261 -79 425 54 -237 207 296 -252 
Source: Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2016) 
Note: ATP = Allmän tilläggspension. 
a A negative item (-) increases the pension liability, and a positive item () decreases it, by the amount 
shown. 
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
B.1 The orange envelope 
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APPENDIX C 
Appendices to Chapter 4 
C.1 Modelling and forecasting mortality rates across 
subpopulations using the common factor model 
The extension of the Lee-Carter model, the so-called common factor model, proposed 
by Li and Lee (2005) can be transformed into the relative approach associated with the 
reference (national) population and the subpopulation introduced by Haberman et al. 
(2014). 
The mortality of the reference population following the Lee-Carter Model can be 
expressed as follows: 
 , ,log x t x x t x tm K        (C.1.1) 
where the central mortality rate at age x  in calendar year t  for the reference 
population, ,x tm , is computed as , , ,x t x t x tm D E . We denote ,x tD  as the number of 
deaths of the reference population aged x  who die in year t  before they reach age 
1x  and the number of person-years of exposure to risk, ,x tE , is estimated by the mid-
year population at age x  in calendar year t , equivalently to the average number of 
individuals aged x  over a year. The parameter x  describes the average age-specific 
mortality pattern. The variable tK  is a time-varying mortality index representing the 
overall change in the level of mortality in year t  and x  measures the deviation of the 
age-specific mortality level when the time index tK  changes. 
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Given the reference population model and the common factor model with the same 
parameter x  and tK  for all population, the mortality level differences of the 
subpopulation i  compared to the reference population for age group x  can be 
determined in the form of ix  as follows: 
, ,log log
i i
x t x t xm m      (C.1.2) 
Substituting the mortality of reference population from the equation (C.1.1) in the 
equation (C.1.2), the mortality of the subpopulation i  is then specified through1 
    ,log
i i
x t x x x tm K        (C.1.3) 
with constraints 1x
x X


 ,   0t
t T
K

   and  0
i
x
i I


  for all x X  
where ,
i
x tm  is the central mortality rate at age x ,   1: ,..., kx X x x  , in calendar year 
t ,  1: ,..., nt T t t  , for the subpopulation i ,  1: ,..., si I i i  , and , , ,
i i i
x t x t x tm D E . 
The age-specific mortality level in the subgroup i  is 
i
x x  . The parameter x  
represents the age-specific pattern of mortality change for all subpopulations and tK  
is a single-period index driving the mortality trend for all subpopulations. Also, the 
subgroup i  is L  for low education, M  for medium education and H  for high 
education, respectively. 
We fit the common factor model presented in the equation (C.1.3) for unisex, male and 
female groups separately by the method of maximum likelihood. The resulting 
parameter estimates are shown graphically in Figure C.1. Then, the single-period 
mortality index tK  is forecasted by the univariate autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) processes and is used to generate the projected life tables (see 
Appendix C.3 for more details of the forecast).  
                                                          
1 See Villegas and Haberman (2014) in Equation (10). 
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In order to evaluate the best model that fits the historical data, we use the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and Root Mean 
Square Error (RMSE). The estimated parameters, their standard errors and the values 
of goodness-of-fit statistics for unisex and both genders appear in Table C.1. The t-
statistics of all parameters are statistically significant and the residual plots guide us 
towards retaining the chosen models. Thus, the series of index tK  for all population 
(unisex) and female are modelled by an ARIMA (0,1,1) process: 
1 1 1t t t tK K             (C.1.4) 
for male, the model is as an ARIMA (1,1,2) process: 
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2t t t t t t tK K K K                   (C.1.5) 
where the constant   indicates the average annual change of tK , the j represents the 
j-th moving average parameter, the j  is the j-th autoregressive  and the error term t  
is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 . 
Table C.1: Parameter estimates of the ARIMA ( , , )p d q model 
Variable 
Unisex ARIMA(0,1,1) Male ARIMA(1,1,2) Female ARIMA(0,1,1) 
Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat 
  -1.032 0.092 -11.234 -0.924 0.467 -1.982 -1.084 0.053 -20.641 
1  -0.473 0.100 -4.711 -1.429 0.121 -11.833 -0.724 0.102 -7.121 
2  - - - 0.609 0.092 6.624 - - - 
1  - - - 0.954 0.051 18.840 - - - 
2  1.615 1.403 1.795 
log-likelihood -87.01 -82.90 -90.05 
AIC 180.01 175.79 186.11 
BIC 185.92 185.64 192.02 
RMSE 1.235 1.128 1.302 
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Figure C.1: Parameter estimates of the common factor model for unisex, male and female 
 
APPENDIX C  154 
 
 
 
Figure C.2: Forecasts of the mortality index tK with 95% confident interval 
 
Next, we use the ARIMA(0,1,1) for unisex and female and the ARIMA(1,1,2) for male 
to generate the forecasts of the mortality index tK  during the period 2014-2083. Figure 
C.2 shows the past values of tK  along with the projected values and the associated 
95% confident intervals for unisex, male and female respectively.  
We then use the estimated parameters from the common factor model in the equation 
(C.1.3) to compute the estimated gender- and age-specific mortality rates by subgroup 
i  in 2013 as the following formula: 
 ,2013 2013ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ expi ix x x xm K        (C.1.6) 
Forecasts from ARIMA(0,1,1), Unisex
year
k
t
1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
-1
0
0
-4
0
0
Forecasts from ARIMA(1,1,2), Male
year
k
t
1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
-1
5
0
-5
0
0
Forecasts from ARIMA(0,1,1), Female
year
k
t
1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
-1
0
0
-4
0
0
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Also, given the above estimated mortality rates ,2013ˆ
i
xm and the resulting forecasts of 
 2013 : 1, 2,...,70sK s  , we calculate the forecasted mortality rates for subpopulation 
i  as: 
  ,2013 ,2013 2013 2013ˆ ˆˆ expi ix s x x sm m K K      (C.1.7) 
The projected mortality rates ,
i
x tm  are converted into ,
i
x tq , i.e.  the probability of an 
individual aged x  in the calendar year t  and subgroup i  dying within one year (also 
namely the one-year probability of death). These mortality rates are used to construct 
the life tables.  
Let xf be the average number of years lived within the age interval  , 1x x   for people 
dying at that age. Following Renshaw and Haberman (2003) and Wilmoth et al. 
(2007), we fix 
1
2
xf   for all single ages. Hence, the approximation of  ,
i
x tq  is 
expressed as: 
    
 
,
,
,1 1
i
x ti
x t i
x x t
m
q
f m

 
    (C.1.8) 
for 25,26,...,94x   and  95, 1
i
tq   in the calendar year 2013,2014,...,2083t  . 
The elements of the matrix of ,
i
x tq  whose rows correspond to ages and columns to 
calendar years can be simplified as in Table C.2 (Pitacco et al., 2009). For a diagonal 
arrangement,  
25, 26, 1 25 ,, ,..., ,...
i i i
t t s t sq q q      (C.1.9) 
corresponding to a sequence of cohort life tables, with each table referring to the cohort 
born in year 25t  . We use the values of  25,2013 26,2014 95,2083, ,...,i i tq q q to construct the 
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subgroup-specific projected cohort life tables of an individual aged 25 in 2013 
(equivalently to who was born in 1988). 
Table C.2: One-year probabilities of death in a dynamic context 
 t t+1 … t+70 
25 25,
i
tq  25, 1
i
tq   
… 
25, 70
i
tq   
26 26,
i
tq  26, 1
i
tq   
… 
26, 70
i
tq   
… … … … … 
x ,
i
x tq  , 1
i
x tq   
… 
, 70
i
x tq   
x+1 1,
i
x tq   1, 1
i
x tq    
… 
1, 70
i
x tq    
… … … …  
95 95,
i
tq  95, 1
i
tq   
… 
95, 70
i
tq   
Let 
i
xp  be the probability that an individual in subgroup i  survives from age x  to 
1x , to complete the subgroup-specific life table calculations. Therefore, 
1i ix xp q      (C.1.10) 
for all ages x .  
Let the radix of the life table be 25 100,000
il  . Then, the number of survivors at age 
x  is 
     
1
, 25
25
x
i i i
x t h
h
l l p


     (C.1.11) 
and the distribution of deaths by age in the life table population is  
     
i i i
x x xd l q      (C.1.12) 
We finally construct the projected cohort subgroup-specific life tables for the people 
who were born in 1988. The unisex life table is used to compute the unisex (average) 
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annuity divisors and the gender- and educational-specific life tables are for the 
calculation of the money’s worth ratio. 
C.2 Modelling and forecasting mortality rates across 
subpopulations using the Joint-K model 
The Joint- K model proposed by Carter and Lee (1992) assumes that mortality rates of 
all subpopulations are jointly driven by a single period index tK  but the age-specific 
mortality pattern and the age-specific responses to changes in the level of mortality are 
subgroup-specific. The model is given by 
log i i ixt x x tm K       (C.2.1)  
Also, given the reference population model, the mortality of subpopulation i  can be 
rewritten as 
    log i i ixt x x x x tm K           (C.2.2) 
According to the Three-way Lee-Carter model introduced by Russolillo et al. (2011), 
a new component i  capturing the variability in the improvement rates of the 
subpopulations was proposed. Then, the Joint- K model in the equation (C.2.2) can be 
reparametersied as follows: 
log i i ixt x x x tm K         (C.2.3) 
with constraints 1x
x X


 ,   0t
t T
K

 , 0
i
x
i I


  for all x X  and 
1
1i
i Is


  
where 
i
x x   describes the general age shape of the age-specific death rates 
i
xtm  in 
the subgroup i . If the improvement differentials in mortality 1i   1i  , it means 
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that mortality rate in subgroup i  improves at a faster (slower) than mortality in general 
population. 
However, the results of the parameter estimates, especially the age-specific mortality 
pattern for subpopulation i , ix x   as shown in Figure C.3, are not reasonable – 
mortality rates for medium-educated people are found to be greater than those of low 
education. This inconsistency might be caused for the use of a very short time period 
of our available data on education-specific mortality. 
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Figure C.3: Parameter estimates of the Joint- K model for unisex, male and female 
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C.3 Time series of the mortality time index tK  
We forecast the period indexes by using the univariate autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) processes to project age-specific mortality rates for three 
different groups of education to construct the subgroup-specific life tables. The 
procedure of modelling that fits our observed data involves an iterative five-stage 
process: data preparation, model selection, parameters estimation, model diagnostics 
and forecasting (Makridakis et al., 1998) decribed as follows: 
1) Data preparation 
We first analyse the general pattern of the time series tK  for unisex and both genders 
as illustrated in Figure C.4. There are noticeable downward trends for all types of 
population indicating that the mortality has deteriorated gradually over the years. We 
also consider the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF) that display a typical pattern for a nonstationary process. The ACF 
plots of three groups are slowly decaying to zero.  For the PACF plot, we observe a 
significant spike at only lag 1 and cutting off suddenly thereafter for all groups. Since 
the ARIMA model requires the stationary time series data (i.e. a constant mean, 
variance and autocorrelation through time), we then transform the data to obtain the 
stationary series by taking differences between consecutive observations. The number 
of differencing the time series to achieve stationary is reflected in the d  parameter. In 
our analysis, the first differencing, 1d  , seems to eliminate the nonstationary in 
mean. Our differenced data become stationary as exhibited in Figure C.5. 
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Figure C.4: Time series of tK  
 
Figure C.5: Differenced series of tK  
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2) Model selection (Identification) 
Once the series are stationary, we determine the order of the autoregressive AR  p  
and/or moving average MA  q by looking at the autocorrelation function (ACF) and 
partial autocorrelation (PACF) plots of the differenced series as shown in Figure C.5. 
For the series of unisex group, the ACF plot of the differenced data displays a negative 
spike at only lag 1 and no significant spikes thereafter. There is negative spike at lag 1 
and then tailing off in the PACF plot, which might indicate an MA (1) process. Hence, 
we fit the ARIMA (0,1,1) with a constant. The ACF and PACF plots for males are 
unclear to identify the p and q  parameters. Similarly, for females, there is a negative 
insignificant spike at lag 1 in the ACF but the PACF plot shows the negative 
insignificant spike at lag 1, 2 and 4. Therefore, we are unable to decide what 
appropriate AR  p  and/or MA  q  would be. As a result, we modelled nine models 
based on the combinations of the order p and q  varying between 0 and 2.  
Table C.3: Goodness of fit test statistics of the ARIMA  ,1,p q  
Model 
Unisex Male Female 
AIC BIC RMSE AIC BIC RMSE AIC BIC RMSE 
ARIMA(0,1,0) 191.3 195.2 1.403 193.0 197.0 1.426 200.7 204.7 1.534 
ARIMA(0,1,1) 180.0 185.9 1.235 - 186.1 192.0 1.302 
ARIMA(0,1,2) - 185.9 193.8 1.280 - 
ARIMA(1,1,0) 181.4 187.3 1.251 - 194.9 200.8 1.422 
ARIMA(1,1,2) - 175.8 185.6 1.128 - 
ARIMA(2,1,0) - - 191.5 199.4 1.349 
ARIMA(2,1,1) - 179.5 189.4 1.173 - 
We use the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) to decide the best model. The models are ranked according to their 
AIC and BIC and the one having the lowest information criterion value is the best. 
Table C.3 shows the values of AIC and BIC of the ARIMA  ,1,p q with the 
significance of the parameter estimates for three groups of population. Thus, we 
APPENDIX C  163 
 
 
 
choose the ARIMA(0,1,1) with constant for unisex and female and the ARIMA(1,1,2) 
for male. 
3) Parameters estimation 
We fit the chosen model to our time series data to obtain the parameter estimates. All 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant, as indicated from the t-statistics in 
Table C.1 (see Appendix C.1). The series of mortality index tK  for all population 
(unisex) and female are modelled by an ARIMA (0,1,1) process and an ARIMA (1,1,2) 
process for males. 
4) Model diagnostics 
The evaluation of the model aims to verify that the chosen model is adequate. If the 
model is found to be inadequate, it is necessary to identify an alternative model. 
Ideally, the chosen model should extract all systematic information from the data and 
the part of data unexplained by the model (i.e. the residuals) should be small. These 
checks are usually based on the residuals of the model. One assumption of the ARIMA 
model is that the residuals of the model should be white noise. We can check the 
properties of the residuals by plotting the ACF of the residuals. If all residual 
autocorrelations fall inside the 95% confidence bounds, it indicates the residuals to be 
randomness. The normality of the residual can also be checked by considering the 
normal probability plot. The residuals seem to be a white noise as shown in Figure 
C.6. Also, the ACF plots of the residuals show all correlations within the threshold 
limits and all three histograms seem to be symmetric distribution. This indicates that 
the residuals are behaving like white noise. Additionally, we consider the Root Mean 
Square Error (RMSE) to measure the accuracy of the chosen model. 
The lower RMSE values represent the smaller percentage of error produced by the 
forecasting model. We find that the chosen models, ARIMA(0,1,1) for all population 
(unisex), ARIMA(1,1,2) for male and ARIMA(0,1,1) for female, are the ones with the 
lowest RMSE as shown in Table C.3. We can conclude that these ARIMA models 
perform the best fit with our given data. 
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Figure C.6: Residuals of the ARIMA ( , , )p d q model 
 
5) Projected subgroup-specific life tables 
Next, we use the ARIMA(0,1,1) for unisex and female groups and the ARIMA(1,1,2) 
for male to generate the forecasts of the mortality index tK  during the period 2014-
2083 (see Figure C.2 in Appendix C.1). 
C.4 Age-earnings profile 
In the analysis of income redistribution, we require the salary histories of an individual 
by age, gender and level of education to compute the individual’s contributions, but 
there are no relevant administrative data available. However, the Eurostat Database 
provides the cross-sectional average annual income for the Swedish population by age-
group, gender and level of education as shown in Table C.4. We then estimate the age-
earnings profile for males and females based on the method of linear interpolation. 
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Due to lack of data on income by age-group among level of education, we assume the 
education-specific income for each age is fixed as the percentage of the average 
gender-specific income. For example, the age-earnings income for low-educated 
males, for medium-educated males, for high-educated males is as 92%, 99% and 108% 
of the average income for all ages of males, respectively. 
Table C.4: The average annual income of the Swedish people in 2013 by gender, age-group 
and educational attainment (in EUR) 
Age-group Men Women 
age 18-24 21,956 21,330 
age 25-49 27,804 27,451 
age 50-64 33,231 32,921 
age over 64 24,490 20,620 
All ages  28,323 27,993 
Educational attainment levels  in EUR 
% of all 
ages 
in EUR 
% of all 
ages 
Low education (L) 25,978 92 21,723 78 
Medium education (M) 27,917 99 26,830 96 
High education (H) 30,501 108 30,328 108 
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APPENDIX D 
Appendices to Chapter 5 
D.1 The expected annual payments for different types of the 
pension recipient 
A. The case of the pensioner 
Recalling the formula (5.15), the expected life annuity of 1 monetary unit covering the 
old-age and survivor benefits paid to a pensioner aged rx  in the middle of year t  can 
be decomposed as:  
For 0t  ; 
 
 
1
( , )
2
r r rr
r
r rr
rf rs rc re
x t x t x tx tr rr
r x t
rf rs rc
x t x tx t
p p p p
Y x t p
FB p SB p CB p
  

 
   
  
 
       
  (D.1.1) 
For 1,2,3,..., rt w x  ; 
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 (D.1.2) 
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We then demonstrate the relations of the expected annual payment at a particular age 
and time from the above equation (D.1.1) and (D.1.2). 
At  0t  ;   
     1 1( ,0)
2 2r r r r r rr r
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r x x x x x xx x
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1
2 22
1
2
( ,2)
1
2
r r r rr
r r
r rr
rfrr rs rc re
x x x xx
r rr rr
r x x
rf rs rc
x xx
p p p p p
Y x p p
FB p SB p CB p
   

 
 
    
   
      
  
 
1 1 2 1 22r r s r cr s
rf frr rs s rc c
x x x x xx x
p FB p EPV SB p EPV CB p EPV
    
         
 
 
 ( ,2) ( 1,1)
r
r rr r
r x rY x p Y x    
3t  ; 
 
 
 
3 3 3 33
3
3 33
1
2
( ,3)
1
2
r r r rr
r
r rr
rfrr rs rc re
x x x xx
r rr
r x
rf rs rc
x xx
p p p p p
Y x p
FB p SB p CB p
   
 
 
    
  
      
  
 
      
22 2 3 2 33r r s r cr s
rf frr rs s rc c
x x x x xx x
p FB p EPV SB p EPV CB p EPV
    
         
 
 
 1( ,3) ( 1,2) ( 2,1)r r r
r rr r rr rr r
r x r x x rY x p Y x p p Y x       
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rt w x  ; 
 ( , ) ( 1, 1)
r
r rr r
r r x r rY x w x p Y x w x       
Thus, the actuarial value of the entire annuity pension for a person retired at age rx  
expressed in the formula (5.15) is equivalent to 
   ( 0.5)
0
( , )
r
r
w x
r t
x r
t
EPV Y x t v



     (D.1.3) 
B. The case of the spouse 
Recalling the formula (5.16), the expected life annuity of 1 monetary unit for a spouse 
aged sx t  in the middle of the year h  is given by 
For 0,1,2,..., sh w x t    and 0,1,2,..., rt w x   
1
( , )
2s s s
s ss ss se
s h x t x t h x t hY x t h p p p    
 
   
 
    (D.1.4) 
Let consider the relations of the expected annual payments at a particular time from 
the above formula (D.1.4) 
At  0t  ;  
1
( ,0)
2s s
s ss se
s x t x tY x t p p     
 1t  ; 1 1
1
( ,1) ( 1,0)
2s s s s
s ss ss se ss s
s x t x t x t x t sY x t p p p p Y x t     
 
      
 
 
 2t  ; 2 2 2
1
( ,2) ( 1,1)
2s s s s
s ss ss se ss s
s x t x t x t x t sY x t p p p p Y x t     
 
      
 
 
 3t  ; 3 3 3
1
( ,3) ( 1,2)
2s s s s
s ss ss se ss s
s x t x t x t x t sY x t p p p p Y x t     
 
      
 
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 ( )st w x t   ; ( , ) ( 1, 1 )s
s ss s
s s x t s sY x t w x t p Y x t w x t          
We also illustrate the backward recursion from the maximum reachable age w  to 
some particular age as follows; 
Age  sx t w  ; 
1
( ,0)
2
s ss se
w wY w p p   
Age  1sx t w   ; 1 1
1
( 1,0)
2
s ss se
w wY w p p     
    1 1
1
( 1,1) ( ,0)
2
s ss ss se ss s
w w w wY w p p p p Y w 
 
    
 
 
Age 2sx t w   ; 2 2
1
( 2,0)
2
s ss se
w wY w p p     
    2 1 1 2
1
( 2,1) ( 1,0)
2
s ss ss se ss s
w w w wY w p p p p Y w   
 
     
 
 
    2 1 2
1
( 2,2) ( 1,1)
2
s ss ss ss se ss s
w w w w wY w p p p p p Y w  
 
      
 
 
Age  3sx t w   ; 3 3
1
( 3,0)
2
s ss se
w wY w p p     
    3 2 2 3
1
( 3,1) ( 2,0)
2
s ss ss se ss s
w w w wY w p p p p Y w   
 
     
 
 
    3 2 1 1 3
1
( 3,2) ( 2,1)
2
s ss ss ss se ss s
w w w w wY w p p p p p Y w    
 
      
 
 
    3 2 1 3
1
( 3,3) ( 2,2)
2
s ss ss ss ss se ss s
w w w w w wY w p p p p p p Y w   
 
       
 
 
Then, the actuarial value of the lifetime annuity for a spouse aged sx t  is the 
summation of the discounted annual payments from any time 0,1,2,..., sh w x t    
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to time 0 with the value of 
1
1
v
r


where r  is the annual rate of interest, that can be 
expressed as: 
    ( 0.5)
0
( , )
s
s
w x t
s s h
x t s
h
EPV Y x t h v
 



      (D.1.5) 
The following triangular matrix presents all pension payments to the surviving spouse 
that we construct to calculate the expected present value of the survivor pensions for 
the spouse. 
Table D.1: The algorithm path of the expected annual pension for a surviving spouse 
Age 
Time ( h ) 
0 1  1 ( )sw x t    ( )sw x t   
      
sx t  ( ,0)
s
sY x t  ( ,1)
s
sY x t   ( , 1 )
s
s sY x t w x t     ( , )
s
s sY x t w x t    
1sx t   ( 1,0)
s
sY x t   ( 1,1)
s
sY x t    ( 1, 1 )
s
s sY x t w x t      
      
2w   ( 2,0)sY w  ( 2,1)sY w  ( 2,2)sY w   
1w   ( 1,0)sY w  ( 1,1)sY w     
w  ( ,0)sY w  
    
C. The case of the complete family 
In this case, we suppose the main recipient of the complete family is the spouse aged 
sx t , conditional on that the age of children is cx t . The annuity is payable annually 
until the children have reached the maximum age, M . Recalling the formula (5.17), 
the annuity of 1 monetary unit of the complete family benefits paid to the recipient 
aged sx t  in the middle of year h  can be decomposed as: 
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For 0h  ;   
1 1
( , )
2 2s s s
s ff fc fc
s x t x t x t
Y x t h p p CB p           (D.1.6) 
For 1,2,3,..., 1 ( )ch M x t    ; 
1 1
( , )
2 2s s s s
s ff ff fc fc
s h x t x t h x t h x t h
Y x t h p p p CB p
      
 
     
 
 
1
0
s s
h
ff fc
k x t x t k
k
CB p p

  

        (D.1.7) 
For ( )ch M x t   ; 
1 1 1
2 4 4
( , )
1 1
2 4
s s s
s
s s
ff fc fc
x t h x t h x t h
s ff
s h x t
fs fe
x t h x t h
p p CB p
Y x t h p
SB p SB p
     

   
 
   
   
    
  
 
1
0
1
2 ss s s s
h
ff fc ff fs s
k h x t hx t x t j x t x t h
k
CB p p SB p p EPV

      

        (D.1.8) 
Thus, the actuarial value of the lifetime annuity for the complete family is given by 
    
( )
( 0.5)
0
( , )
c
s
M x t
f f h
sx t
h
EPV Y x t h v
 



     (D.1.9) 
We do the backward recursive by beginning with the last row – the maximum age of 
children, M – to construct the elements of the annual pension shown in Table D.2. 
( ,0) ( ,0)f f s cY M Y x M x    
    
1 1
(1 )
2 4s c s c s c s c
fs fc fc fe
x M x x M x x M x x M x
p SB p CB p SB p       
       
 
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     
1 1
(1 ) 1
2 4s c s c
fs fe
x M x x M x
p SB p CB SB         
where  
s c s c
fc fe
x M x x M x
p p
   
  represents the probability of dying of the spouse aged 
s cx M x  . 
Table D.2: The algorithm path of the expected annual pension for a complete family 
Children 
age 
Time ( h ) 
0 1  1 ( )cM x t    ( )cM x t   
      
cx t  ( ,0)
f
sY x t  ( ,1)
f
sY x t   ( , 1 )
f
s cY x t M x t     ( , )
f
s cY x t M x t    
1cx t   ( 1,0)
f
sY x t   ( 1,1)
f
sY x t    ( 1, 1 )
f
s cY x t M x t      
      
2M   ( 2,0)fY M   ( 2,1)fY M   ( 2,2)fY M    
1M   ( 1,0)fY M   ( 1,1)fY M      
M  ( ,0)fY M  
 
  
Some elements of the row 1M   and 2M   are illustrated as examples: 
1 1
1
( 1,0) ( 1 ,0) (1 )
2s c s c
f f ff fc
s c x M x x M x
Y M Y x M x p p CB              
1 1
1
( 1,1) ( 1 ,1) ( ,0)
2s c s c
f f ff f fc
s c x M x x M x
Y M Y x M x p Y M CB p               
2 2
1
( 2,1) ( 2 ,1) ( 1,0)
2s c s c
f f ff f fc
s c x M x x M x
Y M Y x M x p Y M CB p                
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Then, we get the general formulae and 0,1,2,..., ck x t  : 
For 0h  ; 
1 1
( , )
2 2s c s c s c
s ff fc fc
x M k x x M k x x M k x
Y M k h p p CB p              
For 1,2,3,..., 1 ( )ch M x t    ; 
( , ) ( 1, 1)
s c s c
f ff f fc
x M k x x M k x
Y M k h p Y M k h CB p
     
         
For ( )ch M x t   ; 
1
( , ) ( 1, 1)
2s c s c
f ff f fc
x M k x x M k x
Y M k h p Y M k h CB p              
D.2 Comparison of the unisex annuity divisors for the 
different types of pension benefits payable in the middle of 
the year 
As the annuities of the two methods – the Italian rule and the direct method – are 
payable annually in the different time point which is at beginning of each year for the 
Italian rule and in the mid-year for the direct method, when we compare the annuity 
divisors between two types it might not reflect the differences. We then show the 
example values of the annuity divisors for the case of only old-age pension and the 
old-age combined with survivors’ benefits from the Italian rule and our proposed 
model in which those life annuities are payable annually in the mid-year according to 
the following formulae: 
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• For the old-age pension, the actuarial value of a life annuity of 1 monetary unit 
per year payable annually in the middle of the year throughout the lifetime of the 
pensioner now aged rx  is given by 
Old-age ( 0.5)
0.5
0
r
rr
w x
t
t xx
t
EPV p v




      (D.2.1) 
Under the assumption of a uniform distribution of deaths (UDD), for integer rx  and 
for 0,1,2,...t  we can express 0.5 rt xp as 
 1 1 1
0.5 0.5
0 0
0.5
(1 0.5 )
r r
r r r r r
r
t t
x t x t
t x x h x t x h x t
xh h
l l
p p p p q
l
 
  
    
 

        (D.2.2) 
Substituting (D.2.2) in (D.2.1) and thus 
 1Old-age ( 0.5)
0
0.5r
r r
r
r
w x
x t x t t
x
xt
l l
EPV v
l

   


     (D.2.3) 
The unisex annuity divisors for the old-age pension is 
  
, ,
Old-age Old-age
Old-age
2
r r
r
x male x female
x
EPV EPV
EPV

    (D.2.4) 
• For the case of the Italian rule, the expected present value of a life annuity for 
the old-age and survivor benefits payable yearly in the mid-year can be modified from 
the formulae in Section 5.2 as follows: 
Italian Old-age Survivor
, ,,r rrx g x gx g
EPV EPV EPV     (D.2.5) 
 , 1,Survivor ( 0.5) spouse
, 0.5, , 1.5,
0 ,
0.5r
r r
r r
r
w x
x t g x t g t
x g g x t g x t g x t g
t x g
l l
EPV q v a
l
 

   
    


    (D.2.6) 
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 , 1 ,
spouse
1.5,
1 ,1
0.5g
g g
g
w x t
x t g x t g
x t g
x t g
l l
a v
l

    

  
       
 
  

    (D.2.7) 
Thus,    
Italian Italian
, ,Italian
2
r r
r
x male x female
x
EPV EPV
EPV

   (D.2.8) 
where  
 
 
1 21.5 2
0.5 0.5
0.5 11
1 1 1
r rr r r
r r
r r rr r
x t x tx t x t x t
x t x t
x t x t x tx t x t
l ll l l
q p
l l ll l
       
   
      
 
      

under the UDD assumption; 
g  denotes the gender of the pensioner with     ,g male m female f  and 
g  is the gender of his/her spouse,   if g ,  if gg f m m f    . 
• For our proposed model by using the direct method in the computation, the 
annuity divisors are calculated according to the formula (5.15) in Section 5.3 and the 
unisex divisor is  
, ,
2
r r
r
x male x female
x
EPV EPV
EPV

    (D.2.9) 
The average (unisex) annuity divisors of the three cases in a selected year of 2015 are 
shown in Figure D.1. Clearly, the divisors of the life annuity of the old-age pension 
(only pensioner) are lower than those values of the Italian rule covering two lives 
(pensioner and surviving spouse) and the direct method involving more than two lives 
(pensioner, spouse and children), respectively. The annuity divisors of the direct 
method are higher than those values of the Italian rule with a range of 0.60-0.82%, just 
only 0.14-0.15 units, at different ages of retirement while the gap between the divisors 
of the direct method and the old-age pension is between 1.07 and 1.10 units, around 
4.9-6.4%.  
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Figure D.1: Average annuity divisors of the pension paid in the mid-year of the old-age 
pension, the Italian rule and the direct method in a selected year of 2015 
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APPENDIX E 
Appendices to Chapter 6 
E.1 One-year transition probabilities 
• An active individual 
The fundamental relations of one-year probabilities and transition probabilities of an 
active individual age x  are defined as follows: 
aa ai a
x x xp p p        (E.1.1) 
aa ai a
x x xq q q        (E.1.2) 
1a ax xp q        (E.1.3) 
   ai ai ai
x x xp q w        (E.1.4) 
   1aa aa aix x xp q w        (E.1.5) 
where aa
xp  is the probability that an active person aged x  is alive in an active state at 
age 1x ; 
 aa
xq  is the probability that an active person aged x  dies in an active state at age 
1x ; 
ai
xp is the probability that an active person aged x  is alive in a disabled state at 
age 1x ; 
ai
xq  is the probability that an active person aged x  dies in a disabled state at 
age 1x ; 
a
xp  is the probability that an active person aged x  is alive at age 1x ; 
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a
xq  is the probability that an active person aged x  dies within one year; 
ai
xw is the probability that an active person aged x  becomes disabled within one 
year. 
• A disabled individual 
The one-year conditional probabilities related to a disabled individual age x  are hold 
in the following relations: 
ii ia i
x x xp p p         (E.1.6) 
ii ia i
x x xq q q        (E.1.7) 
1i ix xp q        (E.1.8) 
ia ia ia
x x xp q w        (E.1.9) 
1ii ii iax x xp q w        (E.1.10) 
where ii
xp  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  is alive in a disabled state 
at age 1x ; 
 ii
xq  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  dies in a disabled state at 
age 1x ; 
 ia
xp  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  is alive in an active state 
at age 1x ; 
 ia
xq  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  dies in an active state at 
age 1x ; 
 i
xp  is the probability that a disabled person aged  x  is alive at age 1x ; 
 i
xq  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  dies within one year; 
 ia
xw  is the probability that a disabled person aged x  recover to an active state 
within one year. 
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E.2  The quadratic equation of ii
xq  
The parabolic function of ii
xq  is expressed as: 
 
2
0ii iix x xA q Bq q      (E.2.1) 
where  1 3 1 21
ia
x x xA k k v v k k w     
  
and       3 2 1 1 11 1ia iax x x x x x x x x xB k v v k w k v q k q v v w v          
Following the quadratic formula to solve the equation (E.2.1), there are two real 
solutions with the positive values. However, we obtain the unique solution that exists 
the (0,1) interval as follows: 
     
2 4
2
xii
x
B B Aq
q
A
  
    (E.2.2) 
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E.3  Model selection for the disability prevalence rates 
We compare all possible model variants for males and females separately. Table E.1 
illustrates the parameter estimates and AIC values for six model variants. 
Table E.1: Model selection for disability prevalence rates: parameter estimates and goodness-
of-fit test 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a 
Male       
α (intercept) -2.2383*** -4.3688*** -1.1546*** -1.1299*** -1.4001*** 1.9380*** 
β1 (age)  0.0496*** -0.1208*** -0.1209*** -0.0972*** -0.4964*** 
β2 (age2)   0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0014*** 0.0179*** 
β3 (age3/1000)     0.0050* -0.2791*** 
β4 (age4/1000)      0.0017*** 
β5 (t)    -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0038** 
AIC 189,561 177,769 174,377 174,369 174,359 174,325 
Female       
α (intercept) -2.1851*** -3.9831*** -2.4081*** -2.3712*** -3.5759*** -1.1506* 
β1 (age)  0.0448*** -0.0430*** -0.0432*** 0.0657*** -0.2339*** 
β2 (age2)   0.0011*** 0.0011*** -0.0019*** 0.0111*** 
β3 (age3/1000)     0.0259*** -0.2103*** 
β4 (age4/1000)      0.0015*** 
β5 (t)    -0.0057*** -0.0056*** -0.0057*** 
AIC 191,443 183,891 183,148 183,143 183,087 183,082 
Source: Own source using the LFS dataset and the logistic regression in the equation (6.13) 
Note: a is the model selected for the estimation of the disability prevalence rates.  
 AIC denotes the Akaike Information Criterion.  
 * 0.10;   ** 0.05;   *** 0.01p value p value p value       
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E.4 Model selection for the one-year recovery rates 
We compare all six possible model variants as shown in Table E.2 that exhibits the 
parameter estimates and AIC value for each model. 
Table E.2: Model selection for one-year recovery rates: parameter estimates and goodness-
of-fit test 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 5 Model 6 
α (intercept) -2.4785*** -0.3389** -0.8770** -1.1705*** -0.7225* -1.0419*** 
β1 (gender) -0.0523 -0.1979** -0.2252** -0.2379** -0.2253** -0.2389** 
β2 (age)  -0.0514*** -0.0177  -0.0191  
β3 (age2)   -0.0004* -0.0007*** -0.0004* -0.0007*** 
time     -0.0206 -0.0202 
AIC 5286 4898 4895 4894 4893 4892 
Source: Own source using the LFS dataset and the logistic regression in the equation (6.15) 
Note: a is the model selected for the estimation of the disability prevalence rates.  
 AIC denotes the Akaike Information Criterion.  
 * 0.10;   ** 0.05;   *** 0.01p value p value p value       
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